

POLICY NETWORKS AND DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE

A Thesis

Presented to the

Faculty of

San Diego State University

In Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the Degree

Master of Arts

in

Political Science

by

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Summer 2017

SAN DIEGO STATE UNIVERSITY

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POLICY NETWORKS AND DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE




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DEDICATION

To my family, for having transformed my dream into their dream.

"Each type of society has a specific form of exercising power and counter-power. It should not surprise us that in the network society, social power is primarily exercised by and through networks. The question is, though, which kind of networks? "

Manuel Castells, ***A Network Theory of Power*** (2011).

ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS

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by

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Master of Arts in Political Science

San Diego State University, 2017

The purpose of this thesis is to present a network theory of public policy, and a kind of policy analysis that might be relevant for understanding governance and how stakeholders' governance may influence policy outputs. To do so, I define policy networks as a set of stable relationships of interdependency among stakeholders, based on a framework composed of policy processes, sets of issues, types of stakeholders, and relational ties. Then, I present a theory of political power based on the inclusion/exclusion of stakeholders representing rival/competing interests, and on their position within a policy network. To empirically test it, I utilize the affiliation tie – formed when interest groups participated as witnesses in public hearings – to measure the influence of representative policy networks in the approval of important legislation in the mortgage and agricultural policies between 2005 and 2014. Besides, I utilize a socio-metric survey and interviews to infer the existence of each policy network. The findings confirm that – regardless of the party which won the elections – the struggle among rival/competing interests present within policy networks shapes decisions in Congress. Policy networks have become an important form of exercising political power in our society, and an essential part of our democracy.

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PREFACE

The idea for this thesis emerged 12 years ago, when I first observed the dynamic of stakeholders participating in the formulation process in the Brazilian Congress. At that time, I got intrigued about the difference between my perception as a public servant of the Urban Development Committee, and the pre-concept that I had about lobbying as a citizen. In my eyes, the policy network formed by interest groups inside the committee was fundamental to achieve the best outputs possible for the moment. These stakeholders - who knew each other very well - brought critical information, and were able to block legislation through congressmen from different parties. With time, I understood that the main quarrel was much more among them, than among congressmen. The latter have more incentive to have things done, even if it is not exactly what they want, to present a result to media and to their constituency, getting the credit for that. But the former have interest in each article of legislation, and the impact of it in their businesses or entitlements. So, having a place at the table for these rival and competing interests, allowing them to debate and suggest policy, is critical to legislation change. This thesis is my way to test this perception in a totally different domain, one in which I have no bias nor knowledge about any stakeholder. If this perception is right, it is supposed to work in any democratic country. So, the U.S. Congress, with its 228 years of interest groups tradition, constitutes the perfect laboratory for an empirical test.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank first my colleagues from the Brazilian Congress for betting on me. It has been a period of intense learning, not only in the scientific field, but also on a professional and personal level. I am sure that, in a way or another, this knowledge will strengthen our institution.

To my SDSU professors, I would like to thank Professor Doc. Brian Adams for believing in my ideas, and for inserting me into the academic debate. Thanks to Professor Doc. Ronald King for showing the way to the empirical analysis. Without your insights nothing would be done. Thanks also to Professor Doc. Salvador Espinosa for bringing me the public administration side of the debate. Finally, I would like to thank Nathan Hillman, from the SDSU Writing Center, for patiently reviewing this paper.

To my old friend Thiago Bastos, thanks for the conversations and for the help with the statistics. To my new friend Doctor Salvatore Loguercio, thanks for showing me how developed the network analysis field is. Namaste!

Finally, I would like to thank the J. Keith Behner and Catherine M. Stiefel Program in Brazil, and the Terhune Political Science Scholarship for the funding support.

Thank you very much, everyone.

Ricardo Modesto Vieira

San Diego, April 14, 2017.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The growing complexity of social problems and the increasing interdependence in solving them make governments more and more related with the activity of a vast and complex network of both non-profit and for-profit stakeholders. Coordinating these stakeholders' interdependencies and leveraging their activity becomes the way to deliver public goods and services in an efficient and effective manner, as important to governmental institutions as turning inputs into outputs. This governing through policy networks has become an important form of exercising political power in our network society.¹

The purpose of this thesis is to present a network theory of public policy, and a kind of policy analysis that might be relevant for understanding governance and how governance may influence policy outputs and outcomes.² To do so, a theoretical approach is presented in Chapter 2, and an empirical approach is presented in Chapter 3, and it is applied in two case studies in Chapters 4 and 5. The presented policy network theory is based on four components, and on three forms of exercising political power through policy networks. The

¹ To Osborne and Gaebler (1993) there is a new paradigm in which government's third-party partners deliver even more public services than the own government. At the local level in U.S., for example, public services are delivered only 40% by government agencies, while private agencies - both nonprofit and for-profit - delivered 60%. The great challenge now is to find a way to comprehend, and to manage, the reinvented government we have produced

² In this research, the outputs are considered the results of the policy processes, and the outcomes are considered the impact of these results in a determined society.

empirical study is based on one specific process – the formulation process³ – and it is delimited by two sets of issues related to mortgage and agriculture policies. From these initial conditions, I investigate the influence of representative policy networks in important legislation approved by the U.S. Congress between 2005 and 2014.⁴

The presented theory intends to fulfill the theoretical gap in the literature by presenting a clear and operable set of concepts to be used in empirical approaches.⁵ Studying policy networks as a set of stable relationships of interdependency among stakeholders, who are tied around policy processes and sets of issues in our network society, will provide an improvement in our explanatory capacity to understand governance and how governance may influence policy outputs. Policy networks and network governance are now far from being only a metaphor, so finding patterns about what kinds of networks matter to understand and predict policy outputs is an important contribution to literature in both fields of political science and public administration.

Table 1. Policy Network Components and Related Forms of Power

<i>Policy Network Components</i>	<i>Categorization</i>	<i>Related Forms of Exercising Political Power</i>
Policy Processes ⁶	Agenda Process	Governmental institutions as a process owner and a central node
	Formulation Process	
	Implementation Process	
	Monitoring/Control Process	

³ The formulation or policymaking process is one of the most important and prolific areas of study in American political science and public administration.

⁴ The period of 10 years is a time considered enough by the specialized literature to register major change in policy.

⁵ The presented framework is a combination of elements from: (1) the 'interest intermediation school': focus on influence policy outputs/outcomes; (2) the 'governance school': stable relationships based on non-hierarchical coordination; (3) Castell's network theory of power; (4) and a method based on Social Network Analysis.

⁶ Four kind of policy processes are presented as options for policy analyses: agenda setting, formulation, implementation, and monitoring process. Each specific process must have a government institution as its 'formal owner', in order to provide a central node in which other stakeholders are gathered around, forming a policy network.

Policy Issues ⁷	Concentrated benefits and concentrated costs	
	Distributed benefits and concentrated costs	
	Concentrated benefits and distributed costs	
	Distributed benefits and distributed costs	
	Policies (housing, agriculture, environmental, healthcare, energy, etc.)	
	Specific set of issues based on a policy	
Policy Stakeholders ⁸	Economic Interest	
	Social Interest	
	Technological/Scientific Interest	
	Governmental Institutions	
Policy Relational Ties	Affiliation	The inclusion/exclusion of stakeholders, and the stakeholder's position in a policy network
	Information Exchange	
	Advice Exchange	
	Deliberation	
	Collaboration	

The empirical analysis presented in Chapter 3 is focused on why some important public policies fail to be approved in Congress and others succeed. Ideally, Congress is a social sound box designed to reflect the will of the majority in House, and to represent regional and state differences in Senate. It is also a stage in which the many different interests and the many different views of the Nation are unified: *E Pluribus Unum*. However, since the iron triangle metaphor, powerful interest lobbying is considered by the literature as the driving force behind politics in Washington, and responsible for public policies' failure to be approved and others' success. New empirical research also support this claim that

⁷ In terms of options to define a set of issues, the classification proposed by Lowi (1972) and complemented by Wilson (1995) is presented as a guide to types of policies. For the empirical model, the set of issues exemplified was given by the taxonomies used by the U.S. Congress committees, and by the Congressional Quarterly (2005-14), complemented by specialized academic authors on each set of issues.

⁸ Policy stakeholders are classified by their type of interest, and they must be related with the set of issues, as well as they must have representation in the same level of the government institution responsible for the policy process.

polymaking in Congress is dominated by powerful business organizations and a small number of affluent Americans.⁹

Based on the proposed policy network theory and network theory of political power, I provide a different view of this question in which the participation of the organized society in Congress' formulation process is seen not as a factor of degeneration of government performance, nor as a mere political manipulation by economic power; but as an indispensable factor for the passage of important legislation. In our network society – in which political power is exercised by and through policy networks – the presence of a representative policy network is supposed to influence legislation approval, increasing the likelihood of an output in the legislative process. So, if there is a representative policy network present, then important legislation is more likely to pass. The stronger the presence, the more likely the approval of important legislation.

'Representativeness' is defined as a form of exercising power which operates through the inclusion/exclusion of stakeholders representing rival/competing¹⁰ interests in policy networks. The broad assumption of the theoretical model is that network structures drive explanation as independent variables about policy outputs. So, 'representative policy network' is presented as an independent variable to predict the approval of important legislation in Congress, and it is operationalized by the presence/absence of stakeholders representing rival/competing interests in Congress' public hearings. Therefore, policy

⁹ Gilens and Page (2014) tested four theories of American politics. The results provide substantial support for theories of Economic-Elite Domination and for theories of Biased Pluralism, but not for theories of Majoritarian Electoral Democracy or Majoritarian Pluralism. To the authors, reality is best captured by mixed theories in which both individual economic elites and business organizations groups play a substantial part in affecting public policy, but the general public and the "median voter" has little or no independent influence.

¹⁰ Rival interests are represented by the dichotomy between economic and social interests, and competing interests by the competition among stakeholders inside one of these interests.

stakeholders and hearings form a two-mode affiliation network in which connections among stakeholders are based on linkages established through hearings.

The empirical research is delimited by two set of issues: the mortgage policy, and the agricultural policy. The mortgage crises of 2008 is one of the most important issues in the studied period; and the agricultural policy has been a classic illustration in literature about how interest groups captured government in order to maintain their privileges. Besides, the mortgage policy provides a case in which policy benefits a well-defined group but a cost to another well-defined group.¹¹ So, it is expected to generate continuing organized rivalry between economic and social interests. On the other hand, the agricultural policy benefits a well-defined group but impose, or appears to impose, no visible costs on any other well defined group.¹² So, it tends to attract the support of the stakeholders representing the benefited group and the opposition of none (Wilson 1995).

Since the study is based on group and institutional level of analysis, the unit of analysis is an entity consisting of a collection of stakeholders and the linkage among them during time. This unit of analysis is denominated policy games. A policy game is composed by a set of public hearings, a set of stakeholders (hearings participants), a set of legislative inputs (proposals), and a set of legislative outputs (proposal is approved or not by committees, chambers, and sanctioned). In order increase the number of cases, each Congress term was divided in four policy games which correspond to a semester. Therefore, there is one specific formulation process – the U.S. Congress legislative process – two sets

¹¹ In the mortgage policy, they are the financial industry, the real estate industry, consumers and minorities associations in the core of the mortgage policy network, competing in the U.S. Congress legislative process to influence policymaking.

¹² In agriculture, they are general farmers associations, Midwest and Southern crops farmers associations, dairy and meat producers' associations in the core of the agriculture policy network – and a host of environmental and conservationists groups, food consumers, advocates for the rural and urban poor, and for global food aid – competing to influence the agricultural policy.

of issues – based on the mortgage and on the agriculture policy – a specific set of stakeholders based on each set of issues – and one specific kind of relational tie – the affiliation tie provided by the participation of these stakeholders in Congress' hearings. From these initial conditions,¹³ I investigate the influence of representative policy networks in important legislation approved by the U.S. Congress between 2005 and 2014.

Through the specialized literature in each set of issues, I identified a competing claim which intend to confirm or not if policymaking is dominated by powerful business organizations and a small number of affluent Americans. In the mortgage case, there is empirical evidence to support theories of biased pluralism and economic-elite domination as a causal explanation to policymaking in Congress. So, this 'economic-elite interest' variable is measured through how the presence of stakeholders representing only economic interests in hearings varies, and relating this variation with important legislation approved or not in each Congress term. In the agricultural case, there is no identified dichotomy between economic and social interests, but there is the claim that 'local farmer's interests' are more important than Washington groups in legislation approval, due to the expansion of the network and the disunity of the interest groups. This variable is measured through how the presence of stakeholders representing local interests varies in hearings, and relating this variation with important legislation approved or not. Both the 'economic-elite' interests' and the 'local farmers' interests' provide a test to American democracy.

The importance of the legislation approved and not approved is given by the Congressional Quarterly (2005-14) in each set of issues. The outputs measured are the approval of legislation by committees, by one of the chambers – House or Senate – the

¹³ It is important to highlight that – by choosing a policy process, a set of issues, and a kind of tie – I also determine the set of stakeholders and, consequently, the policy network. To minimize this influence and increase reliability, I utilized only the set of issues which are presented as the most important in the period by the Congressional Quarterly (2005-14).

approval by both chambers, and the sanctioned law. Thus, this research intends to investigate the influence of representative policy networks in important legislation approved in the period by measuring how policy networks vary in terms of the presence/absence of rival/competing stakeholders in public hearings, and relate this variation with important outputs approved or not in each Congress term.¹⁴ Besides the constitution of a representative policy network and legislation approval, one more variable is common to both cases: partisan majority interest. Pragmatically, if there is a partisan majority supporting an important proposal then important legislation is more likely to be approved. This variable is analyzed through the alignment of partisan control of Congress' chambers, and the presidency. Therefore, testing these possible causes – (1) there is a representative policy network constituted,¹⁵ (2) there is just a majority party acting, (3) there are economically-elite stakeholders acting, or (4) there are local farmers acting – and the null – (5) there is no relationship between policy networks constituted and important legislation approved – will provide an improvement in our explanatory capacity to understand why legislation is approved or not, and an increase in our capacity to predict outputs in Congress.

¹⁴ Theoretically, joint participation in events not only provides the opportunity for actors to interact, but also increases the probability that direct pair-wise ties (such as acquaintanceship and friendship) will develop between actors. Overlap in group membership allows for the flow of information between groups, and perhaps coordination of the groups' actions. (Wasserman and Faust 1999, 293). But, in order to check if there is in fact a policy network and not a group of loose group players, two other kind of relational ties based on flow – information and advice exchange – and two kind based on interaction – dialogue and collaboration among stakeholders – are investigated in the empirical model to infer the existence of a policy network constituted in Congress. So, the stakeholders which were more assiduous in participate in hearing were also included in a survey which tries to measure these relational ties.

¹⁵ Policy networks are not just made ad hoc for a specific policy making process, instead they are more like informal institutions. So, the constituted policy network is a stable horizontal set of interrelationships of interdependency among stakeholders, whose central node is a governmental institution, in a set of policy games through history. In this context, the simple fact of being in or out of a policy network constitutes a form of exercising political power.

Figure 1. Mortgage Case Variables





Figure 2. Agriculture Case Variables



CHAPTER 2

A GUIDE TO POLICY NETWORK CONCEPTS

In the past decade there was a shift in vocabulary, and terms like 'policy network' and 'governance' have come to dominate academia (Hajer and Wagenaar 2003; Hwang and Moon 2009) and became commonplace in civil service. The increase of academic articles, however, didn't resolve the Babel Tower identified by Borzel (1998), in which "different authors have used similar labels to describe different phenomena, or different labels have been used for similar phenomena" (Van Waarden 1992). There is no universally accepted understanding of either policy networks or network governance (Lewis 2011). There remains less agreement on whether it is a useful metaphor, a method, an analytical tool, or a theory (Borzel 1998). As a result, differences of opinion may merely reflect differences in definition (Van Waarden 1992).

Maybe the network is, as Riles describes, both a descriptor of social relations and a descriptor of itself – it is both a model and an object, and it stands both for itself and for something beyond itself (Lewis 2011). Nevertheless, it is necessary to clarify unclear network concepts (Borzel 1998), and conflicting network terminologies (Lewis 2011) which have been used in public administration and political science in order to propose a policy network theory and a model to empirical approaches. It is not the purpose to unravel the linguistic chaos resulting from the development of these two parallel streams of literature about network, but to investigate if there is a minimal level of shared consensus concerning policy network concepts, and then to propose sounder definitions when possible.

NETWORK ANALYSIS, SOCIAL NETWORK, NETWORK APPROACH, AND NETWORK THEORY

"Network analysis comes in many guises. It is common to all the social science disciplines. The vast literature ranges from social network analysis (Scott 2000) to the network society created by the information revolution (Castells 2000), from the actor-centered networks of technological diffusion (Callon, Law and Ripp 1986) to cross-cultural analysis (Lin 1999)" (Rhodes 2006). Beyond being common to all social sciences, network analysis is also applied to other diverse fields, like traffic analysis, economics, public choice, game theory, and public health (O'Toole 1997; Passmore 2011). The broader concept of 'network' is an interconnected system or group of things, such as computers, television stations, terminals, roads, tubes, lines, nerves, and people. As Wasserman and Faust (1999, 6) explain, the fundamental difference between a social network explanation and a non-network explanation is the inclusion of concepts and information on relationships among units in a study. So, properties of the network rather than properties of its members drives the explanation (Dowding 1995), as independent variables.

The use of network to connote complex sets of relationships between people have been praxis for more than 50 years in a systematic way in the field of sociology. "Social network analysis has moved from being a suggestive metaphor to an analytic approach to a paradigm, with its own theoretical statements, methods, social network analysis software, and researchers" (Passmore 2011). In political science, policy network analysis is the most common specie of network analysis (Rhodes 2006), and has assumed great importance in Europe and America (Dowding 1995). But the increase in the use of network analysis (Hwang and Moon 2009) did not help to clarify basic concepts.

Figure 4 shows concepts of 'policy network' used in the three fields. It is notable that the social network concept utilized in sociology is more precise and operational than the concepts suggested by O'Toole (1997) in public administration, and Rhodes (2006) in

political science. The last two authors mixed points about stakeholders, and pre-conceptions about relationships in their concepts. Researchers of these three fields use 'network' as a kind of social or organizational network; the idea of relationships or interconnections is also present, as well as the idea of interdependency, even though it is not expressed in Rhodes' definition.

Table 2. Network Definitions

Passmore 2011	Borgatti and Halgin 2011	O'Toole 1997	Rhodes 2006
A social network is a social structure made up of individuals (or organizations) called "nodes", which are tied (connected) by one or more specific types of interdependency.	A network consists of a set of actors or nodes along with a set of ties of a specified type that link them. The ties interconnect through shared end points to form paths that indirectly link nodes that are not directly tied.	Networks are structures of interdependence involving multiple organizations or parts thereof, where one unit is not merely the formal subordinate of the others in some larger hierarchical arrangement.	Networks are one institutional setting in which public and private actors interact. Network are structures that can constrain or facilitate action.

According to social network tradition, the pattern of ties in a network yields a particular structure, and nodes occupy positions within this structure. Being necessarily structural, networks are distinguished from one another by the relations between the actors. These different structural features of different networks can be examined by a number of mathematical techniques. Measures – like centrality and density – may stand as independent variables, for they are measures of characteristics of the lines between the dots and are not characteristics of the dots themselves (Dowding 1995). Much of the theoretical wealth of network analysis consists of characterizing network structures and node positions and relating these to outcomes (Borgatti and Halgin 2011).

"Social network analysis certainly can claim to have the best developed set of mathematical concepts, methods, and specialized software for network analysis" (Lewis 2011). Since the mathematical approach to network analysis has the potential to define structural properties of networks and structural attributes of actors in more than

metaphorical terms (Wasserman and Faust 1999), it is not a surprise that these potential formal mathematical techniques of networks analysis has been widely explored in the field of policy analysis so far (Adam and Kriesi 2007; Borzel 1998).

Following this reasoning, one can note that the social network concept is a broader concept of networked people than the ones used in political science and public administration by the simple fact that there are social phenomena which are neither political or government related. So, policy network analysis is a specific kind of social network analysis, and it is composed of some general parts, shared with sociology, and some particular parts, specific to the study of political phenomena.

At this point, it is clear that public administration and political science must utilize the sociological network tradition in empirical analysis (Dowding 1995; Rethemeyer and Hatmaker 2008). Actually, this is already happening. In the last decade, the concerns of political science and public administration, centered on the power issues that accompany network governance, have been more frequently combined with social network analysis, centered on analyzing the social structure of networks (Lewis 2011).

Empirical study of policy networks using network analysis as a method has been called the 'network approach' by political science and public administration authors. Both quantitative and qualitative network approaches take networks as analytical tools, and these two methodological approaches are not mutually exclusive but are rather complementary (Borzel 1998). Mixed-method research design – combining Social Network Analysis (SNA) to describe and Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) to explain¹⁶ outputs – are also being used (Fischer 2011).

¹⁶ This allows adding an element of potential causal explanation to SNA, while SNA indicators allow for a systematic description of the cases to be compared by QCA.

The fact is that the 'network approach' uses mainly social network analysis as a tool for public policy research. The terms 'network analysis' and 'network approach' can be used interchangeably to determine an analytical method focused on information about relationships among units in a public policy. The kind of information can vary among researchers, but the mixed-method seem to be the most promising approach to recent empirical works on policy network research (Fischer 2011).

There is a difference between 'network approach' in public administration and 'policy network analysis' in political science. Because of the normative knowledge¹⁷ focus of public administration, the network approach contribute to the improvement of the open and democratic processes in policy networks (Klijn and Koppenjan 2000). In contrast, to Rhodes (2006), policy network analysis stresses how networks limit participation in policy processes: deciding which issues will be included and excluded from the agenda; shaping the behavior of actors through the rules of the game; and substituting public accountability for private government. So, to some authors, it is a way to enhance participation and democracy; to others, it is about stability, privilege and continuity.

The policy network approach is more an analytical toolbox than a theory (Adam and Kriesi 2007; Borzel 1998, 254; Dowding 1995, 157; Wasserman and Faust 1999, 17), but it not possible to disregard the attempts to provide 'meso-level' theories to network approaches (Dowding 1995). The 'interest intermediation school' and the 'governance school' are the main examples cited in the literature¹⁸ by Borzel (1998), Adam and Kriesi

¹⁷ Evaluation and prescription play an important role in public administration. This value-laden research – that is more concerned in what ought to be instead what it is – permeates studies about policy network in this field.

¹⁸ Rhodes (2006) cites also policy network as a reform approach to network management in public sector, and Hwang and Moon (2009) cites policy approach as tools of government in network management. Since both are related only to public administration and network management, they were not considered as a 'meso-level' theory to network approach.

(2007), Hwang and Moon (2009), and, in a certain way, by Dowding (1995) and Rhodes (2006).

The 'interest intermediation school' – also cited as 'the Rhodes' model' (Adam and Kriesi 2007; Dowding 1995) – interprets policy network as a generic term for different forms of relationships between interest groups and the state. Policy networks are autonomous, self-governing and resistant to government steering; but they are also an analytical tool for examining institutionalized exchange relations between the state and civil society. Since there are a great variety of policy networks, it is necessary various typologies to capture the different forms of relations (Adam and Kriesi 2007). Whereas pluralist concepts stress the wide range of actors involved in policy making and the resulting competition among them, corporatist concepts point to the cooperation between few and central actors. By using a more general and neutral concept such as 'policy network', corporatism can be considered as being only one type of network,¹⁹ and compared on 'network dimensions' with other types of state-industry relations found in the literature, such as clientelism, pluralism or 'iron triangles' (Van Waarden 1992).

The problem with the intermediation school is the focus on description, what makes policy network a metaphor; and, as Dowding (1995) noted, the metaphor does not even form the centerpiece of explanation. Besides, the typology does not distinguish dependent and independent variables; and there is no agreement about the self-organizing and self-governing suggested characteristics of policy networks, since public administration authors advocate that this cooperation is not spontaneous or simple, and it is necessary government action to make it work (Klijjn and Koppenjan 2000).

¹⁹For some of author, the network approach presents an alternative to both the pluralist and the corporatist model (Van Waarden 1992).

Beyond policy network as a characterization of public-private relations, there is the 'governance school' which conceives of policy networks as a mechanism of mobilizing political resources in situations where these resources are dispersed between public and private actors. The 'governance school' views policy network as both an analytical concept and a model. In this view, policy networks are best understood as a web of relatively stable relationships which mobilize resources so that collective action can be orchestrated towards the solution of a common policy (Borzel 1998). The same idea is presented in Adam and Kriesi (2007): policy networks constitute stable patterns of social relations between interdependent actors, which take shape around policy. And in Klijn and Koppenjan (2000): the network approach assumes that policy is made in complex interaction processes between a large number of interdependent actors which takes place within networks. These actors are mutually dependent so policy can only be realized on the basis of co-operation.

The two cited schools are not mutually exclusive. While the interest intermediation school conceives of policy networks as a generic concept which applies to all kinds of relations between public and private actors; the governance school conceives policy networks as a specific form of public-private interaction in public policy, based on non-hierarchical co-ordination.²⁰ While British and American scholars conceive policy network as a model of state/society relations in a given issue area, Germans treat policy networks as an alternative form to hierarchy and market (Borzel 1998).

To sum up, in political science and public administration, the 'network' has often been used metaphorically to describe contemporary government-society interactions, or to describe a shadow structure of interests that affects policy through interconnections (Lewis 2011). In both schools 'network analysis' or 'network approach' is still highly descriptive and

²⁰ There is still other objections, like the role of public actors within networks, which are considered to be the same as any other organization, neglecting their role as guardian of the public interest (Klijn and Koppenjan 2000; Rhodes 2006).

does not provide explanations about policy outcomes (Borzel 1998; Dowding 1995; Klijn and Koppenjan 2000). Besides, the governance school is still a tool box rather than a theory in strict sense (Borzel 1998). As Rhodes (2006) attests, there are many different meso-level theories in policy networks.²¹ This prolificacy, however, did not form a solid theoretical body of knowledge. As a result of this lack of theoretical framework, concepts are unclear and there is no adequate connection between these theoretical concepts and sound methodological operationalization (Adam and Kriesi 2007; Borzel 1998; Klijn and Koppenjan 2000).

At least, there is a consensus between political science and public administration about policy network analysis' focus on relationships of interdependency among units – that can be individuals or organizations – related to public policy. So, it seems that this is a kind of 'network explanation' focused on information about relationships among units, like in social network analysis,²² which have an important differential: it is related to a specific kind of political phenomena called public policy. The conclusion is that social network analysis is a good analytical tool, focuses on the relations between actors and not on the actors' characteristics, that lacks a good theoretical framework. However, SNA is also a well-established methodological operationalization, which has its own conceptualization; so, it is not possible either to disregard the attempts of Social Network Analysis to provide 'meso-level' theories applicable to policy network approaches.

SNA theorizing encompasses two analytically distinct domains: (1) “network theory” – which refers to the processes that interact with network structures to yield certain

²¹ Besides the three main ways that policy network is used in literature, Rhodes (2006) cite power dependence and rational choice as two broad schools of thought in policy network theory.

²² This is what Adam and Kriesi (2007) call quantitative approach, Rhodes (2006) calls interorganizational analysis, and Dowding (1995) calls sociological network approach. All these definitions are about social network analysis.

outcomes for individuals or organizations, such as having many ties or being centrally located – and (2) “theory of networks” – which refers to the processes that determine why networks have the structures they do. This includes models of who forms what kind of tie with whom, who becomes central, and what characteristics the network as a whole will have (Borgatti and Halgin 2011). Another important element to policy network is the theory behind the kind of ties – like Granovetter's (1973) strength of weak ties, Burt's (1995) structural holes, and Borgatti and Halgin's (2011) state and event types²³ – which rely on an underlying model of a social system as a network of paths that act as conduits for information to flow. This theorization, however, does not specify which components are relevant for the political phenomena studied. Social network analysis indeed has a distinctive methodology, but these theoretical concepts do not constitute a foundation to study policy networks.

Therefore, more effort must be added in order to help organize, systematize, and coordinate existing knowledge about social networks as political phenomena in a unified explanatory framework. Until then, we are studying relationships of interdependency among nodes connected by specific kinds of ties in a political phenomenon. Furthermore, it's not just about networks or social networks anymore, because they have been around for a long time. It's about a society where the key social structures and activities are organized around electronically processed information networks. The diffusion of a networking logic substantially modifies the operation and outcomes in processes of production, experience, power, and culture (Castells 1996). That's why O'Toole (1997) concluded that the public administrative world is networked; Klijn and Koppenjan (2012) believed that the increasing use of social media and the emergence of virtual networks impact governance networks

²³ According to Borgatti and Halgin (2011) there are two kind of ties: state-type ties (bond model) – which have continuity over time – and event-type ties (flow model), which have a transitory nature, like flows and interactions.

and politics; Hwang and Moon (2009) cited that network is a perspective or world view to perceive social problems and research questions; and Rhodes (2006) summed up this view in the maximum "the world is a network and networks are the world."

Since among theories with equal degrees of confirmation, the simplest – the one based on the fewest assumptions and explanatory factors – and the broader – the one that explains a broader range of things – is to be preferred; network society theory can provide the theoretical foundation to political science and public administration in order to study political phenomena through social network analysis. Network society is the expression related to the social, political, economic and cultural changes caused by the spread of networked, digital information and communications technologies (Castells 1996). This network society is structured around networks instead of individual actors or organizations, and works through a constant flow of information through technology. Castells argues that the 'network' is the defining feature that marks our current epoch, and the 'new economy', the informationalism, is based on a new of kind of development in which networking is a critical attribute. In this new 'informational economy' a firm's competitiveness is dependent on access to networks (Castells 1996).

Therefore, the network society theory is a consistent generalization that can fit in public administration and political science context and provide a common ground in which it's possible to identify the mechanisms behind the relationships in policy networks utilizing social network analysis. The idea is to investigate the relationships of interdependency among stakeholders connected by specific kind of ties – which form network structures and node positions – related to public policy within a networked society.

POLICY NETWORK THEORY

Through the last section, it is possible to identify some of the elements, and the relationships among them, that one needs to consider for a sound policy network theory.

So, there is no more room to use 'policy network' as a generic term for different forms of relationships between interest groups and government, neither as a prescription for reforming public management, nor as only an approach utilizing social network analysis. We are now studying 'policy network' as a set of relationships of interdependency among stakeholders – who are tied by one or more specific types of ties – through a method in which SNA plays a big role, within network society. So, two main components of this framework are the ties and the stakeholders. The other two components, which constitute the framework, are related to the political phenomena studied: policy processes, and type of policies and sets of issues. However, before defining policy network and specifying its four components – processes, issues, stakeholders, and ties – it is necessary to recognize the implications of assuming Castells' 'network theory' and utilizing the method based on SNA to policy network theory.

(1) In a network society political power is primarily exercised by and through networks, so public policies are shaped by their policy networks. The pattern of ties in a policy network yields a particular structure, and policy stakeholders occupy positions within this structure;

(2) Network society is structured around networks instead of individual actors; so, the focus is on the relationships of interdependency among these individuals or organizations within the policy network. Therefore, network structures and stakeholders' positions drive explanation as independent variables;

(3) The method presupposes that all information necessary to study policy networks can be gathered by surveys and other relational data collected among stakeholders who are involved in or affected by public policy;

(4) Since it is the researcher – by choosing a process, a set of issues, a set of nodes and a type of tie – that defines the policy network, it is necessary to focus on concrete manifestations of policy networks in the network society.

DEFINING POLICY NETWORK

With these assumptions in view, it is possible to analyze 'policy network' concepts provided by political science and public administration, and compare them with what we are studying. In all concepts exposed in Figure 5, it is clear the emphasis on interrelationships of interdependency among a variety of interdependent entities, actors, or stakeholders. These actors can be public and private, government and society, and there is no hierarchy among them.

The presence of ties among stakeholders is also evident in all definitions, and it is clear that the characteristics of their ties or links matter. Coordination, orchestration, cooperation, bargain, negotiation, mobilization, are all words used to characterize the pattern of relationships predominant inside the policy network.²⁴ This is what Van Waarden (1992) would call 'functions': access to decision making process, consultation, exchange of information, etc.

The idea of stability of these relationships is also present directly or indirectly – by terms like endless negotiation, and regular communication – in the provided definitions. To Van Waarden (1992) it would be called 'institutionalization': it is a special structure property which refers to stability and the degree of stabilization. Stabilization is characterized by the repetition of patterns in relationships in policy networks over time.

It is also obvious that stakeholders share interest in a specific object: an issue, a problem, a program, a common goal, etc. But public policy is not made once and for all, it is made and remade endlessly, so this object, let's call it a policy issue,²⁵ is also an input and

²⁴ Adam and Kriesi (2007) and Rhodes (2006) hold that this coordination is horizontal and self-organizing.

²⁵ Browne (1995) distinguishes the issue and the substantive mechanism by which an issue becomes law, what is called policy vehicle: bills, appropriations, administrative and regulatory decisions, etc.

an output of a policy process. The idea of a policy process is explicitly present only in Rhodes (2006), who emphasize the difference between public policymaking and policy implementation. Therefore, among the four components proposed for the framework, in three of them there is a high level of shared consensus between the authors and their fields of knowledge.

Table 3. Policy Network Concepts

Borzel 1998	Klijn and Koppenjan 2000	Rhodes 2006
<p>Policy network is a set of relatively stable relationships which are of non-hierarchical and interdependent nature linking a variety of actors, who share common interests with regard to a policy and who exchange resources to pursue these shared interests acknowledging the co-operation is the best way to achieve common goals.</p> <p>In this view, policy networks are best understood as web which mobilize resources so that collective action can be orchestrated towards the solution of a common policy.</p>	<p>Policy networks constitute stable patterns of social relations between interdependent actors, which take shape around policy problems and/or policy programs.</p>	<p>Policy networks are sets of formal institutional and informal linkages between governmental and other actors structured around shared if endlessly negotiated beliefs and interests in public policymaking and implementation. These actors are interdependent and policy emerges from the interactions between them. These institutions are interdependent, and policies emerge from the bargaining between the networks' members.</p>
Adam and Kriesi 2007	Lewis 2011	Proposed Concept 2017
<p>Policy networks constitute stable patterns of social relations between interdependent actors, which take shape around policy. Regular communication and frequent exchange of information lead to the establishment of stable relationships between actors and to the coordination of their mutual interests.</p> <p>Policy network as a distinct new government structure, characterized by horizontal, self-organizing coordination between private and public actors who are involved in joint negotiating and problem solving.</p>	<p>Policy networks is defined as a way of organizing stakeholders. In political science and public administration, the network has been often used metaphorically to describe contemporary government-society interactions, or to describe a shadow structure of interests which affects policy through interconnections.</p> <p>Policy networks is a form of governance focus on the relationship between state and society.</p>	<p>Policy network is a set of stable relationships of interdependency among stakeholders who are tied around policy processes and set of issues. The broad assumption is that network structures and stakeholders' positions drives explanation as independent variables about policy outputs.</p>

POLICY NETWORK PROCESSES

The importance of distinguishing the 'policy making process' from the 'implementation process' is clear in Rhodes (2006) conceptualization. In this way, 'policy problem' and 'policy issue' can be objects of a 'policy decision making process' which has a draft as output, and 'policy programs' can be the output of a 'policy implementation process', and their results in society can be the 'policy outcomes'. Follow this reasoning, there is at least one more process – the agenda setting process – that has well defined outputs: a policy agenda.²⁶ According to Kingdon (1994) there are four process: (1) the setting of the agenda; (2) the specification of alternatives; (3) the authoritative choice among alternatives, as in a legislative vote or a presidential decision; and (4) the implementation of the decision. So, an idea 'whose time has come' open a window of opportunity in which an irresistible movement sweeps over politics and society, pushing aside everything that might stand in its path (Kingdon 1994).

The idea of four processes or stages is not new in public administration literature. The agenda setting stage – in which the issue is selected and the problem is recognized – the policy formulation and decision-making stage, the implementation stage, and the evaluation or termination stage are also identified by Jann and Wegrich (2006). In their study, it is evident that a process after implementation and before a new agenda setting – in which the implemented public policy is monitored, checked, and reviewed or evaluated – is necessary.²⁷ Despite some differences, mainly in the last process, the idea of a cycle

²⁶ The agenda is a list of subjects or problems to which governmental officials, and people outside of government closely associated with those officials, are paying attention to any given time (Kingdon 1994).

²⁷ In the 'agenda process'– which determines which issues enter the political agenda while others are ignored – is hard to establish a beginning, but the end or ends are when the policy issue is inserted in the agenda. In the same way, it is possible to determine when the 'monitoring process' starts, normally after the implementation, but it is hard to affirm when it will end, because it generally keeps going even during the processes of 'agenda setting' and/or 'formulation'. Moreover, the 'formulation' and the 'implementation process' tends to be the time in which there is a greater volume of interactions and information.

composed of four processes is well accepted. These differences in policy process terminology can be related to the normative characteristics of public administration view of policy network, in which the authors seem to see the object of study from their perspective. Then, 'policy making' is transformed in a policy problem, and 'implementation process' in a program to be implemented.

It is important also to note that each policy process can also be decomposed. For example, the decision making process can be decomposed in a rational way; 'identification of alternatives', 'evaluation of options', 'selection of options', etc. The 'evaluation of alternatives processes', in turn, can gather complex processes like 'legislative impact assessment processes'. In fact, there are a lot of similarities between the cycle process idea presented in public policy and the best practices of business process management common body of knowledge. The four processes that form the cycle can be studied as a PDCA (plan–do–check–act or plan–do–check–adjust) cycle used in business for the control and continuous improvement of processes. They also can be studied as more concrete processes inside a macro process.

Since we assume that it is possible to derive a network structure from a policy process, it is necessary to focus on concrete manifestations of policy networks in these processes. After all, it is really different to ask if policy network structures can explain legislative outputs in Congress, than if these structures can explain outcomes of a policy implementation by an executive agency. So, policy processes must be as much as possible understood as a sequence of traceable linked events, which can be related to process outputs or outcomes.²⁸

²⁸ Understanding outputs as the result of the processes and outcomes as the effects of this outputs in the real world.

Therefore, the idea of processes forming a policy cycle is fundamental to better understand that each process has its own inputs-and-outputs, as well as its own stakeholders, trade-offs, arenas, and domains. Thus, the four policy processes utilized in the proposed theory are agenda setting, formulation,²⁹ implementation,³⁰ and monitoring process.³¹ In this way, policy is resulting from complex interaction among stakeholders who participate in concrete game-like processes in a policy network.

POLICY NETWORK ISSUES

Policy must be also understood as an object – like the cited outputs of the legislative process, or the programs of an implemented policy. In this way, policy has a life of its own: it was born as an idea, it enters in the legislative agenda, it passes all steps of the legislative process, it gets appropriations and funds, it is implemented, and then it is monitored and evaluated. So it is fundamental to think about policies as inputs and outputs of policy process, as something concrete that has characteristics and produces results.

It is commonly understood that differences in policies influence policy networks. In practice, it is not easy to use these differences to classify types of policy in an exclusionary way. This enterprise started with Lowi (1972) and his main differentiation among distributive, redistributive and regulatory policies, and evolved with Wilson (1995) and his

²⁹ According to Kingdon (1994), the formulation process includes a legislative vote or a presidential decision. The author also spreads out the formulation process in two: specification of alternatives, and authoritative choice.

³⁰ To Pressman and Wildavsky (1983), implementation is the ability to achieve predicted consequences after initial conditions have been met. Implementation, however, does not refer to creating the initial conditions: legislation has to be passed and funds committed before implementation takes place to secure the predicted outcome. The word "program" signifies the conversion of a hypothesis into government action.

³¹ The 'monitoring process' tends to be longer in time and, like the 'agenda setting process', not as intense as the other two in order to suggest a kind of 'policy game'.

classification system of four types of policies: (1) concentrated benefits and concentrated costs, (2) distributed benefits and concentrated costs, (3) concentrated benefits and distributed costs, and (4) distributed benefits and distributed costs. 'Concentrated benefits and concentrated costs' policy tends to benefit a well-defined group but at a cost to another well-defined group, generating continuing organized conflict. In 'distributed benefits and concentrated costs' policy, a specific group bears the costs of policy conferring distributed benefits. The group is likely to feel its burdens keenly and thus it tends to make opposition to the policy. 'Concentrated benefits and distributed costs' policy tends to benefit a well-defined group but impose, or appear to impose, no visible costs on any other well-defined group, so they will attract the support of stakeholders representing the benefited group and the opposition of none. Finally, 'distributed benefits and distributed costs' policy does both confer benefits on, and spread the costs over, large number of persons, so they tend to become easily institutionalized without significant opposition.

Classifying type of policies, however, is not enough to separate different policy networks. It is necessary to distinguish different set of issues in order to separate different interests that stakeholders can represent in a policy process. The best example of a policy taxonomy based on set of issues is the classification provided by thematic committees and subcommittees in the U.S. Congress. Each committees is responsible for one or more big issues which can be decomposed into minor topics or set of issues. Therefore, by specifying the set of issues, the researcher defines the stakeholders and, consequently, the policy network.

POLICY NETWORK STAKEHOLDERS

According to Klijn and Koppenjan (2000), policy processes are complex and not entirely predictable because of the variety of stakeholders, perceptions and strategies. The stakeholders depart from perceptions they hold about the policy issue, the other actors and the decisions at stake, and they need the money and authority that only government can provide (Rhodes 2007). Assuming that there is a macro process – composed by agenda

setting process, formulating process, implementation process, and monitoring process – which leads to an outcome in a policy issue; each one of these processes must have an owner, a responsible stakeholder that not just provides the arena where this process occur, but also takes care of the process, in terms of governance and management.

That's the reason Adam and Kriesi (2007) said that policy networks are a new government structure, and Lewis (2011) said that it is a form of governance focus on the relationship between state and society. In fact, public policies are so intrinsically related to states and governmental institutions that the perspective of these stakeholders as central nodes in policy networks is determinant to comprehend these political phenomena. Thus, states/governmental institutions provide the arena – locus where the processes occur—the authority, the legitimacy, and even the necessary IT tools, since governments have been throughout history the main technological innovation strength (Castells 1996). It is not a surprise that policy networks must be viewed from the state/government perspective, since no other stakeholder would absorb the costs, or would take the risk of doing policy despite the collective action's unpredictable odds.

Therefore, let's assume that the owner of the 'agenda setting process' and of the 'formulation process' is an entity of the legislative branch, and the owner of the 'implementation process' and of the 'monitoring process' is an entity of the executive branch.³² These state/government stakeholders that are directly responsible for the policy process will be the central nodes in which the other public/private nodes will gather around

³² It is well accepted that the formulation process is related to the Legislative branch and the implementation process is related to the Executive branch. The agenda setting and the monitoring process are, in a certain way, 'shared' by both branches, since parliaments have also the function of monitoring programs' implementation and presidents also have high influence in the legislative agenda.

in ego-networks.³³ This idea is fundamental to comprehend the characteristics of the policy's stakeholders and how they are correlated to the variety of policy issues. It is evident that each issue has a different kind of policy network which has its own stakeholders; but the variety of policy networks doesn't mean that a stakeholders' taxonomy is unfeasible. Despite the fact that a policy's peculiarities influences the kind and the number of stakeholders gathering around government, it is possible to propose a taxonomy based on the type of stakeholders' interest.³⁴

Therefore, policy is a result of rival or competing interests in a determined policy network. Thus, there are environmentalists for whom there is a primacy of the environment over economic growth; and there are capitalists for whom there is a primacy of growth over environment. There are homeless for whom housing is over profit; and there are businessman for whom profit is over housing. So, in a capitalist society, it seems logical that economic interests should be involved; in a democracy, social interests should be involved too. Thus, in a capitalist democracy, this dichotomy between economic and social interests is the central part of the concept of policy network representativeness.

However, it is not feasible to assume that all economic or even all social interests are unified behind the same banner. So, besides identifying rival interests, it is necessary to identify also competing interests inside economic and social segments for the representativeness analysis. These competing interests are more relevant when the dichotomy between economic and social interests is not present in a policy issue. So, even policies in which there is no dichotomy between social and economic interests, there are

³³ An ego-network consists of a focal actor, termed ego, and a set of other actors which have ties to the ego, forming a network around it. Theoretically, all actors can relate to each other, but the focus is their interaction with the ego. (Wasserman and Faust 1999).

³⁴ Van Waarden (1992) propose that in the dimension 'actors', the number of participants determine the size of the network, but it is also important the type of societal actors and the size of the organizations involved.

competing interests clashing, like different farmers' associations disputing public subsidies. Therefore, in order to avoid legitimacy problems and increase efficiency/effectiveness, government institutions seek to include these competing interests in their policy process.

Besides the irreconcilable dichotomy between economic and social interests, and the competing interest inside economic or social segments; it is also possible that other interests which influence policy are not predominantly economic or social. This is the case of universities and think tanks which seek mainly to provide technical-scientific advice to Congress. Despite they have sort of economic interest based on the prestige and the influence they can get from Congress, this is not the main purpose of their participation, and definitely they do not represent any economic or social segment. Moreover, there are stakeholders in policymaking representing different governmental institutions, apart from the government owner of the process and central node of the policy network. This is the case in agencies' participation in policy formulation process in Congress, for example. Therefore, these four types of stakeholders – economic, social, technical-scientific, and government institutions – are enough to analyze the different possible types of stakeholders in a policy network, according to the stakeholder's type of interest.

Governmental institutions, however, cannot include all stakeholders related to an issue in their policy process. They need the right spokesperson for each set of issues, because including any stakeholder will reduce efficiency (or even make it impossible), and it won't increase legitimacy or even the level of information. Therefore, in order to reduce the number of stakeholders it is necessary to decide on inclusion or exclusion of stakeholders in policy processes. Two requirements are usually applied by governmental institutions in order to reduce the number of stakeholders without affecting legitimacy and efficiency: (1) the stakeholder organization reason must be related with the set of issues, the thematic

requirement; (2) and the stakeholder must have representation in the same level of the government institution,³⁵ the territorial requirement. Therefore, in order to be considered as part of the policy network, stakeholders must meet both the thematic and the territorial requirements. In order to be considered representative, a policy network must have stakeholders representing rival/competing interests, which operate in the same level of representation and which purpose is related with the policy issue.³⁶

POLICY NETWORK RELATIONAL TIES

Along with policy process, issues, and stakeholders, relational ties form the components of the policy network theory presented in this thesis. Relational ties are linkages between stakeholders in a policy network, and the collection of specific kinds of ties among stakeholders is called a relation (Wasserman and Faust 1999, 20). There are many ways to see ties. One can see ties as relations of power, as trust and social capital, as cooperation, as information flow, etc.

According to Borgatti and Halgin (2011), there are two kind of ties: state-type ties (the bond model) – which have continuity over time – and event-type ties (the flow model),

³⁵ So, in a federation, stakeholders must have national representation to participate in federal policymaking; they must have regional representation to participate in state policymaking; and they must have local representation to participate in local policymaking.

³⁶ Partially relying on Pitkin's work on political representation, Perez and Smismans (2012) distinguish between an 'acting for' and a 'standing for' dimension of representativeness. 'Acting for' refers to how the representative is authorized (ex-ante) to act on behalf of, and is accountable (ex post) to, the represented (Pitkin, 1972, 11). They call this 'procedural representativeness'. The 'standing for' dimension of representation relates to composition rather than to action, and functions as a map, or a mirror, as an accurate representation of a variety of interests in society (Pitkin, 1972, 61). Follow Pitkin, the authors also refer to this as 'descriptive representativeness'. The organization representativeness in the descriptive dimension has three main aspects: the territorial scope of the organization, the substantive issues an organization is supposed to represent, and the membership of an organization.

which have a transitory nature. Relational states are classified in similarities – same location, participation, or attributes – relational roles – like kinship and friendship – and relational cognition – which can be affective or perceptual. Yet relational events are classified only in interactions and flows. If the ties are related to organizations, the relations among them are classified in four types: similarities – like co-location – relations – like official joint ventures – interactions – like participation in same events – and flows – like technological transfers, and cash infusions (Borgatti, Everett, and Johnson 2013, 4).

It is worth pointing out when that stakeholders are organizations there are two different kinds of ties possible: among these organizations, and among individual members of these organizations. Even though these are not 'official' ties between these organizations, they may serve all the same functions (Borgatti, Everett, and Johnson 2013, 5). Therefore, networks are categorized by the nature of the sets of actors and the properties of the ties among them (Wasserman and Faust 1999, 35).

To Van Waarden (1992) and Wasserman and Faust (1999, 3), the presence of regular patterns in relationships among stakeholders is the policy network structure. So, in order to have a representative policy network, for example, it is necessary to have a linking pattern which includes both social and economic competing rival interests. Since relationships can vary to relational states which bond stakeholders from interactions and flows among these same stakeholders, there are many different policy networks structures possible.

Another attribute of ties cited by Van Waarden (1992) is institutionalization: it is a special structure property which refers to stability and the degree of stabilization. Time is determinant for these groups representing competing interests to build reciprocal trust and increase cooperation. So, detecting the presence of the same representative policy network in different policy process, for instance, can be fundamental to predicting successful outputs. That's why the stability idea is so present in policy network concepts among different authors in both fields.

Policy networks ties can also be used to measure social capital – understood as the value that a stakeholder gets from a network (Passmore 2011). There are sophisticated measurements of social capital in which it is conceived as the value of an individual's relationships – like the conception of Burt (1995) – as well as social capital is conceived as a quality of groups – like the conception of Putnam (1994). Borgatti, Jones, and Everett (1998) go even further, proposing a type of focus – internal and external – besides the type of actor – individual and group. Attempts to create an operational concept of social capital as assets in networks come back to the idea of centrality, cohesion, and sophisticated measures like 'prestige'– used to aggregate the measures of 'degree prestige', 'proximity prestige', and 'status prestige' (Passmore 2011). It is also important to highlight that the idea of 'trust' is strongly present in the social capital literature in networks, and some authors have seen it as a different kind of social capital, called network capital.

Actually, this idea is not new. Fafchamps and Minten (2002), using data on agricultural traders in Madagascar, created an index of 'social network capital' to show how it has a large effect on firm productivity. In this way, Naurin (2007) introduces a concept of network capital – indicating the quantity and quality (in terms of power) of cooperation partners of European Union member states – and analyze the stock of this asset for individual and groups of member states. More recently, Shrestha (2012) analyzed the effect of network capital on policy outcomes in Nepal.

In fact, the forms and processes of power are specific to each network (Castells 2011), and it is also specific to each kind of tie, given the fact that each tie generates its own network. The most common set of relationships of interdependency among stakeholders presented in the policy network literature in both fields is cooperation. Cooperation must be understood in opposition to competition, and not in opposition to conflict. Conflict is inherent to interaction, and it do not characterize a pattern of interaction, but a result from interaction. In this way, stakeholders which are in the same policy network and are not cooperating but rather competing. In order for cooperation to exist, it is also necessary a weaker kind of tie between stakeholders. It is necessary that they know each other and that

they are able to at least engage in dialogue. Since it is possible to have dialogue without cooperation, but not cooperation without dialogue, it is fundamental to consider dialogue as a pattern of interaction.

Besides dialogue and cooperation/competition as patterns of interaction, there is also information as a main flow. Network society works through a constant flow of information, so the control of this information flow within a policy network, and the due information asymmetry, is also a form of exercising power in policy networks. Beyond information, there are many different types of flows which can be useful as ties in policy networks: money, beliefs, ideas, advice, etc. The main point is that it is possible to determine power relations by analyzing the position of stakeholders in these flows, and consequently, determine some hierarchy among stakeholders, identifying the powerful players. Therefore, the structures formed by ties through patterns of interactions and flows show different ways by which stakeholders exercise their power over other stakeholders.

Based on the type of tie, there are some useful structure measurements proposed by SNA, such as centralization, the difference between the number of links for each node divided by the maximum possible sum of differences; radiality, the degree an individual's network reaches out into the network and provides novel information and influence; structure cohesion, the minimum number of members who, if removed from a group, would disconnect the group; structural equivalence, the extent to which nodes have a common set of linkages to other nodes in the system (Passmore 2011).

To sum up, policy network ties constitute an important and prolific component of this framework, in so far as the pattern of ties yields a particular structure in policy networks, and these structures, as well as the stakeholder's position in these structures, are the driving force of explanation (independent variables) of this proposed policy network theory. In this way, it is necessary now to understand how these structures and stakeholders' positions are related with how political power is exercised in our network society.

NETWORK GOVERNANCE AND POWER

As Klijn and Koppenjan (2012) state, "in the context of network theory, instead of policy networks and network management we now speak of governance networks and network governance". Policy networks represent a shift from government to governance through networks, and also it describes the public sectors' increased fragmentation and improves coordination between government and multifarious other organizations. Governance refers to the interactions by which public and private stakeholders coordinate their interdependencies in order to realize public policies and deliver public services. Governance network theory has provided new ideas and management practices, focusing on the relation between the state and interest groups, to deliver public services and to solve complex policy problems through horizontal coordination between interdependent actors (Klijn and Koppenjan 2012).

In this context, policy emerges from the bargaining and game-like interactions between interdependent stakeholders in policy networks. Since there are too many groups to consult, government must aggregate interests. So, it needs the 'legitimated' spokespeople for that policy area. Thus, governance becomes broader than government, changing the boundaries of the state and incorporating the state relationships with non-state actors (Rhodes 2007). Since the management of programs depends on the interconnections among stakeholders who implement programs (government by proxy), this revolution that no one noticed, changed the focus to links outside the bureaucratic chain of command, in which authority does not work well (Kettl 2012).

Therefore, a network of partners, many of whom are outside government, must work together closely if public programs are to perform well. The task of government is now to find a way to leverage these private partners, align and coordinate their activities (Kettl 2006). Much of the government now depends not on a straight function of turning inputs into outputs but leveraging the activity of a vast and complex network of partners, in both for-profit and nonprofit sectors (Kettl 2012). The idea of governance as the best way to

delivery public goods and services effectively and efficiently, and to translate policies into action is so strong that it makes governance a new tradition in public administration, besides traditional public administration and new public management (Peters 2003). The conclusion is that the informal authority of these networks supplements and supplants the formal authority of the government. So, governance refers to governing with and through networks (Rhodes 2007).

The characteristics of 'governance' concepts – proposed by authors like Rhodes (2007), Lewis (2011), and Klijn and Koppenjan (2012) – are similar to their 'policy network' concepts. There are horizontal and stable interactions between interdependent stakeholders, which can be public and private actors. These interactions can lead to negotiation, cooperation, and different strategies. The purpose is to realize policy and to deliver public services. The confusion between these two terms permeates the literature in political science and public administration. The governance idea rose with the emergence of the government by proxy, started with the ideas of the new public management school, aiming a reduced, businesslike, and more efficient government. The focus on efficiency, however, brought an accountability trade-off. This problem persists in the governance tradition (Kettl 2012; Peters 2003). In this way, the openness to organized society makes accountability less of an internal governmental operation and more of a collaboration between stakeholders. So, it increases flexibility, and provides more legitimacy (assuming that these organizations are acting more on behalf of broader interest of their associates than of narrow interests of their leaders), but it also provides accountability problems (Peters 2003).

Does policy network result in network governance (Lewis 2011) or are policy networks a form of governance (Klijn and Koppenjan 2012)? Actually, governance, in a strict sense, is a form by which power is exercised. Public administration and political science research has continued to examine power in networks, and the democratic implications of network governance (Lewis 2011); but the network approach is still neglecting the role of power, giving too much emphasis on the role of cooperation and ignoring power differences

(Klijn and Koppenjan 2012). Therefore, it is the idea of power that brings governance into the academic literature as well as into public institutions. Taking the idea that network governance is specific forms of exercising political power through policy networks in our network society, let's analyze three related forms: (1) the power of government institutions as a central node; (2) the presence of ties and the power of inclusion/exclusion; and (3) the stakeholders' position as a form of exercising power.

THE POWER OF GOVERNMENTAL INSTITUTIONS AS A CENTRAL NODE

Governance is premised upon a concept of steering society, through a process of collective goal setting with non-governmental stakeholders (Peters 2003). As a horizontal form of governing in contrast to hierarchical forms (Borzel 1998), network governance approach to public administration has a broader conception of democracy in which networks become crucial means of shaping policy (Peters 2003). Thus, a network of stakeholders – many of whom are outside government – must work together closely in order to negotiate shared purposes (Rhodes 2007) and define collective goals. The task of government is to make it happen, it is to find a way to leverage these stakeholders, align and coordinate their activities (Kettl 2006). Much of the government now depends not on a straight function of turning inputs into outputs but leveraging the activity of a vast and complex network, in both for-profit and nonprofit sectors (Kettl 2012). The bureaucracy's role is to manage administration's relationships with the civil society network (Kettl 2006).

In fact, as Klijn and Koppenjan (2000) state: "network management has acquired a prominent position in policy science and public administration, demonstrated by the number of publications on policy networks and network management in Europe (Wilks and Wright 1987; Rhodes 1988; Marin and Mayentz 1991; Marsh and Rhodes 1992; Glasbergen 1995; Kickert et al. 1997) and in the United States (Milward and Wamsley 1985; Provan and Milward 1995; O'Toole 1997). Along with its growth in popularity, however, the ideas on network management also have met with frequent criticism." According to Adam and Kriesi

(2007), network management is a 'weak' form of governance. In this way, Klijn and Koppenjan (2000) affirm that network management is thus an independent variable in the development of policy processes. The implicit assumption is that satisfying outputs for stakeholders is more difficult without network management.

The success of a policy game is thus partially determined by the degree to which indispensable resources, and the actors who own them, are involved in the game (Klijn and Koppenjan 2000). So, network management focuses on mediating and coordinating interorganizational policymaking, and, consequently, process management intends to improve interaction between actors in policy games (Klijn and Koppenjan 2000). This improved interaction is, as Agranoff (2003) states, the challenging task of working across organizations, collaborating with others in order to achieve a common purpose. As Kettl (2006) states, the challenge is also setting boundaries that promote efficiency and effectiveness without threatening accountability and responsiveness. This issue was a central lesson of Woodrow Wilson's work (Kettl 2006).

In fact, network management is mainly composed by different normative strategies like 'initiating and facilitating interaction between actors', 'conflict management', 'improvement of mutual perception about an issue or solution', and 'temporary organization arrangement to sustain interactions and coordinate strategies', 'creating and changing networks arrangements for better coordination', and 'creating new content' (Klijn and Koppenjan 2000). Underneath this normative focused content, there is the idea of network management as a form of exercising power in policy networks. Once activated by a policy process, stakeholders participate in a game like interaction defending their interests and trying to produce the best outputs possible for the moment. In this paradigm, government institutions role in managing policy networks is fundamental to deliver public goods and services with efficiency and effectiveness.

Therefore, it is important to remember that governmental institutions – as an owner of a policy process, and a central node around with the other stakeholders gather – has a

different role in policy network governance. As Rhodes (2007) wisely attests, legitimacy problems or accountability problems can emerge when government is considered just an actor among actors.

THE PRESENCE OF TIES AND THE POWER OF INCLUSION/EXCLUSION

Taking policy network as a stable horizontal set of interrelationships of interdependency among stakeholders, whose central node is a government institution, and governance as specific forms of exercising political power through policy networks in our network society; the simple fact of being in or out of a policy network constitutes the most basic form of exercising power through networks (Castells 2011). This form of power – which operates by exclusion/inclusion – is called 'networking power' by Castells (2011). The concept proposed by Castells, however, admits to the formation of ad hoc networks, and does not include the idea of stabilization, necessary for a relational state among policy stakeholders.

In fact, the idea of stable relationships in the literature is so strong that authors argue that policy networks are more like informal institutions (Borzel 1998): they have a life of their own, their history, their specific purpose, some common goals, internal conflicts, and rules. The idea of constitute networks, present in Klijn and Koppenjan (2000), corroborate with this view and with Castells' view of 'networking power'.

Since the government institutions are the owners of policy processes, and they have legitimacy and effectiveness as concerns (Klijn and Koppenjan 2000), it is necessary to gather in the network all stakeholders that have indispensable resources, or that have direct or indirect veto powers, because they are indispensable to keeping representativeness. This indispensable policy network's core, gathering around a government institution, must be present in policy processes in order to guarantee the desired policy outputs and outcomes.

So, there is this latent network constituted in which there is more interaction in 'formulation' and 'implementation' policy processes, which have more the strong presence of government institutions as owners, so stakeholders are 'activated' to policy games from these latent networks.³⁷ On the other hand, there is less interaction among stakeholders during 'agenda setting' and 'monitoring' policy processes; because their high degree of fuzziness and, consequently, absence of a formal process's owner.

The fact that there is an already constituted policy network, nevertheless, doesn't mean that the powerful stakeholders are in and less powerful are out; but the fact of being in or out matters. In order to have a relational state, it is necessary to relate the stakeholders to a specific level of government³⁸ (the location similarity or territorial requirement), and to a specific issue matching the stakeholder's purpose (the thematic similarity or requirement).

Therefore, when it is possible to identify relational states – which means regular participation in policy games, and evidence of routine stakeholders and policy network stability – it is possible also to say that there are interactions and flows among stakeholders occurring inside a policy network. So, the inclusion/exclusion of stakeholders from this relational states and, consequently, from flows and interactions, form the first form of exercising power through policy networks.

³⁷ The network is not formed for a specific 'game' in the process, the policy network is only activated, stimulated by the processes.

³⁸ So, in a federation, stakeholders must have national representation to participate in federal policy processes; they must have regional representation to participate in state policy processes; and they must have local representation to participate in local policy processes.

If stakeholders have the territorial and the thematic similarity, it doesn't mean that they are insiders; it means that they, and only they, should be regular participants in policy games. Nevertheless, sharing practices, rules, and standards of communication are also essential to be an insider. In this case, power is exercised not by exclusion, but by the imposition of the rules of inclusion (Castells 2011). As Rhodes (2007) attests, shared values and norms are the glue which holds the complex set of relationships together. Like the gatekeepers of the exclusion/inclusion mechanism, the stakeholders that determine the internal rules have power. According to Castells (2011), this form of power determines the level of openness of the network and it is called 'network power'.

"What comes out in Castells' work is that the presence or absence in particular networks, combined with the inherent dynamics of each of these networks now becomes critical source of power (Hajer and Wagenaar 2003)." The exercise of these forms of power, however, makes much more sense when the rival/competing interests inside a policy network are disclosed by the researcher. In this way, the presence/absence of rival/competing economic/social interests in a policy network – given their territorial and thematic similarity – form the primary way of exercising power through policy networks. From this point, governmental institutions attempt to include stakeholders in a policy processes, keeping the policy network representative.

Since there are too many stakeholders to consult, governmental institutions must aggregate interests. So, it needs the 'legitimated' spokespeople for that policy area (Rhodes 2007). The right spokespeople reduce costs of information and transactions, besides diminishing uncertainty, and the risk of defection, by creating mutual trust among stakeholders in repetitive non-zero sum policy games. Besides, these stakeholders are not completely autonomous, they are subject to the control of the members of their organizations (Borzel 1998). So, the introduction of new actors is not just a constitution strategy, as Klijn and Koppenjan (2000) suggest, but a way to attest legitimacy and enhance efficiency and effectiveness.

THE STAKEHOLDERS' POSITION AS A FORM OF EXERCISING POWER

Besides the presence of ties and the power of inclusion/exclusion, there is the form of power exercised by nodes over other nodes within policy network. This form of power is called 'networked power' by Castells (2011). Who has power in policy networks? There is no way to determine 'the source of power' in policy networks, but based on the kind of tie, it is possible to have an idea about which stakeholder is more influential.

The most common and studied metric in Social Network Analysis to answer this question is centrality. The concept of centrality gives a rough indication of a node's power based on how well it is 'connected' with the network. When stakeholders are extensively involved in relationships with other stakeholders, this involvement makes them more visible to the others. Thus, for a non-directional relation, a central stakeholder is one involved in many ties (Wasserman and Faust 1999). If it is possible to make a distinction between ties sent and ties received, as is true for directional relations, Wasserman and Faust (1999) define a prestigious stakeholder as one that is the object of extensive ties, thus focusing solely on the actor as a recipient. Therefore, the prestige of a stakeholder increases as it becomes the object of many ties, and not when it initiates the ties. According to Passmore (2011), prestige can be decomposed into 'degree prestige', 'proximity prestige', and 'status prestige'.

Another distinguished useful centrality measure is 'eigenvector centrality', since it measures the importance of a node in a network, based on the principle that connections to the node having a high score contribute more to the score of the node in question (Passmore 2011). So, since it assigns relative scores to all nodes in the network, eigenvector centrality is measure in relation to a weighted network. In order to have an idea about how centrality measures are complex and sophisticated in SNA, according to Abbasi (2013), centrality measures are proposed for a node in weighted networks in three different categories: (1) considering only a node's neighbors' degree; (2) taking into account the links' weights of a node in a weighted network; and (3) combining both neighbors' degree and their links' weight.

It is not the idea here to describe or analyze various SNA tools, but only highlight that this well-developed tool box can be vastly applied to analyze the power exercised by nodes over another nodes in policy networks. If power is the relational capacity to impose a stakeholder's will over another stakeholder's will on the basis of the structural capacity of domination (Castells 2011), so being central in kind of ties that determines the network – like information, consulting, dialogue, and collaboration – is an important form of exercising political power.

Besides the use of SNA tools to analyze the power exercised by nodes over other nodes, it is also possible to analyze power in policy networks through what Castells (2011) denominates 'network-making power': "In a world of networks, the ability to exercise control over others depends on two basic mechanisms: (a) the ability to constitute network(s) and to program/reprogram the network(s) in terms of the goals assigned to the network; and (b) the ability to connect and ensure the cooperation of different networks by sharing common goals and combining resources while fending off competition from other networks by setting up strategic cooperation" (Castells 2011).

According to the proposed policy network theory, a policy network is constituted through the relational state between a government institution, owner of a policy process, and diverse stakeholders which gather around it to influence policy. In this way, specific stakeholders – called 'programmers' by Castells' (2011) – led the process of collective goal setting, according to their interests and values. This form of power – which intend to program specific policy networks in terms of social assigned goals – is also an important form of exercising political power in our network society.

In a society in which political power is primarily exercised through policy networks, it is not enough to assign collective goals and promote collaboration inside the network. The power to switch different networks, following the strategic alliances between the dominant actors of various networks, is also fundamental (Castells 2011). Therefore, power is not only exercised within policy networks, it is also exercised among them, and the switchers are the

ones who are able to ensure collaboration, combining the necessary resources, from different policy networks in pro of shared collective goals.

Besides the programmer – who has the ability to steer the network to common goals – and the switcher – who connects and allies different networks – there are also two concepts provided by SNA that helps to understand power in policy networks: gatekeepers and bridges. The bridge is the one who has more indirect connections and, thus, brings new information; the gatekeeper is the one who approves the newcomers' entrance in the policy network. Therefore, there are different forms to view who has power in policy networks, and all of them help to understand how power exercised by nodes over other nodes.

CHAPTER 3

EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS DATA AND METHODS

Based on the presented theory, I intend to investigate if representative policy networks influence important outputs in the U.S. Congress. To do so, I selected two different types of public policies. One which has notorious rival interests in a set of policy games through history, and tends to have more concentrated benefits and concentrated costs:³⁹ the housing policy. The other which has more concentrated benefits and distributed costs:⁴⁰ the agricultural policy. So, the claim is: The presence of a 'representative policy network' constituted in hearings influences the approval of 'important legislative outputs'. Based on specialized literature, the competing claim for the mortgage policy is the influence of 'economic-elite's interests'; and for the agricultural policy is the influence of 'local farmers' interests'. Besides, it is tested if 'partisan majority interests' are the dominant influence in legislation approval as it should be expected in a representative democracy.

So, if only stakeholders representing economic interests are presented when important legislation is approved, then the theories of Economic-Elite Domination and

³⁹ Policies that benefit a well-defined group but at a cost to another well-defined group tend to generate continuing organized conflict. So, the housing policy is a good case to analyze the influence of a representative policy network in legislation approval when there are rival economic and social interests involved.

⁴⁰ On the other hand, policies that benefit a well-defined group but impose, or appear to impose, no visible costs on any other well-defined group will attract the support of stakeholders representing the benefited group and the opposition of none. Thus, the agricultural policy is a good choice to analyze the influence of a representative policy network in legislation approval when there are only competing economic interests present.

Biased Pluralism are more likely to be correct, and, in fact, government institutions are more likely to be captured by these powerful interest groups. On the other hand, if stakeholders representing social interests are also present when important legislation is approved, mainly if this correlation is stable, so maybe they are acting as a counter weight to these powerful economic-elite interests, since no one plays a game which give zero results for a long time. It is possible, however, that there is no relationship between the presence of a representative policy network and the approval of important legislation. Pragmatically, if there is a majority party or coalition supporting an important proposal, then important legislation is more likely to pass. So, it is probable that the majority rule is the responsible for most variation between important legislation being approved or not approved.

Theoretically, 'representative policy networks' should be more influential in important legislation approval than 'economic-elite interests', than 'local farmers' interests' and even than 'majority interest'. Since clashing leads to poor results and high risks for both rival/competing groups; they tend to make concessions, and policy is the result of this collaborative/competitive behavior as a strategy to achieve the desired results. Since policy is a non-zero-sum game that is made and re-made endlessly, this collaborative behavior to achieve more favorable collective outputs tends to be reinforced. So, time and constant interaction tends to increase collaboration among these rival/competing groups over repetitive games.

The unit of analysis of this investigation is the policy game, composed by majority parties in the involved government institutions, a set of public hearings, a set of stakeholders (hearings' witnesses), a set of legislative inputs (proposals), and a set of legislative outputs (proposal is approved or not), and an affiliation tie (participation of stakeholders in public hearings). There is no direct correspondence between one hearing and one proposal, instead they are taken as a set in each game. In order to increase the number of cases, it is be considered as a policy game the period between January and July, and the period between August and December. Since the Congress must take an August

recess if it fails to adjourn by July 31, it seems appropriate to separate the two periods in this way. The given semester is the smaller period of time that can be used as policy game, since the Congress term (two years) and the legislative session (one year) are too long, and it makes difficult the statistical analysis. The time period for the data collection is between 2005 and 2014, because the period of 10 years is well accepted by the specialized literature as long enough to detect major changes in policy, and consequently, to provide an important legislation approved sample. So, these 40 policy games provide enough variation to test the hypotheses and the competing claims.

According to Congressional Quarterly (2005-14), the most important set of issues in the period are the ones related to the mortgage crisis for the housing policy: housing financing overhaul (regulation on GSEs⁴¹ and Federal Loan Banks); affordable housing founding; mortgage regulation (including down payment); and foreclosure prevention. On the other hand, the most important set of issues in the period in the agriculture policy, according to Congressional Quarterly (2005-14), are the ones related to the farm and appropriation bills: nutrition aid programs; agriculture subsidy programs; conservation; trade and global food aid; rural development; and food safety. It is necessary to highlight that only the most important set of issues in the period are investigated. Thus, other important issues in the period – like flood insurance, which become relevant with the Hurricane Katrina disaster, section 8 vouchers, homeless policy, agricultural loans and commodity credit-corporation, agricultural insurance, and agricultural research and education – were not considered.

The policy outputs that are measured in each proposal are the approval of legislation by a committee, the approval of legislation by one of the chambers – House or

⁴¹Government Sponsor Enterprises.

Senate – the approval by both chambers, and the sanctioned laws. The proposals and their outputs provide enough variation for the dependent variable 'legislation approval'.

Congressional Quarterly (2005-14) also identified the most important proposals in the period related to the two studied sets of issues. On one hand, the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (H.R. 3221), and the Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009 (S. 896, and H.R. 1106), plus 11 other proposals related to the mortgage policy were the most important in the period. On the other hand, the farm bill of 2008 (H.R. 2419 and H.R. 6124), the farm bill of 2014 (H.R. 2642), the appropriation bill of 2009 (H.R. 2997) – because it was the first appropriation bill after a presidency change – besides two other proposals that failed in 112 Congress term (H.R. 6083 and H.R. 6228) were the most important in the period for the agriculture policy.

The committees related to these policies – the House Committee on Financial Service and the House Committee on Agriculture; and the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, and the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry – provide the list of public hearings related to the set of issues.⁴² Besides that, hearings about nominations and authorizations were excluded, because they were not directly related to the debate of the sets of issues. According to these criteria, there are 139 public hearings – that occurred in the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, and in the House Committee on Financial Service between 2005 and 2014 – related to the set of mortgage issues. On the other hand, there are 66 public hearings – that occurred in the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, and in the House Committee on Agriculture between 2005 and 2014 – related to the agriculture set of issues.

⁴²All information was gathered in the government web sites: congress.gov and gop.gov.

The stakeholders were collected from lists of witnesses in these committees' public hearings. According to Social Network Analysis tradition, hearings and witnesses form an affiliation network. Theoretically, joining participation in hearings not only provides the opportunity for actors to interact, but also increases the probability that direct pair-wise ties (such as acquaintanceship and friendship) will develop between stakeholders. Thus, the affiliation of individuals with social groups provides the opportunity for interpersonal influence (Wasserman and Faust 1999, 293). After collecting the stakeholders from lists of witnesses, they were submitted to the thematic and territorial tests in order to check if they operate in the national level of representation and if their purpose is related to the set of issues investigated. Thus, the thematic test consists of identifying the purpose or mission of the stakeholder, and check if this purpose/mission is related to the set of issues; yet the territorial test consist in identify the operation area of the stakeholder's action, and check if it is consistent with Congress national representation arena. This information is available on-line in the stakeholders' website.

Since public hearings can be used by congressman as an accountability instrument to constituents, or as a bridge to approximate local interests from federal governmental institutions, it is necessary to exclude stakeholders who do not act in the national level, because including any stakeholder will reduce efficiency (or even make it impossible), and it won't increase legitimacy or even the level of information. Therefore, it is necessary to eliminate stakeholders that – by the territorial or thematic rule – do not belong, or should not belong, to the policy network. In order to avoid the exclusion of important stakeholders, it is checked if excluded players are routine participants in hearings. If they are among the most assiduous participants during this 10 years, they belong to the policy network anyway, since the premise is that no one plays a game which gives zero results for such a long time. After the tests and the classification, the stakeholders were aggregated according to the policy network rival/competing interests identified for each set of issues.

Thereby, a representative network is constituted when both economic/social rival interests are presented or, in the case that this dichotomy is not involved, when the

identified competing interests are represented in public hearings. In the mortgage case, because of the large number of stakeholders participating in hearings, it was necessary to distinguish 'representative policy networks' from 'highly representative policy network' constituted. So, the representative policy network is constituted when at least 1 stakeholder representing economic interests and 1 representing social interests, from the list of 28 most assiduous participants, are present in hearings. If at least 3 stakeholder from the list representing economic interests and 3 representing social interests are present in hearings, so the policy network is considered highly representative. Yet, the agriculture policy network is considered representative when there are at least 1 stakeholder representing Midwest crops, 1 stakeholder representing Southern crops, and 1 representing general farmers in order to constitute the crop interests network;⁴³ or when there are 2 (or more) stakeholders representing meat interests; or when there are 2 (or more) stakeholders representing dairy interests. All these stakeholders must come from the list of 18 more assiduous participants in agricultural public hearings.

In the mortgage case, literature and empirical evidence supports theories of biased pluralism and economic-elite domination as causal explanations to policymaking in Congress. The 'economic-elite interests' influence in legislation approval is measured through how the presence of stakeholders representing only economic interests varies in hearings, and relating this variation with important legislation approved or not in each Congress term. In the agricultural case, divergent literature claims that due to the expansion of the network and the disunity of Washington's interest groups, congressman shift their attentions to local farmers. The alternative claim 'local farmer's interests' influence in legislation approval is measured through how the presence of stakeholders representing

⁴³ The specialized literature identified the competition in Congress between Midwest and Southern crop producers.

diverse local interests vary in hearings, and relating this variation with important legislation approved or not in each Congress term.

Finally, 'partisan majority interest' is operationalized by the alignment of government institutions: (1) the presidency and both chambers are under the control of the same party; (2) both chambers – House and Senate – are under the control of the same party, but the presidency is not; (3) the chambers are not under control of the same party. In this way, partisan majority interest varies in an ordinal categorical way: 100% of alignment, when all involved government institutions are aligned; 50% of alignment, when both chambers are aligned, but not with the presidency; 0% of alignment, when there is no alignment between chambers. Even though the president has the option to block legislation through a veto, it is preferable to avoid it. Thus, the presidential influence in legislation approval in Congress must also be considered in the model.⁴⁴

Therefore, it is possible to model the relationships between hearings and stakeholders as a system, and to distinguish cohesive subsets of stakeholders, like economic-elites and local farmers. When stakeholders participate in more than one hearing, a linkage is established between the two hearings. So, overlap in group membership allows for the flow of information between groups, and perhaps coordination of the groups'

⁴⁴ Besides presidential influence, another important influence in legislation approval could be media coverage. Media forms public opinion and, thus, pressures congressman to vote according to media preferences. However, the literature do not support this causal relation. On the other hand, disasters and catastrophes are known to move congressman to approve new legislation, but since they are unpredictable, it is not necessary to include this variable in the model, just to be aware that these events can produce outliers in the model.

actions. The idea now is co-relate the public hearings which have representative policy network constituted with the date in which important legislation was approved in Congress. In the same way, the hearings which have only 'economic-elite interests' represented are co-related with legislation approval, as well as, the hearings which have diverse 'local farmers' interests' constituted in hearings are also co-related with the approval of important legislation.

The stronger the presence of rival/competing interests in public hearings, the more representative the policy network is. The higher the co-relation in time between these hearings – which have the presence of a representative policy network – and the important legislative outputs, the more likely is the influence of the independent in the dependent variable. In other words, representativeness is measured by the presence of rival/competing interests in hearings, and its' influence in important policy outputs is measured by time co-relation between hearings and outputs.

The main collected data are about the affiliation tie between the stakeholders and the Congress, which is the owner of the process and the central node of the policy network, through public hearings. In this way, public hearings provide incontestable evidence of the relationship between this governmental institution and the stakeholders, but it only provides evidence of probable relationship among these stakeholders. Thus, in order to infer the existence of the policy network, interviews with the committee's seasoned staff and a survey with the stakeholders identified in hearings were utilized.

The survey was reviewed and verified as exempt – in accordance with SDSU's Assurance and Federal Requirements, pertaining to human subjects protections within the Code of Federal Regulations (45 CFR 46.101) – by the SDSU Institutional Review Board. The survey consists of a five question socio-metric questionnaire that aim to elicit the structure of the policy network by investigating four kinds of relationships among stakeholders. This investigation is based on the stakeholders' perception about two kinds of interactions – dialogue and collaboration – and two kind of flows – information and advice exchange –

among them. In order to avoid obtrusiveness in the survey, there is also a question about which stakeholders is not in the survey but is a participant of policymaking in Congress. This question intend to identify stakeholders that were not present in hearings but have participated in the legislative process; creating, thus, a snow ball sample.

Besides the survey, a set of interviews were conducted with seasoned civil servants in the studied committees. Beyond identifying stakeholders, these interviews served to confirm the policy network modus operandi in Congress: if routine stakeholders are acquitted and friends, or if they are not; if the information they provide is critical or not, as well as their role in coalition building; if there are collective close door meetings with congressmen to determine goals and to settle disputes; if the stakeholders are able to block legislation approval through congressmen; if the stakeholders' suggestions as a group are more likely to be accepted by congressman or not.

Thus, the survey and the interviews intend to provide enough evidence to determine if there is in fact a policy network acting in Congress, and not a bunch of loose stakeholders pursuing their own interests. It is important to note that there is no public assessment of the stakeholder's internal representativeness. It is possible that they just represent small narrow interests of a few affiliates and leaders who captured the organization. Stakeholders that enjoy privileged access to public institutions due to their particular democratic or representative added value should offer guarantees of their openness and accountability in relation to their own affiliates.⁴⁵ But this is not a concern of this research.

⁴⁵Despite the fact that it is important to cognize the nature of this relationship, making an assessment of its control mechanisms is costly and it is not an intrinsic function of a government institution doing it. One can imagine the problems that emerge when a legislative house starts to require that non-governmental organizations prove the efficiency of their internal control mechanisms in order to be allowed to participate in public debate.

Finally, a literature review about each set of issues, and the rival/competing interests behind them, provides the necessary background, and also minimizes the possibility of not identified powerful stakeholders in policymaking. In any research about legislation approval, it is highly probable that something is missing. Backroom deals and interest groups' nefarious pressures do not appear in official papers or in scholarly analysis. Knowing that the full history will never be narrated, it is necessary to use a range of different sources and complementary data in order to understand the variables' relationships.

In this way, there are six sets of data in this investigation: (1) the list of public hearings, and their witnesses – that is given by gop.com – (2) the list of proposals, and their outputs in the legislative process – that is given by congress.com – (3) the partisan composition of committees and chambers – that is also given by congress.com – (4) the socio-metric survey – (5) the interviews with seasoned public servants in Congress' committees; (6) and the literature review about each set of issues. To avoid obtrusiveness, it is used only official data published by governmental institutions.

Therefore, a (1) socio-metric survey and interviews are utilized to infer the existence of the policy network, and (2) a relation between the representative network constituted in public hearings and the important legislative outputs is utilized to infer the causal connection. The testing strategy isolated the impact of representative policy network constitution upon legislation approval by eliminating possible exogenous influence and competing possible causes. So any perceived pattern of co-variation between representative network constitution and the legislation approval is more likely to be no spurious.

CHAPTER 4

MORTGAGE POLICY CASE

THE MORTGAGE CRISIS

According to the theory, the mortgage policy benefits a well-defined group but at a cost to another well-defined group. This kind of concentrated benefits and concentrated costs policy generates continuing organized conflict (Wilson 1995). So, in order to test the influence of a representative policy network in important mortgage legislation approved in the period, it is necessary first to identify the stakeholders representing economic and social interests, and then analyze their governance.⁴⁶ The main claim is: If there is a representative policy network present, then important legislation is more likely to pass. Thus, the appearance of strongly representative public hearings is expected to happen close to important decisions related to the outputs. On the other hand, if just stakeholders representing economic interests are presented in hearings when legislation is approved, then the elite theories are more likely to be correct.

This approach is in line with recent empirical research, Gilens and Page (2014) tested which sets of stakeholders have more influence over public policy decision making in

⁴⁶ Governance refers to the interactions by which public and private stakeholders coordinate their interdependencies in order to solve complex policy problems through horizontal coordination between interdependent actor, realizing public policies and delivering public services (Klijn and Koppenjan 2012).

Congress: average citizens,⁴⁷ economic elites, organized interest groups,⁴⁸ and mass based groups.⁴⁹ The results provide substantial support for theories of Economic-Elite Domination and for theories of Biased Pluralism, but not for theories of Majoritarian Electoral Democracy or Majoritarian Pluralism. For the authors, reality is best captured by mixed theories in which both individual economic elites and organized interest groups play a substantial part in affecting public policy, but the general public has little or no independent influence. Because of the status quo bias and the informational advantages of elites, even when large majorities favor policy change, they generally do not get it. To Gilens and Page (2014), majority does not rule – at least not in the causal sense of actually determining policy outputs.

The case of mortgage policy is consistent with Gilens and Page's (2014) argument. To Igan, Mishra, and Tressel (2012) the financial industry altered the course of government action, manipulating policymakers to obtain unjustifiable profits and tailor the financial regulatory landscape to fit their needs. The authors find that lobbying expenditures by the U.S. financial industry were directly associated with how legislators voted on key bills in the years before the crisis. The financial industry fought and defeated measures that might have allowed for a timely regulatory response to some of the reckless lending practices and consequent rise of foreclosures that played a pivotal role in igniting the mortgage crisis.⁵⁰

⁴⁷ Majoritarian Electoral Democracy: in rational choice theories of electoral democracy, vote-seeking parties or candidates in a two-party system tend to converge at the mid-point of citizens' policy preferences. So, the median voter tend to drive policy outputs and determine the results of policy making.

⁴⁸ Biased Pluralism: Both the thrust of interest-group conflict and the public policies that result tend to tilt toward the wishes of corporations and business and professional associations. Interest groups and corporations representing "large scale business" tend to prevail.

⁴⁹ Majoritarian Pluralism: it implied that the wants and needs of the average citizen tend to be reasonably well served by the outcomes of interest group struggle.

⁵⁰ The authors asked whether lobbying lenders behaved differently from non-lobbying lenders in the 2000-2007 period and how they performed in 2008. The findings showed that lenders that lobbied more intensively (a) originated mortgages

The more intense the lobbying, the more likely legislators were to vote for deregulation. There is a clear association between the money spent on lobbying and the way legislators voted on the key bills considered before the crisis.

Johnson (2009) adds that, typically, countries helped by the IMF are in a desperate economic situation because of powerful elites within them. In the U.S. case, according to him, the great wealth that the financial sector created and concentrated gave bankers such enormous political weight that they were able to effectively capture the U.S. government. Like in most IMF cases, the financial industry connections allowed them to push onto the government the substantial problem that arose and they were among the first to get extra help from the government. This elite business interests played a central role in creating the crisis, making ever-larger gambles, with the implicit backing of the government, until the inevitable collapse, using their influence to block all sorts of reforms that were needed.

In global capitalism, it is not a surprise that the global financial market has the last word. The "word" is usually spoken in the language of the U.S. Treasury Department, the Federal Reserve Board, or Wall Street (Castells 2011). The power of the financial industry, as Johnson (2009) noted, reached the point of creating the belief in the American peoples' mind that large financial institutions and free-flowing capital markets are crucial to America's position in the world. That is why an "IMF default prescription"⁵¹ was unthinkable as a solution for the mortgage crisis. Weakening the political power of the mortgage

with higher loan-to-income ratios (LIR), (b) securitized a faster growing proportion of loans originated; and (c) had faster growing mortgage loan portfolios. These same lenders had negative abnormal stock returns during the failures of Bear Sterns rescue and the collapse of Lehman Brothers, but positive abnormal stock returns around the date the bailout package was announced. Finally, lobbying lenders were more likely to be bailed out than other lenders. This evidence suggests that the political influence of financial industry contributed to the 2007 mortgage crisis.

⁵¹ Nationalize troubled banks and break them up as necessary. Scale up the standard Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation process, a government-managed bankruptcy procedure for banks. Cleaning up the banks, it would probably cost close \$1.5 trillion. Break up the oversized banks and sell them back to the private sector. Anything that is too big to fail is too big to exist. Regulation and taxation should be also part of the solution.

industry and limiting their lobbying activities doesn't seem an option as a prescription to prevent future crisis, or as a way out to enable Congress to produce different legislative outputs.⁵²

The story, however, is more complex than just lenders buying government support for subprime lending. Mian, Sufi, and Trebbi (2013) find evidence that mortgage industry campaign contributions and the share of subprime borrowers in a congressional district predicted congressional voting. There was a sharp increase in mortgage credit corresponding to a period in which special interests, as measured by campaign contributions from mortgage lenders, and constituent interests, as measured by the fraction of subprime borrowers in a congressional district, appear to be influencing politician voting behavior in both parties. The fraction of subprime borrowers in a given representative's congressional district becomes a more powerful determinant for roll call votes on subprime legislation during the lending expansion.⁵³ Bills debated and passed in the U.S. Congress that reduced regulation of subprime lenders and increased mortgage support for low income households were influenced by both lenders and borrowers, there was a convergence of special and constituent interests in Congress that influenced policy outputs.

In fact, as expressed by the dissenting statement of Thomas, Hennessey, and Holtz-Eakin (2010), the view that the financial sector influence in Washington was the single cause

⁵² Lobbying firms have better information than policymakers, they can inform the policymakers, facilitating decision making and promoting innovation. Moreover, network connections between politicians and lobbyists who worked on a specific bill also influenced voting patterns (Igan, Mishra, and Tressel 2011).

⁵³ From 1994 to 2000, mortgage contributions toward representatives who come from districts with a high fraction of subprime borrowers were relative steady. However, there was a sharp rise in mortgage industry campaign contributions toward representatives from high subprime share districts beginning in 2001. The sharp increase in mortgage industry campaign contributions and lobby expenditure coincides with a sharp increase in securitization and mortgage lending to high subprime zip codes that occurs from 2001 to 2006. The differential path of campaign contributions toward representatives from high subprime share districts is unique to the mortgage industry. This evidence suggests that the mortgage industry viewed high subprime share representatives as potential allies in shaping subprime market legislation.

of the mortgage crisis is just too simplistic. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac's failures were result of policymakers using the power of government to blend public purpose with private gains and then socializing the losses. But for the whole financial crisis there were ten essential causes that must be taken into consideration.⁵⁴ The complexity of the financial crisis makes it impossible to determine a specific source of power, as a single entity, that is able to impose its will over all, capturing government. The idea that there is an economic elite or, in the mortgage policy case, a financial industry using campaigns contributions and carrying out lobbying activities in order to block and shape legislation in Congress, thereby achieving their power will, is just too simplistic.

There are at least two major groups of stakeholders – as shown by Mian, Sufi, and Trebbi (2013) – the mortgage industry and the consumers associations, interacting with each other and with governmental institutions in order to achieve more favorable legislative outputs. These stakeholders are interdependent, and they need the money and legislative authority that only government institutions can provide. Policy emerges from the game-like interactions between the members of this policy network. Since there are too many groups to consult, government must aggregate interests, through the 'legitimated' spokespeople for that policy area (Rhodes 2007). In the case of mortgage policy, these spokespeople are most often national associations related to mortgage industry and consumers organizations. Since in a network society⁵⁵ political power is primarily exercised by and through

⁵⁴ (1) the global credit bubble; (2) the national housing bubble; (3) nontraditional mortgages; (4) credit ratings and securitization; (5) financial institutions concentrated correlated risk; (6) leverage and liquidity risk; (7) risk of contagion; (8) common shock; (9) financial shock and panic; and (10) financial crisis causes economic crisis.

⁵⁵ The 'network' is the defining feature that marks our current epoch. The diffusion of a networking logic substantially modifies the operation and outcomes in processes of production, experience, power, and culture (Castells 2011). Social networks have been around for a long time, but this widespread networking logic is an unprecedented change.

networks,⁵⁶ the informal authority of this mortgage policy network supplements and supplants the formal authority of Congress.

To test the influence of this policy network in legislation approval, I examined a 10 year period – a well-known term for major changes in public policies – between 2005 and 2014. Therefore, 5 Congress' terms were analyzed in which a total of 793 proposals were introduced, and a total of 699 public hearings were realized by the House Committee on Financial Service, and 437 by the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs. From this total, 13 proposals were appointed by Congressional Quarterly (2005-14) as being the most important in the period. In this way, 139 public hearings from the total focus more specifically on the set of issues treated by Congress during the time: housing financial overhaul (regulation on GSEs and Federal Loan Banks), affordable housing funding, mortgage regulation (including predatory lending, brokers licensing, and down payment), and foreclosure prevention (including FHA overhaul).

MAJORITY PARTIES AND LEGISLATIVE PRODUCTION

Pragmatically, if there is a majority party or coalition supporting a proposal, then legislation is more likely to pass. Therefore, the control of the two chambers and the White House is all what matters to approve legislation. All that a party needs is control of the involved government institutions to approve whatever legislation they want. So Congress terms in which the chambers were controlled by the same parties, and the Legislative and

⁵⁶ Since each type of society has a specific form of exercising power and counter-power, it should not surprise us that in the network society, social power is primarily exercised by and through networks. The question is, though, which kind of networks? (...) In a world of networks, the ability to exercise control over others depends on (...) the ability to constitute network(s) (Castells 2011).

Executives branches were aligned are supposed to be more prolific in the approval of important legislation.

Table 4. Majority and Mortgage Legislative Production

Congress Term	2005/06	2007/08	2009/10	2011/12	2013/14
Executive Government	Republican	Republican	Democratic	Democratic	Democratic
Majority in Chambers	Republican	Democratic	Democratic	Rep.(H.R)/Dem.(S)	Rep.(H.R)/Dem.(S)
Proposals introduced	96	201	191	169	136
Committee Consideration	68	72	37	127	19
Passed Committee	12	31	18	7	5
Passed one Chamber	11	29	17	7	5
Passed both Chambers	1	2	6	0	2
Became Law	1	2	6	0	2
Important Law	0	1	1	0	0

Source: (congress.gov 2005-14; gpo.gov 2005-14)

In these 10 years, there was one Republican period, followed by two Democrats periods, and two periods in which the chambers were opposed – with Republicans in the House, and Democrats in the Senate. By the majority alignment rule, it should be the 109th Congress, controlled by the Republicans, and the 111th Congress, controlled by Democrats, that should produce the most important outputs, and not the 110th and 111th Congress. According to Congressional Quarterly (2005-14), rivalry between chambers are a main cause of blocked legislation. But, the chamber's rivalry should not affect the approval of proposals in committees, and it is notable that in the last two Congress terms the number of proposals approved in the committees decreased sharply too.

It is also possible to argue that in both successful Congress terms both chambers were in Democrats hands, so they were more pro policy change and more receptive to stakeholders participation, mainly social organizations. On the other hand, in the 109th Congress the conservative bias of Republican majority in both chambers may be the cause of the status quo being preserved. However, simplifying legislation approval to a conservative bias is reducing politics to an ideological determinism that do not exist. So, despite the sample is too small to infer any conclusion, the explanation that there is only a majority party acting in Congress to approve legislation of its interest do not find enough evidence in the collected data.

So, what was different in 2007/08 and 2009/10 that cause important legislation to be approved? The financial crisis manifested itself in August 2007, and ended in early 2009. The recession was from December 2007 to June 2009 (Thomas, Hennessey, and Holtz-Eakin 2010). A skeptic might say that these powerful stakeholders and government made a late-night, backroom dealing, when they saw that they went too far. Treasury and Fed just worked out a transaction and claimed it was the best that could be done under the circumstances (Johnson 2009). Despite the clear influence of the financial crisis in this legislation approval, a single event cannot be utilized to disclose a pattern about legislation approval in Congress.

In the period, it is well-known that the affordable housing funding was the point of discord between Democrats and Republicans. However, there is no support in the specialized literature to link definitely Republican or Democrats to stakeholders representing economic or social interests. The mortgage industry and the consumers association were allied to Republicans and Democrats in different issues during different times – for example, the consumers associations and the Democrats were allied against some points of the GSE reform; the mortgage industry and the Republicans were allied against some points in the foreclosure prevention legislation. There was a notorious clash between the mortgage industry and the consumers associations in one main issue: mortgage regulation. As Mian, Sufi, and Trebbi (2013) stated, there was no major legislation passed to impose stricter regulations on the subprime mortgage industry before the crisis, despite the pressure from consumer advocacy groups.

Since it is not possible to isolate a single bill or single action to estimate the effect of special interests on government policy, because government efforts are too varied (Mian, Sufi, and Trebbi 2013), the focus is on all important bills that were approved in the period, but also in important proposals which failed but still contribute to deepening the debate, and to approve further legislation. From Congressional Quarterly (2005-14), 13 proposals were selected as the most important between 2005 and 2014:

a) 109th Congress:

- The Federal Housing Finance Reform Act of 2005 (H.R. 1461);
- The Federal Housing Enterprise Regulatory Reform Act of 2005 (S.190).

b) 110th Congress:

- The Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (H.R. 3221);
- The Expanding American Ownership Act of 2007 (H.R.1852);
- The National Affordable Housing Trust Fund Act of 2007 (H.R. 2895),
- The FHA Modernization Act of 2007 (S. 2338);
- The Federal Housing Finance Reform Act of 2007 (H.R. 1427);
- The Mortgage Reform and Predatory Lending Act of 2007 (H.R. 3915);
- The HOPE VI Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2007 (H.R. 3524).

c) 111th Congress:

- The Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009 (S. 896);
- The Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009 (H.R. 1106).

d) 113th Congress:

- The Housing Finance Reform and Taxpayer Protection Act of 2014 (S. 1217);
- The Partnership to Strengthen Homeownership Act of 2014 (H.R. 5055).

POLICY GAMES AND LEGISLATIVE OUTPUTS

In order to increase the number of cases and facilitate the analysis, each Congress term (109, 110, 111, 112, and 113) is separated in four policy games, each one corresponding to a working period in Congress: January to July, and August to December. A policy game is composed by a set of public hearings, a set of stakeholders (hearings participants), a set of legislative inputs (proposals), and a set of legislative outputs (proposal is approved or not by committees, chambers, and sanctioned).

The inputs are the 13 proposals considered by Congressional Quarterly (2005-14) as the most important in the period. The list of 33 legislative outputs related to these proposals were obtained from congress.gov. It is noted that only 8 of the 20 investigated policy games have outputs, 5 of them have legislation approved by at least one chamber, and only 4 policy games have outcomes that are related to the two proposals which

become law, since the proposal H.R. 1461 of 2005 was approved by the House, but didn't become law.

Table 5. Outputs on Mortgage Policy:

Date	Proposal Number	Action
04/05/2005	H.R. 1461/2005	Committee report or markup
05/25/2005	H.R. 1461	Committee report or markup
07/14/2005	H.R. 1461	Committee report or markup
07/28/2005	S. 190/2005	Committee report or markup
10/26/2005	H.R. 1461	Passed House
03/09/2007	H.R. 1427/2007	Committee report or markup
05/02/2007	H.R. 1852/2008	Committee report or markup
05/09/2007	H.R. 1427	Committee report or markup
05/22/2007	H.R. 1427	Passed House
06/28/2007	H.R. 1852	Committee report or markup
07/31/2007	H.R. 2895/2007	Committee report or markup
08/04/2007	H.R. 3221/2008	Passed House
09/17/2007	H.R. 1852	Committee report or markup
09/18/2007	H.R. 1852	Passed House
09/19/2007	S. 2338/2007	Committee report or markup
09/26/2007	H.R. 3524/2007	Committee report or markup
10/02/2007	H.R. 2895	Committee report or markup
10/10/2007	H.R. 2895	Passed House
11/06/2007	H.R. 3915/2007	Committee report or markup
11/09/2007	H.R. 3915	Committee report or markup
11/13/2007	S. 2338	Committee report or markup
11/15/2007	H.R. 3915	Passed House
12/14/2007	S. 2338	Passed Senate
01/03/2008	H.R. 3524	Committee report or markup
01/17/2008	H.R. 3524	Passed House
04/10/2008	H.R. 3221	Passed Senate
07/30/2008	H.R. 3221	Become law
03/05/2009	H.R. 1106/2009	Passed House
05/06/2009	S. 896/2009	Passed Senate
05/19/2009	S. 896	Passed House
05/20/2009	S. 896	Become law
05/15/2014	S. 1217/2014	Committee report or markup
09/18/2014	S. 1217	Committee report or markup

Source: (www.congress.gov 2005-14)

The selection of public hearings was based on the main issues identified in the 10 years period, excluding nominations and authorizations. The stakeholders were identified from the witnesses' lists of these 139 public hearings in the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, and in the House Committee on Financial Service.

After the thematic and territorial tests,⁵⁷ necessary to exclude participants that do not belong to the national mortgage policy network,⁵⁸ there were the presence of 80 stakeholders representing economic interests – finance, insurance, and real estate industry – and 44 stakeholders representing social interests – consumers and minorities associations. The witnesses who appeared the most in public hearings were:

Table 6. Most Assiduous Stakeholders in Mortgage Hearings

N. of Appearances	Organization's Name	Type of Interest
48	Mortgage Bankers Association	economic
30	National Association of Realtors	economic
24	Center for Responsible Lending	social
19	National Council of La Raza	social
18	National Association of Home Builders	economic
17	National Association of Mortgage Brokers	economic
15	National Consumer Law Center	economic
14	National Community Reinvestment Coalition	social
12	American Bankers Association	economic
11	American Securitization Forum	economic
10	Fannie Mae	economic
10	Wells Fargo	economic
9	Bank of America	economic
9	Conference of State Bank Supervisors	economic
9	Independent Community Bankers of America	economic
8	Freddie Mac	economic
8	National Low Income Housing Coalition	social
7	Consumer Federation of America	social
7	Enterprise Community Partners	economic
7	JP Morgan Chase	economic
7	National Association for the Advancement of Colored People	social
7	HOPE NOW Alliance	social
6	Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association	economic
5	Amherst Securities	economic

⁵⁷ It is necessary criteria to decide on inclusion or exclusion of stakeholders in policymaking, because including any stakeholder will reduce efficiency (or even make it impossible), and it won't increase legitimacy or even the level of information. Two requirements must be applied in order to reduce the number of stakeholders: (1) the stakeholder organization reason must be related with the policymaking issue, the thematic requirement; (2) and the stakeholder must have representation in the same level of the legislative house, the territorial requirement. So, in a federation, stakeholders must have national representation to participate in federal policymaking; they must have regional representation to participate in state policymaking; and they must have local representation to participate in local policymaking. Since public hearings can be used as an accountability instrument to the electorate, or as a bridge to approximate local interest from federal government, it is necessary to exclude participants who do not act in the national level.


⁵⁸ In order to avoid the exclusion of important stakeholders, it was checked if excluded players are routine participants in hearings, but none of them participate more than five times.

5	Appraisal Institute	economic
5	Neighbor Works America	social
4	Leadership Conference on Civil Rights	social
4	National Fair Housing Alliance	social

Source: (www.gpo.gov 2005-14; congress.gov 2005-14)

The idea is testing the appearance of stakeholders representing both, economic and social interests, in a public hearing, and correlate this presence with legislative outputs in a timeline. The cut line to belong to the mortgage policy network is established in 5 appearing for economic interests and 4 appearing for social interests in the 10 years interval. In this case, it seems reasonable that if an organization appears less than 4 or 5 times in Congress in a 10-year interval, it is a sporadic participation.

Figure 3. Mortgage Policy Network Representation



Legend:
 Blue: economic interest;
 Red: social interest;
 Green: governmental institutions;
 Orange: technical-scientific stakeholders;
 Size: size is proportional to the number of appearances in Congress' public hearings between 2005 and 2014.

Based on the appearance of these stakeholders as witnesses in public hearings, the policy network constituted is classified in 'no representative', 'representative', and 'highly representative' in order to determine the degree in which the network is constituted by the same players, like an image of the presented policy network. So, in order to be considered representative, a public hearing must have at least 1 stakeholder representing economic interests and 1 representing social interests from the list of the 28 most assiduous participants. When at least 3 stakeholder representing economic interests and 3 representing social interests are present in hearings, so the policy network is considered highly representative. On the other hand, any other case is considered 'no representative': (1) When only stakeholders representing economic interests are present in a public hearing, than it will be considered dominated by economic-elite interests. (2) Hearings in which there are only stakeholders representing social interests are also no representative. (3) The same happen with hearings in which government institutions or technological/scientific organizations – like universities and think tanks – are present, but economic and social interests are not.

Since the public hearings were selected based on the main issues debated in Congress at time, there is no need to identify a perfect correlation between a proposal and a public hearing. It is not possible to know if, besides attending hearings, the witnesses were friends – spending time and lunch together – or if they simply don't know each other. Close-door meetings are hard to track. According to Social Network Analysis literature, affiliation networks provide the opportunity for stakeholders to interact, and increase the probability that they become acquainted or even friends. So, hearings provide the opportunity for personal influence.

Therefore, the main claim is: If there is a representative policy network present, then legislation is more likely to pass. Thus, the appearance of strongly representative public hearings is expected to happen close to important decisions related to the outputs. On the other hand, if just stakeholders representing economic interests are presented in hearings when legislation is approved, then the elite theories are more likely to be correct.

Policymaking is therefore more likely to be dominated by powerful business organizations and a small number of affluent Americans. But, if stakeholders which represent social interests are also represented in the constituted networks when legislation is approved, especially if this pattern is stable, then these social organizations are at least being heard, and their efforts are probably not in vain – since nobody plays a game which always generates no results for a long time – and maybe these institutions are in fact empowering some other citizens in our reinvented government.⁵⁹

Through the tables below, it is possible to note that there is a significant correlation between the four most important outputs and eight highly representative public hearings. The only time in which there was an important output, and there was no representative policy network constituted, the proposal (H.R. 1461 of 2005) didn't become law. In three of the cases, there were a significant increase in the number of public hearings, only in one policy game there was such increase and no output (2013/Semester 1). Besides, there was the presence of stakeholders representing economic-elite interests in all policy games, and they were also present the policy games in which there are important outputs. There isn't, however, any notable pattern between only economic-elite interests and the important outputs.

⁵⁹ As social problems become too complex for government to handle on its own, a third party government emerges in which a wide variety of stakeholders are allow to participate in government. To Osborne and Gaebler (1993), and Salamon (2002), there is a new paradigm in which government's third-party partners deliver even more public services than the own government.

Table 7. Mortgage Policy Games

Year/Semester	No. Hear.	Outputs	Imp. Out ⁶⁰	Repres. Const ⁶¹	High. Repres. ⁶²	Econ.ELIT.	Major. Align.
2005/Semester 1	3	yes	no	2	0	0	100%
2005/Semester 2	3	yes	yes	1	0	1	100%
2006/Semester 1	4	no	no	3	0	1	100%
2006/Semester 2	3	no	no	1	0	1	100%
2007/Semester 1	15	yes	yes	10	2	2	50%
2007/Semester 2	6	yes	yes	3	2	1	50%
2008/Semester 1	19	yes	yes	3	2	5	50%
2008/Semester 2	3	no	no	1	0	2	50%
2009/Semester 1	15	yes	yes	5	2	4	100%
2009/Semester 2	5	no	no	2	0	2	100%
2010/Semester 1	9	no	no	4	0	2	100%
2010/Semester 2	3	no	no	3	0	0	100%
2011/Semester 1	10	no	no	2	0	5	0%
2011/Semester 2	11	no	no	1	0	6	0%
2012/Semester 1	10	no	no	4	0	2	0%
2012/Semester 2	0	no	no	0	0	0	0%
2013/Semester 1	15	no	no	1	0	3	0%
2013/Semester 2	3	no	no	2	0	1	0%
2014/Semester 1	1	yes	no	1	0	0	0%
2014/Semester 2	1	yes	no	1	0	0	0%

Source: (www.gpo.gov 2005-14; congress.gov 2005-14)

In an aggregated view by Congress term, it is also possible to note that the 8 highly representative hearings – in which at least 3 stakeholders representing social interests and 3 stakeholders representing economic interests were present – are in the same Congress term, and in the same semester, of important legislative outputs. These hearings also precede these outputs, indicating a causal connection.

Table 8. Mortgage Policy Games Summary

Congress Terms	Import. Legis.	Part. Align.	N. of Hear.	Repres. Net.	High. Repres. Net.	Eco -Elite
109 Congress term	no	100%	13	07	00	03
110 Congress term	yes	50%	43	17	06	10
111 Congress term	yes	100%	32	14	02	08
112 Congress term	no	0%	31	07	00	13

⁶⁰ Outputs other than committees' outputs: Legislation approved by one of the chambers, by both chambers, or enacted law.

⁶¹ At least 1 stakeholder representing economic interests and 1 representing social interests from the list of 28 most assiduous participants in hearings.

⁶² At least 3 stakeholder representing economic interests and 3 representing social interests from the list of 28 most assiduous participants in hearings.

113 Congress term	no	0%	20	05	00	04
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Source: (www.gpo.gov 2005-14; congress.gov 2005-14)

In order to investigate if these 8 hearings are really correlated with the important legislative outputs in the period, the history of the mortgage policy will be narrated in the light of the relationships among these 27 stakeholders representing economic and social interests in public hearings.

Table 9. Mortgage Highly Representative Hearings

Year/Semester	Hear. N.	Date	Econ.	Social	Total	Hearing Name
2007/Semester 1	110018	03/27/2007	3	3	6	Subprime And Predatory Lending: New Regulatory Guidance, Current Market Conditions, and Effects on Regulated Financial Institutions.
2007/Semester 1	110021	04/17/2007	4	3	7	Possible Responses to Rising Mortgage Foreclosures.
2007/Semester 2	110074	10/24/2007	5	5	10	Legislative Proposals on Reforming Mortgage Practices.
2007/Semester 2	110083	12/06/2007	4	3	7	Accelerating Loan Modifications, Improving Foreclosure Prevention, and Enhancing Enforcement.
2008/Semester 1	110108	04/16/2008	5	3	8	The Foreclosure Prevention and Sound Mortgage Servicing Act of 2008.
2008/Semester 1	110132	07/25/2008	4	4	8	A Review of Mortgage Servicing Practices and Foreclosure Mitigation.
2009/Semester 1	111011	03/11/2009	8	4	12	Mortgage Lending Reform: A Comprehensive Review of the American Mortgage System.
2009/Semester 1	111025	04/23/2009	8	5	13	The Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act of 2009.

Source: (www.gpo.gov 2005-14; congress.gov 2005-14)

The Federal Housing Finance Reform Act of 2005 (H.R. 1461), and the Federal Housing Enterprise Regulatory Reform Act of 2005 (S. 190).

In 2003 and 2004, multibillion dollar accounting scandals led to the dismissal of top executives in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Together, the two companies owned or guaranteed about \$5 trillion worth of the \$12 trillion in mortgages issued on U.S. houses. In a Congress dominated by Republicans, despite the concordance that a small agency under

HUD⁶³ was viewed as insufficient to oversight the GSEs,⁶⁴ efforts to tighten the regulation were unsuccessful for the third straight year.

The House passed a GSE regulation bill in October 2005 – the Federal Housing Finance Reform Acts of 2005 (H.R. 1461) – and the Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs committee approved similar legislation (S. 190).⁶⁵ In the House Financial Services committee the proposal aimed to limit the types of assets, reducing the GSE portfolios' size, and to create an affordable-housing founding through the donation of five percent of their after-tax profits. The Floor debate rejected the reduction of the size of the portfolios, and also amended the fund, specifying what groups would be ineligible for affordable housing fund grants, reducing the fund to 3.5% in the first two years, and requiring the program end after 5 years. In the Senate debate the major sticking point was a provision, opposed by the Democrat that would give the new regulatory authority to limit the types of assets the two companies could hold in their portfolios. According to them, proposing restrictions on the firm's portfolios would favor private banks. Republicans were also against the creation of an affordable-housing fund, making Democrats unhappy. Despite the Senate version being closer to the White House than to the House committee, disagreements between the chambers and the Fannie and Freddie's lobby made the legislation go no further (Congressional Quarterly 2005-06).

⁶³ U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development.

⁶⁴ Government Sponsored Enterprise.

⁶⁵ According to Mian, Sufi, and Trebbi (2013), two other proposal deserve being noted: the Responsible Lending Act of 2005 (H.R. 1295) and the Prohibit Predatory Lending Act of 2005 (H.R. 1182). The first got the opposition of consumers associations which opposed to replace tougher state-mandated consumer protections with weaker federal protections, and then it failed to pass House. The second was favored by the Center for Responsible Lending that considering the Act a model for preventing abusive lending first while preserving access to credit, even though it failed to pass House. The other three proposals related to the studied issues that passed House⁶⁵ were not mentioned by the literature.

There were 13 public hearings in the 109 Congress term related to the debated set of issues. The period in which there were more representative public hearings coincided with the period in which the decisions were made. It is noticeable that there is a concentration of representative hearings between the introduction of the important proposals in the beginning of 2005, and the approval of the Federal Housing Finance Reform Acts of 2005 (H.R. 1461) by the House. However, there is no presence of a highly representative policy network constituted in any hearing.

It is important to note that even though Democrats were the ones who publicly opposed to reduce GSEs' portfolios and to remove government support from the mortgage market, congressional majority of both parties consistently reject amendments aiming at constraining GSEs balance sheets and limiting their systemic risk role. While the Federal Housing Finance Reform Acts of 2005 (H.R. 1461) was complex in their applications, and there were certain instances of an alignment of special and constituent interests in favor of mortgage credit expansion (Mian, Sufi, and Trebbi 2013). Moreover, Republicans used their majority to block affordable housing legislation, but did not use it to settle the dispute between the mortgage industry and the consumers associations about mortgage regulation.

The Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (H.R. 3221), and Six other Proposals that Helped to Deepen the Debate⁶⁶

In 2007, the new Democratic majority, working with the Treasury Department, seemed poised to tighten regulation on Fannie and Freddie. But with the subprime

⁶⁶ The Expanding American Ownership Act of 2007 (H.R. 1852); the National Affordable Housing Trust Fund Act of 2007 (H.R. 2895); the FHA Modernization Act of 2007 (S. 2338); the Federal Housing Finance Reform Act of 2007 (H.R. 1427); the Mortgage Reform and Predatory Lending Act of 2007 (H.R. 3915); and the HOPE VI Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2007 (H.R. 3524).

mortgage crisis, hundreds of thousands of borrowers faced the loss of their homes as their payments jumped to levels they could not afford when the introductory rate expired. Thereby, the momentum changed and the congressmen started to see an increasing in the role of the two firms in the real estate market as a way out, shifting the immediate priority from regulating the mortgage finance giants – putting limits on the size of the companies' portfolio and the kinds of assets they could own – to addressing the collapse in the subprime market. In this way, both chambers passed bills aimed at giving a response to the mortgage crisis, but the two chambers were still on a collision course (Congressional Quarterly 2007-08).

Among the 8 investigated hearings, two occurred in the first policy game, one in May 24 and the other in April 17. The first was the "Subprime And Predatory Lending: New Regulatory Guidance, Current Market Conditions, and Effects on Regulated Financial Institutions", which aggregates Economic interests – Mortgage Bankers Association, National Association of Mortgage Brokers, and Conference of State Banking Supervisors – and social interests – Center for Responsible Lending, Consumer Federation of America, and National Community Reinvestment Coalition – besides government institutions – Federal Reserve, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Office of Thrift Supervision, National Credit Union Administration – and the American Enterprise Institute.

The second was the Possible Responses to Rising Mortgage Foreclosures, which aggregates economic interests – American Securitization Forum, Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Housing Policy Council – and social interests – National Community Reinvestment Coalition, National Council of La Raza, and Neighbor Works America – besides government institutions – Department of Housing and Urban Development, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.

After these two hearings, the Financial Services committee approved the Expanding American Ownership Act of 2007 (H.R.1852) authorizing the use of some FHA surpluses to

help finance an affordable-housing fund. The fund itself was to be created under the National Affordable Housing Trust Fund Act of 2007 (H.R.2895), and its purpose was to distribute grants to state and local governments to finance low-income homebuyers so they can make a down payment on a first home. The proposal had also provisions to raise the size of single-family mortgages and the limit that FHA⁶⁷ could ensure. Groups including the National Association of Homebuilders, the National Association of Realtors and the U.S. Conference of Mayors backed it, as well as some Republicans; but the White House warned a veto.

Despite the fact that the debate had shifted emphasis from oversight to expanding the already huge role of the companies in the lending industry, the Financial Services committee approved also the Federal Housing Finance Reform Act of 2007 (H.R.1427), establishing an independent regulator to oversee Fannie, Freddie, and 12 Federal Home Loan Banks. It also included the creation of an affordable-housing fund financing by the two firms' portfolio, and provided money to rebuild communities devastated in 2005 by hurricanes Katrina and Rita. The new regulator role was weakened in the House floor, and the housing fund was one more time a contentious issue, both displeasing to Republicans, and the Senate did not act on the bill in 2007 (Congressional Quarterly 2007-08).

The second policy game of 2007 started with the hearing the "Legislative Proposals on Reforming Mortgage Practices", in October 24, which aggregates economic interests – Mortgage Bankers Association, American Bankers Association, America's Community Bankers, Conference of State Bank Supervisors, National Association of Mortgage Brokers, and Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association – and social interests – Center for Responsible Lending, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, National

⁶⁷ Federal Housing Administration.

Council of La Raza, National Community Reinvestment Coalition, and HOPE NOW Alliance – besides government institutions – Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, National Credit Union Administration, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and Office of Thrift Supervision.

After this hearing, the Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs committee passed a proposal (S. 2338) which not include the affordable-housing fund, but reduced the minimum down payment, and allowed the FHA to insure loans of up to 100 percent. In the House, the Financial Services committee also approved the Mortgage Reform and Predatory Lending Act of 2007 (H.R. 3915) which (1) required all mortgage providers (brokers) to be registered and licensed through a new licensing system, (2) provided regulation against steering borrowers to subprime mortgages, and (3) established a pre-empt state law on the liability. However, the proposal was perceived as anti-mortgage by the industry. Besides, some Republicans, and the White House were also opposed. Amendments were adopted to escrow accounts for risky loan applicants and establish federal standards for appraisers by the H.R.3837 proposal, clarifying provisions dealing with liabilities for the companies, and excluding loans insured by the FHA. But, with the opposition of the Mortgage Bankers Association the legislation went no further.

The last highly representative hearing of 2007 was the "Accelerating Loan Modifications, Improving Foreclosure Prevention, and Enhancing Enforcement", on December 6, which aggregates economic interest – Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association, American Securitization Forum, and Conference of State Bank Supervisors – and social interests – Center for Responsible Lending, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, HOPE NOW Alliance, and National Community Reinvestment Coalition – besides government institutions – Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, National Credit Union Administration, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and Office of Thrift Supervision – and the George Washington University. After this hearing, the proposal S.2338 passed in Senate.

In the beginning of 2008, a proposal to provide stimulus was approved by a bipartisan agreement with the blessing of the White House. The centerpiece of the bill was a plan to send checks – advance refunds on credits against taxes owed for fiscal 2008 – to most taxpayers. However, it increased the size of mortgages that Fannie and Freddie could purchase and the FHA could insure. The huge bank losses, resulting from rising forecloses and a parallel drop in home prices, were leading to a series of major bankruptcies and takeovers, so the two chambers began writing a broader bill to ease the mortgage crisis. The crisis swept away the differences over mortgage provisions, and the Congress agree in the approval of a foreclose relief bill. The disagreement point of the proposal was allowing bankruptcy judges to modify subprime mortgages, including reducing the outstanding principal. Republicans, the White House, and the lending industry argued that it would hurt all borrowers because lenders would raise their interested rates to offset the chance that a loan could be modified. So, an attempt to restore the bankruptcy language was killed in the Senate. The House tried to reintroduced the bankruptcy issue through the HOPE VI Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2007 (H.R. 3524), which introduced a new program to help borrowers avoid foreclose by refinancing mortgages at lower rates, but it was again stopped in the Senate (Congressional Quarterly 2007-08).

At the end of the day, the Senate used a House-passed energy bill, the proposal H.R. 3221, to get around the requirement that tax provisions originate in the House,⁶⁸ deleting the energy language and replacing it with the mortgage package. After the approval of H.R. 3221 in the Senate, there were two of the 8 investigated hearings that happened during the time in which Senate and House were resolving their differences. The first was the "The Foreclosure Prevention and Sound Mortgage Servicing Act of 2008" which gathered

⁶⁸ The Constitution explicitly requires that all tax measures originate in the House of Representatives, the body that the founders believed would be the "people's house," to make sure that citizens had a voice in their own taxation (Kettl 2012, 366).

economic interests – American Securitization Forum, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Mortgage Bankers Association, and Countrywide Financial – and social interests – Center for Responsible Lending, National Consumer Law Center, Neighbor Works America, and HOPE NOW Alliance – besides government institutions – U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, and U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs. The second hearing was "A Review of Mortgage Servicing Practices and Foreclosure Mitigation" which included aggregate economic interests – Mortgage Bankers Association, American Bankers Association, Bank of America, and Wells Fargo – and social interests – Center for Responsible Lending, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, National Council of La Raza, and HOPE NOW Alliance.

Shortly thereafter, the House passed a much broader version of H.R. 3221, including a strong, independent regulator for Fannie and Freddie, and an affordable-housing funding. Therefore, the mortgage relief bill created the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) to regulate and oversight Fannie and Freddie, and the Home Loan Bank system. The FHFA could restrict the GSE's asset growth, including the expansion of its mortgage portfolios, and even dismiss directors or executives if the GSE was found to be significantly undercapitalized. It also created the new affordable-housing trust fund (0.42% of the value of newly purchased mortgages), and a program, introduced by the Senate, to help state and local governments buy foreclosed homes and residential properties (CDBG⁶⁹ program). Besides that, the bill increased the size of individual mortgage loans that Fannie and Freddie could buy, raising the federal debt limit by \$800 billion, and providing \$15.1 billion in housing tax deductions. Finally, brokers were required to be registered and licensed in order to originate mortgages loans.

⁶⁹ Community Development Block Grants.

There were 43 public hearings in the 110 Congress term related to the debated main issues. It would be expected that there was an increase in public hearings in August 2007, when the financial crisis first manifested itself. Instead, there were representative hearings the whole year. The apex was the hearing 110074, Legislative Proposals on Reforming Mortgage Practices, which happened when most legislation had passed House. The hearing united 12 major stakeholders and the government. Moreover, it would be expected that there was an increase in public hearings in August 2008, when three large U.S. financial institutions failed, and in September, when the financial shock led to a financial panic in the last few months of 2008. Instead, this period got few representative hearings, and the important ones were concentrated in the period in which House and Senate were resolving their differences to approve H.R.3221. Government also were highly participative in this policy game: it was presented in 6 of the 9 most representative hearings, and in a total of 12 times by the side of representatives hearings: 110015, 110018, 110021, 110023, 110074, 110081, 110083, 110956, 110957, 110108, 110122, and 110139. Finally, there are three coincidences between economic interests (E) public hearings and legislation approval: 110012 and 110061 and 110103.

The Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009 (S. 896, and H.R. 1106)

In 2009, the Congress approved legislation helping homebuyers stave off foreclosures and increase the liquidity of FDIC and NCUA.⁷⁰ The bill offered homeowners on the brink of foreclosure the chance of refinance into 30-year, fixed rate mortgages insured by the FHA. It also (1) altered the yearly insurance premiums, giving the government the flexibility to lower them, (2) provided renters new protection from eviction when owners of

⁷⁰ Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and Credit Union Administration (NCUA).

their homes went to foreclosure, and (3) authorized \$2,2 billion to expand a program on federal shelters and homeless assistance. On the House Floor, the new wording gave bankruptcy judges the option of reducing interest rates before directly cutting the principal of a mortgage, it also stipulated that the lender would receive 90 percent of the profit resulting from selling the home within one year, going down 10 percent each year until reaching 10 percent. Republicans and the banking industry argued that judges should be required to consider other options before reducing the principal (Congressional Quarterly 2009-10).

In the beginning of the first policy game in 2009 – between the approval of H.R. 1106 by the House, and the approval of S. 896 by the Senate – there were two highly representative hearings. The first was the "Mortgage Lending Reform: A Comprehensive Review of the American Mortgage System" in March 11, which gathers Economic interests – Mortgage Bankers Association, American Bankers Association, American Securitization Forum, Appraisal Institute, National Association of Home Builders, Conference of State Bank Supervisors, National Association of Mortgage Brokers, and National Association of Realtors – and social interests – Center for Responsible Lending, National Consumer Law Center, National Community Reinvestment Coalition, and National Council of La Raza – besides government institution – Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System – and the National Urban League Policy Institute. The hearings 111011 happened after H.R. 1106 passed the House.

The second was "The Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act of 2009", in April 23, which aggregates economic interests – Mortgage Bankers Association, National Association of Mortgage Brokers, American Bankers Association, Appraisal Institute, Conference of State Bank Supervisors, Independent Community Bankers of America, National Association of Realtors, and Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association – and social interests – Center for Responsible Lending, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, National Community Reinvestment Coalition, National Consumer Law Center, National Council of La Raza, and National Apartment Association and

National Multi Housing Council – besides government institutions – Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Financial Services Roundtable. The hearing 111025 happened one day before S. 896 was introduced in the House.

After the hearings, the Senate passed the proposal S.896 which became law. The bill, however, did not include the controversial allowance to bankruptcy judges to modify the terms of mortgages on primary residences that were undergoing foreclosure. The financial industry fiercely fought against the proposal, saying that if bankruptcy courts could adjust the terms of mortgages on primary residences, it would force banks to raise interest rates for all borrowers (Congressional Quarterly 2009-10).

There were 32 public hearings in the 111 Congress term related to the debated main issues. The correlation between the public hearings and the mentioned proposals showed that the period in which there were more representative public hearings coincide with the period in which the decisions were made. It is noticeable that there is a concentration of representative hearings in the first semester of 2009, when all important legislation was introduced and approved.

It is interesting to note that in this Congress term the two main stakeholders of each side – the Mortgage Bankers Association and the Center for Responsible Lending – were present with government in the hearing 111028 – Legislative Solutions for Preventing Loan Modification and Foreclosure Rescue Fraud – in the same day that the proposal S. 896 was approved by the Senate. The presence of government was also high: it was represented in 2 of the 3 most representative hearings, and in a total of 12 times by the side of representatives hearings present in hearings: 111011, 111025, 111028, 111091, 111113, 111115, 111121, 111122, 111260, 111473, 111987, and 111166. Finally, there is only one coincidence between economic-elite interests constituted in public hearings and legislation approval: hearing 111006.

The Housing Finance Reform and Taxpayer Protection Act of 2014 (S. 1217), and the Partnership to Strengthen Homeownership Act of 2014 (H.R. 5055)⁷¹

The Financial Services Committee had approved an overhaul of the housing finance system measure in 2014, and the House was pushing a proposal (H.R. 2767) to remove government support from the mortgage market. Yet the Senate Banking committee had introduced the proposal S. 1217 that served as a base for Johnson and Crapo's proposal which included a government guarantee, in order to add stability to the economy, keep costs reasonable for borrowers and renters, and ensured fair access to the secondary market for all lenders. The proposal determined that Fannie and Freddie would disappear after five years, and it would be created the Federal Mortgage Insurance Corp. that was designed to provide liquidity in the mortgage market. Also first time homebuyers would pay 3.5 percent down payment, and other borrowers would pay 5 percent.

The Obama administration, the Mortgage Bankers Association, and the National Association of Home Builders lobbied for an overhaul, but some they were concerned over the new Federal Mortgage Insurance Corporation that the legislation would create. Besides, some Democrats were worried about the future of home ownership for lower-income borrowers, and the Financial Services Committee criticized the plan because it provided a mortgage-backed security with an explicit government backstop. A Republican proposal (Waters' bill) in the House committee, supported by the Center for Responsible Lending,

⁷¹ Congressional Quarterly (2005-14) and the specialized literature say nothing about important legislation debated in the 112 Congress term. The rivalry between Chambers, and between committees that were in different parties in both chambers, may be the cause of blocked legislation. There were 31 public hearings in this Congress term related to the set of issues, but none of them were highly representative. It is noticeable that the two main stakeholders of each side – the Mortgage Bankers Association and the Center for Responsible Lending – were present with government in two hearings: 112044 – "Mortgage Servicing: an Examination of the Role of Federal Regulators in Settlement Negotiations and the Future of Mortgage Servicing Standards" – and 112666 – "Helping Responsible Homeowners Save Money Through Refinancing". Government was present in hearing number 112007, 112044, 112047, 112139, and 112134.

established a lender-owned cooperative that would act as the single issuer of government-guaranteed mortgage-backed securities. It was aligned with the Senate proposals which required a cushion of private capital to stand before any use of tax payers' funds. The proposal got opposition from the housing industry, and the risk of tampering with the housing market led senators in both parties balking at moving ahead. Without a crisis to spur lawmakers to act, and since Fannie and Freddie had repaid their \$187.5 billion bailout, it was easier to allow the status quo to continue (Congressional Quarterly 2013-14)


There were 20 public hearings in this Congress term related to the set of issues, but there was no highly representative policy network constituted in these policy games, and there was either no government present in representative hearings. There was, however, both – the Mortgage Bankers Association and the Center for Responsible Lending – presented with government in the hearing 113032 – "Examining the Dodd-Frank Act Hampers Home Ownership" – and 113058 – "How Prospective and Current Homeowners Will Be Harmed by the CFPB's Qualified Mortgage Rule". Finally, there is only one coincidence between economic-elite interests constituted in public hearings and legislation approval: hearing 113159.

POLICY NETWORK ANALYSIS

The main purpose of this survey is to provide evidence for inferring the existence of a mortgage policy network, instead of a bunch of loose stakeholders. There were 9 respondents among 22 stakeholders, totalizing 40% of the network.⁷²


⁷² In order to avoid a big questionnaire, only stakeholders over 8 presences for economic interests, and 7 over social interests, were considered.

Figure 4. Mortgage Policy Network Discussion and Collaboration



Legend:
 Blue nodes: economic interest;
 Red nodes: social interest;
 Octagonal shape: stakeholders which answered the survey;
 Tie size: it is proportional to the intensity of discussions related to Congress' proposals between two stakeholders;
 Tie color: it is a gradation according to the collaboration between stakeholders related to Congress' proposals:
 Yellow: collaborate in few proposals;
 Orange: collaborate in half the proposals;
 Light green: collaborate in most proposals;
 Dark green: collaborate always;
 Gray: never collaborate.

Figure 5. Mortgage Policy Network Information and Advice Flow



Legend:

Blue nodes: economic interest;

Red nodes: social interest;

Octagonal shape: stakeholders which answered the survey;

Tie size: it is proportional to the frequency of information flow between two stakeholders;

Tie color: it is a gradation according to the advice frequency between stakeholders:

Yellow: ask for advice annually;

Orange: ask for advice semiannually;

Light green: ask for advice monthly;

Dark green: ask for advice weekly;

Gray: never ask for advice.

Despite the percentage of respondents – which influences the network analysis – there is no isolated stakeholders in both discussion/collaboration, and information/advice networks. The proportion of pair of stakeholders that can reach each other by a path is 100% in both networks, which means that all stakeholders are connected.

Besides, the cohesiveness of the network, which is given by the density measure,⁷³ is 0.398 for the discussion/collaboration network, and it is 0.351 for the information/advice network, which means that almost 40% of the stakeholders in the first case and 35% in the second were connected directly to everyone else. This is a highly dense network, considering the percentage of respondents. The density and the clustering coefficient values are also higher than for a random network (Erdős-Rényi model; Erdős and Rényi 1960) of the same size. Therefore, through the characteristics of the ties among the stakeholders, it is safe to infer the existence of the mortgage policy network.

Beyond that, applying the least squares method for linear regression to measure the neighborhood connectivity distribution,⁷⁴ I found that the data fitted well the regression line well. Since it is a decreasing function in k , edges between low connected and highly connected nodes (the ones which not answered the questionnaire and the ones which answered it) prevail in the network.

⁷³ Density is the proportion of ties in a network relative to the total number possible.

⁷⁴ The connectivity of a node is the number of its neighbors. The neighborhood connectivity of a node n is defined as the average connectivity of all neighbors of n . The neighborhood connectivity distribution gives the average of the neighborhood connectivities of all nodes n with k neighbors for $k = 0.1$.

Table 10. Mortgage Network Statistics

Measure	Discussion/Collaboration	Information/Advice
Connected by a path	100%	100%
Isolated nodes	0	0
Avg. Number of Neighbors	8.364	7.364
Network density	0.398	0.351
Neighborhood connectivity distribution - Correlation	0.940	0.910
Neighborhood connectivity distribution - R-squared	0.883	0.828
Network centralization	0.610	0.557
Network heterogeneity	0.552	0.651
Clustering coefficient	0.655	0.618
Average clustering coefficient distribution - Correlation	0.974	0.818
Average clustering coefficient distribution - R-squared	0.948	0.669

The discussion/collaboration network is more centralized,⁷⁵ but the information/advice network has more tendency to contain hub stakeholders. It is notable that collaboration (green and orange lines) is higher inside the two groups (social and economic) than between the two groups. Through the clustering analysis, there is higher likelihood that two associates of a stakeholder are associates themselves in the discussion/collaboration network, than there is in the information/advice network.

The respondents also nominated 10 other organizations that are not in the hearings lists, but, in their view, influence legislation approval in the committees: the Credit Union National Association, the Financial Services Roundtable, the National Urban League, the Americans for Financial Reform, the National Rural Housing Coalition, the National Housing

⁷⁵ Centralization is the difference between the numbers of links for each node divided by maximum possible sum of differences. A centralized network will have many of its links dispersed around one or few nodes, while a decentralized network is one in which there is little variation between the numbers of links each node possesses.

Resource Center, the Habitat Housing Resource Center, the Habitat for Humanity, the Independent Insurance Agents and Brokers, and the National Fair Housing Alliance.

CONCLUSION – FROM LOBBYING TO GOVERNANCE

There is a clear correlation between highly representative public hearings and important legislative outputs. So, if there is a representative mortgage policy network present in public hearings, then important legislation is more likely to pass. Policy games with representative hearings were more prolific, and policy games which had highly representative hearings were the only ones which approved important legislation. There was also evidence of a temporal coincidence between highly representative public hearings and important decision making points in the legislative process related to the outputs of important proposals. Therefore, empirical evidence suggests that there is more going on in legislation approval than a majority party governing, or an economic elite overcoming government. The appearance of highly representative public hearings close important decisions related to the most important proposals approved in the period suggest that there is a relationship between representative policy networks and legislation approval.

Nevertheless, it doesn't mean that economic interests have the same weight of other interests in Congress decision making. There were almost twice as much stakeholders representing economic interests, than representing social interests in the mortgage policy network. Moreover, the one which appear most in the business side – the Mortgage Bankers Association – had two times more presence than the one which appear most in the social side – the Center for Responsible Lending. So, there is evidence that the participation of economic groups were more intense during the analyzed policy games. The finance stakeholders – Mortgage Bankers Association, American Bankers Association, Fannie Mae, and Wells Fargo – and the real estate industry – National Association of Realtors, National Association of Home Builders, and National Association of Mortgage Brokers – were present in hearings frequently in all Congress terms. But the apex of their participation were 110

and 112 Congress terms, and there were too few temporal coincidences between public hearings which had only economic stakeholders and legislation approval.

On the other hand, the stakeholders representing social interests had an increase in their participation in the 110 and 111 Congress terms, when the two important bills were approved. But it was also when the Democrats were majority in both chambers, what may have a synergic influence in the participation of the consumers associations and the minorities groups. If the mortgage industry must negotiate with these social organizations to enact legislation, these stakeholders must have the power to block legislation as well. It is soon to say that they are empowering citizens in our reinvented government, but at least they are acting as a counter power to the financial industry in Congress. Besides, it is naïve to suppose that these stakeholders represent all affiliates they claim to, but there is also no evidence that they represent only narrow interests of a small group who captured the entity. Since these stakeholders enjoy privileged access to government institutions, due to their particular democratic or representative added value, they should be open and accountable in order to guarantee their responsiveness to the social or economic segment represented. But this is a problem that most governments prefer do not envisage.⁷⁶

It is remarkable that individual institutions – like Wells Fargo, J.P. Morgan, Bank of America, etc. – do not represent any economic segment interests, but only their own interest. If one consider that they are also represented by the bankers and mortgage associations, these companies have a privileged access that would be not necessary, given the role of the national associations as the legitimated spokespeople for the mortgage policy. Therefore, even though, these 'too big to fail' organizations are able to pass into the

⁷⁶ Despite the fact that it is important to cognize the nature of this relationship, making an assessment of its control mechanisms is costly and it is not an intrinsic function of the government/state doing it. One can imagine the problems that emerge when a legislative house starts to require that non-governmental organizations prove the efficiency of their control mechanisms in order to be allowed to participate in public policy debate.

territorial – they have national operation – and thematic tests; they should be considered by government institutions as a group and not as individuals stakeholders. On the other hand, consumers' associations do not organize themselves in order to only represent people's interests in the mortgage policy, they have a much broader purpose. Despite the fact that there are some specific organizations representing only people's housing interests – like the National Low Income Housing Coalition, and the HOPE NOW Alliance – they do not constitute the majority or even the most active players. Besides, minorities groups – like the National Council of La Raza, and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People – should not pass in the thematic test, since their purpose is not only fight for housing entitlements. However, when minorities are able to organize responsibly to put forward its demands, and governmental institutions are responsive to them, it means that democracy is working as it supposed to.

Despite these detected problems, it seems that the social portion of the mortgage policy network is working as a counter power of economic-elite interests. Far from being mere witnesses, these stakeholders have an active role in the legislative process. This also means that – besides corporations, business and professional associations – mass based groups – in this case consumers and minorities associations – also play an important role in Congress' formulation process, contradicting Gilens and Page (2014) findings. Finally, the influence of stakeholders which do not represent social or economic interests in legislation approval – like other governmental institutions, and technical and scientific institutions – cannot be disregarded. Despite being circumstantially aligned to economic or social interests, these stakeholders constitute a different portion of the mortgage policy network, and there is no evidence in the specialized literature nor in this study to support that other

governmental institutions⁷⁷ or technical/scientific⁷⁸ institutions influence decisively important legislation approval in Congress. So, their role can be defined as coadjutant.

Therefore, this empirical evidence suggests that representative policy networks influence decision making in Congress. The mortgage policy is better explained as a result of the competition among stakeholders that have irreconcilable rival interests,⁷⁹ but who tends put their differences aside and collaborate to achieve more favorable outputs when it is necessary. Since it is a non-zero-sum repetitive game, this collaborative behavior tends to be reinforced. When these stakeholders form representative policy networks, they become another stratum between government and society. Thus, these policy networks operate to complement the state, and government institutions become responsive to them. Regardless of the party that won the elections, the mortgage policy network will be present, as an indispensable factor for the passage of important legislation. At the end of the day, these stakeholders are a factor of stability, and the competitive play within and between them is all what our democracy is about. So, the question is not anymore if government was captured, but how the struggle among these rival interests shapes decisions in Congress. In a context in which governance is more important than government, it is time to treat the

⁷⁷ The government participation reached its peak in hearings participation in the 111th Congress: 16 appearances (5 in the 109, 13 in the 110, 9 in the 112, and just 3 in the 113). The stakeholders which appear most were the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (40 times), the U.S. Department of the Treasury (18 times), and the Federal Reserve (16 times).

⁷⁸ In relation to the technical and scientific stakeholders, the George Mason University (12 times), the American Enterprise Institute (11 times), the Center for American Progress (10 times), the Cato Institute (9 times), and the New York University (6 times) were the ones which appear most in hearings. It is remarkable that in 113th Congress there were 4 hearings with only technical and scientific stakeholders.

⁷⁹ As it was discussed before, both sides – representing economic and social interests – also engage in a struggle for the construction of meaning in people's minds. This stable source of power (Castells 2011) cannot be despised, because it shapes the debate and establish the range of alternatives. American people believe that huge financial institutions and free-flowing capital markets are crucial for their lives. On the other hand they believe that housing is not a social right, the culture of "one must gain from one's own efforts" is too rooted to permit that housing become a universal right.

participation of policy networks in Congress as an essential part of the operation of our reinvented government.⁸⁰ It is time to change from lobbying to democratic governance.

⁸⁰ The difficulty in perceiving the relationship between these policy stakeholders' governance and the legislative outputs in Congress is because, as Aldous Huxley feared, we have so much information that we are drowned in a sea of irrelevance, unable to separate what is trivial and what is important for legislation approval.

CHAPTER 5

AGRICULTURE POLICY CASE

THE APPROPRIATIONS AND FARM BILLS

According to the theory, the agriculture policy benefits a well-defined group but impose, or appear to impose, no visible costs on any other well-defined group. So they will attract the support of stakeholders representing the benefited group and the opposition of none. This kind of concentrated benefits and distributed costs policy (Wilson 1995), however, do not generate continuing organized conflict. In fact, there are no evidence in the specialized literature about agriculture associations struggling with nutrition associations for tax money, regulations, and entitlements. Instead, agriculture stakeholders compete among each other for the same benefits. So, in order to test the influence of a representative policy network in important agriculture legislation approved in the period, it is necessary first to identify the stakeholders representing the competing interests, and then analyze their governance.⁸¹ The main claim is: If there is a representative policy network present, then important legislation is more likely to pass. Thus, the appearance of strongly representative public hearings is expected to happen close to important decisions related to the outputs. On the other hand, if just stakeholders representing local farmers'

⁸¹ Governance refers to the interactions by which public and private stakeholders coordinate their interdependencies in order to solve complex policy problems through horizontal coordination between interdependent actor, realizing public policies and delivering public services (Klijn and Koppenjan 2012).

interests are presented in hearings when legislation is approved, then the open models or unbounded policymaking theories are more likely to be correct.⁸²

In the literature, agricultural policy has been a classic illustration of how private organizations – formed around common economic interests – influence public policy to exploit American institutions. This paradigmatic case of interest group capture has become the orthodox approach to American politics, and Agriculture policy provides the best example of this phenomenon. In the words of Lowi (1972), agriculture exemplified 'the control of public policy by organized groups undermined the legitimacy of democratic institutions'. "Agriculture is the field of American government where the distinction between public and private has come closer to being completely eliminated by private expropriation of public authority through the iron triangle" (Sheingate 2001, 6). "The assumption is that only a few policy players, including congressional committee members, key lobbyists, and the agency officials who implement programs, dominate any single public policy. Others have been seen as largely excluded from these specialized, tripartite networks" (Browne 1995). So, these stakeholders have dominated and limited the scope of the agricultural policymaking process, resulting in stable policy benefitting primarily the farm constituency (Huelskamp 1997).

There are other authors, however, that consider this interest group dominance as a false impression caused by the transparency of the American political deliberation, in which access is confounding with influence. In a comparative perspective, private interests

⁸² The literature on institutions and interest group power are divided in (1) closed models or bounded policymaking - scholars who argue that policymaking is made by subsystems which are centered on specific policy areas, and enjoy considerable policymaking autonomy - and in (2) open model or unbounded policymaking - scholars who argue that policymaking is open to a multiplicity of competing interests and a fluctuating number and types of policy participants, which makes it decentralized and unstable. Instead of institutionalized relationships, there seems to be ad hoc networks where stakeholders look less for long-term alliances on recurring issues than for short-term gain on policymaking.

exercise greater control over policy outputs in countries where political deliberation is less transparent (Sheingate 2001, 248). To Browne (1995), continuing to think of policy networks in terms of stable triangles is unrealistic. Instead of institutionalized relationships, there seems to be ad hoc networks where stakeholders look less for long-term alliances on recurring issues than for short-term gain on policymaking.

Therefore, the literature is divided in closed and opened policy systems, or bounded and unbounded policymaking. Iron triangle, sub-governments, policy communities, bounded policymaking are some of the terms used to describe this closed model; these subsystems are centered on specific policy areas, and enjoy considerable policymaking autonomy. On the other hand, many scholars argue that policymaking is open to a multiplicity of competing interests and a fluctuating number and types of policy participants, which makes it decentralized and unstable. So, terms like issue networks and unbounded policymaking are more appropriate (Huelskamp 1997). As Sheingate (2001, 12) summarized, "the literature on institutions and interest group power – particularly as it is applied to agriculture – is also mixed in its conclusions. Scholars have used U.S. farm policy to exemplify the autonomy of government actors (Finegold and Skocpol), the capture of public policy (Lowi; McConnel), the evolution of relatively closed policy subsystem (Hansen, Jones), and the expansion of an issue network" (Browne 1995). This diversity of conclusion and opinion reveals that this relationship between interest groups and policy outputs remains unclear.

In a historical perspective, Browne (1995) considers three stages for the agriculture policy. The first is in the 1920s, when an agricultural-development policy game culminated in the cooperation of farm interests representing the dominant crops of their respective regions (Browne 1995, 134). In that time, the interest group universe has expanded from only four key farm organizations (Huelskamp 1997). The second stage of policy games generated rural/urban and farm/labor coalitions in the 1950s and 1960s and led to support of food-stamps programs inside the farm policy and labor policies beyond it (Browne 1995, 134). Farmers and workers never created a coalition like in Scandinavian countries, but as

partners in the New Deal coalition, they did provide the political foundation for food stamps and farm subsidies (Sheingate 2001, 245). Between 1919 and 1981, the Farm Bureau came to occupy a privileged place in Congressional farm politics because of its capacity to supply politicians with reliable information on constituency preferences (Sheingate 2001, 10). Once reform interests were integrated into policy bases, coalition-building ceased to be necessary, and low-income food programs became part of a standing domain agreement (Browne 1995, 134). In the third stage, besides nutrition, other social and economic interests entered in the mix of constituencies: environmental and conservationists' groups, agribusiness, food consumers, and advocates for the rural and urban poor (Browne 1995, 134; Orden, Blandford, and Josling 2009). A host of non-producers' interests gained access to the farm policy process, and maintaining this broad coalition was vital to enacting a farm bill and provides multiple paths to securing congressional majorities (Orden, Blandford, and Josling 2009).

So, coalition politics in Congress and a pluralistic interest group environment diluted the influence of farmers and their representatives over the content of agricultural policy (Sheingate 2001, 239). Diffusely interested associations have become less relevant to policymaking when they speak on behalf of an entire occupation, profession, or segment of the economy. The American Farm Bureau Federation can no more negotiate all major interest group views within the policy network. Besides, as the number of farms declined, so did the capacity of rural influence; with a farm population in perpetual decline since the mid-1930s, urban voters simply would overpower farm district representatives; after all, not a single congressional district had a 20 percent farm population in the 1990s (Browne 1995, 15, 84). Moreover, an increasing suburban representation constituents who receive neither food stamps nor farm subsidies – should threaten the formed broad coalition, and be reflected in public policy (Sheingate 2001, 246). To make it worse, the sector was facing a decremental budgeting, and this fact should significantly increase the level of conflict among stakeholders, as demonstrated by Pressman and Wildavsk (1983). The agriculture network is not a cozy community. Agricultural interest groups are not able to unify under a

single banner the divergence forces among regional groups of producers, what generates conflict (Sheingate 2001, 239). Due to these myriad of agriculture disputes, the agriculture network lacks cohesion, and shows no effective integration of its players. Since they don't first agreed among themselves, when congressman sense that stakeholders are divided, they become less relevant.

However, despite the policy network expanding considerably – from only four key farm organizations in 1920 to 564 stakeholders in 1990 (Huelskamp 1997) – there was no evidence of declining farm-sector influence. As well, an urbanized national majority has not destroyed the influence of a small farm population (Browne 1995, 188). Though there apparently were some minor policy changes in possible response to network expansion, the increase of the network did not have significant impact in the agriculture policy. Four reasons are presented for this. First, the rural states are still over-represented in the Senate. Second, farmers are a small but well-organized – from the grassroots up to Washington circles – vocal minorities which cannot be ignored by congressman without assuming high risks in the next election. These ones who speak out the loudest in public can provide a backlash to congressman even in districts with small farmers' constituency (Browne 1995, 188). Contradictorily, the level of conflict was not significantly expanded when the network grew. As Huelskamp (1997) highlighted, the decremental budgeting should bring more conflict, but there were no substantial changes in terms of conflict nor budget. Finally, farm subsidies and nutrition programs are an important component of the American welfare state. So, weakening the agriculture policy might means weakening the political foundations of the welfare state as well (Sheingate 2001, 245). This is reflected in the geopolitics level either, as stated by Orden, Blandford, and Josling (2009), "it is not desirable for the United States been dependent on unstable places in the Third World for a safe and abundant supply of food". So in an international context, the U.S. is unlikely to support multilateral trade agreements on the World Trade Organization in detriment of the domestic farm safety net (Orden and Zulauf 2015).

Browne (1995, 188) provides an alternative explanation in favor of the unbounded model; farmers are not only organized into Washington interest groups, and the farm sector influence is more than organized lobbies exercising power in Congress. These groups lost their influence because they no longer tie district constituency to organized policy goals. Policies were designed for large areas of the country or for the entire nation, and little information was available from established lobbies about how local farmers, business, and economies would be affected (Browne 1995, 140). Since interest groups fail to attend to localized problems and to reflect local needs, congressmen are drawn to their districts and to local farmers confidants for cues and advice, constituent informants appear to be replacing interest group representatives as sources of information for congressmen (Browne 1995, 140). Since both the committees and the congressmen have shown preoccupation for satisfying district constituencies, constituents and districts matter in policymaking (Browne 1995, 140, 185).

However, it is pretty obvious that congressmen must pay attention to their farmer constituency, preferring district solutions to increase their chances to be reelected. In fact, the policy network expansion, the demographic changing – with the reduction of farm constituents and the increase of suburban constituents – and the supposed shift to local interests are not enough to explain why the agriculture policy still pretty much the same.⁸³ Neither is the WTO and the international context pressure enough to motivate major policy changes. It means that even fragmented, quarrelsome, and increasingly minority, a few farmers interest groups seem to be able to secure policy outputs inside government

⁸³ It is important to highlight that governmental institutions in U.S. are not designed to facilitate policy change. Federalism, separated powers, and other institutions believed to fragment public authority do not merely protect private exchange from the encroachment of public power; these same institutional characteristics also protect public functions from the encroachment of private interests. The Framers had to balance the fear of an interventionist state against the danger that a weak government would easily succumb to the will of a particular faction (Sheingate 2001, 247).

institutions. Since the unbounded model in terms of interest group participation does not reflect the expected policy instability and change, even in the face of changing and expanding the set of participants in the structure, it means that some relatively stable policymaking process remains at the core and limits policy change (Huelskamp 1997). According to Orden and Zulauf (2015), the last four farm bills – 1996, 2002, 2008, and 2014 – were "enacted with large bipartisan congressional majorities under different control of Congress and the presidency. Each bill engendered extensive debate and to varying degrees turned the farm safety net in a different direction while continuing support for farmers and expanding the farm bill coalition". It seems that powerful interest-group lobbying is still the driving factor behind farm bills, and the most important variable to predict policy outputs.

In order to get empirical evidence for or against the bounded and the unbounded models, I test the influence of a representative policy network in legislation approval, in a 10-year period – between 2005 and 2014 – in which there were 2 farm bills – 2008 and 2014 – and 10 appropriations bills. There were also a total of 224 public hearings in the House Committee on Agriculture, and 147 in the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, in which 66 of them focus on farm and appropriations bills. According to Congressional Quarterly (2005-14) and specialized literature, the set of issues related to the farm and appropriation bills are: nutrition aid programs; agriculture subsidy programs; conservation; trade and global food aid; rural development; and food safety. The main idea is testing the relationship between the presence of these competing stakeholders in public hearings and the most important legislative outputs in the period.

MAJORITY PARTIES AND LEGISLATIVE PRODUCTION

The farm bill that passed by Congress in 1933, as part of Roosevelt's New Deal, was composed of two dichotomous parts: agriculture subsidy programs, and nutrition aid programs. Since then, every five years or so, Congress passes an omnibus bill with all affairs under the purview of the U.S. Department of Agriculture; and annually the Congress pass

the agriculture and nutrition policy as one of the 12 regular appropriations measures. Besides agriculture and nutrition, there are also four other main categories of issues in the bills: conservation, rural development, food safety, and trade and global food aid.

In the studied period, the appropriations bills were generally 80 percent mandatory, reaching 75 percent just in 2009. The main investment are the nutrition programs – composed basically by food stamps (Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program-SNAP), school lunches for low-income children and other child-nutrition programs, like the Women, Infants and Children program (WIC) – which were responsible for half the investments in 2005, and 2/3 in 2014. Basically, the increase of resources during the period was absorbed by the nutrition programs, which doubled despite the dispute between the Democrats – pro expansion – and the contrarian Republicans. There was also a significant increase in spending related to food safety and discretionary spending in the period.

The Agriculture subsidy programs, on the other hand, didn't get an enough increase to recover losses due to inflation in the time period.⁸⁴ The main programs were (1) direct payments: fixed but declining annual payments to producers of major crops – corn, wheat, sorghum, barley, oats, cotton, rice, and soybeans – in which payments are made to producers and landowners based on their historical participation in commodity price and income support programs, whether or not they continue to grow anything on the land; (2) countercyclical payments: which pay producers of major crops when market prices dropped below a target price defined by the government; (3) loan-deficiency payments: permit farmers to hold off selling some of their production at harvest, when market prices were usually in their lowest; and (4) marketing assistance loans: allowed farmers to borrow from the government using their crops as collateral until they sold their harvests.

⁸⁴ Only 2006 and 2007 presented a real increase, and for 2014, considering the annual inflation, the amount should be \$32,743,046,000.

Table 11. Where The Money Goes - Fiscal Appropriations (in thousands of dollars of new budget authority):

Year	Nutrition	Agriculture	Conservation	Rural development	Trade and Global aid	Food Safety and FDA	Discretionary spending
2005	52,488,361	27,041,494	991,901	2,413,768	1,520,935	1,450,098	16,832,417
2006	58,894,142	35,403,790	994,165	2,503,055	1,468,711	1,474,721	16,780,000
2007	57,029,981	34,030,340	0	2,499,975	1,478,565	1,574,194	17,811,500
2008	60,056,845	24,250,902	0	2,333,957	1,213,525	1,716,770	18,093,000
2009	76,155,162	25,727,414	0	2,732,291	1,499,405	2,051,397	20,662,300
2010	82,782,603	30,037,787	0	2,978,772	2,089,499	2,357,089	23,400,640
2011	89,655,095	29,490,110	0	2,430,776	1,891,341	2,457,001	20,220,104
2012	105,553,001	24,970,211	0	2,250,233	1,835,667	2,505,809	19,833,294
2013	104,438,539	28,306,792	0	2,217,755	1,799,097	2,466,237	20,510,000
2014	108,585,603	29,938,096	0	2,297,709	1,838,472	2,560,693	20,880,000

Source: (Congressional Quarterly 2005-14)

According to Congressional Quarterly (2005-14) and the appropriations bills, there are six main topics that delimit the debate about the agriculture and nutrition policy: nutrition aid programs, agriculture subsidy programs, conservation, trade and global fund aid, rural development, and food safety. Therefore, issues related with energy – increasing discretionary funds, and eliminate incentives and royalty relief for oil and gas companies (Congressional Quarterly 2007), new incentives for alternative energy, and development of bio fuels in (Congressional Quarterly 2008) – and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) – regulating the U.S. futures and options market (Congressional Quarterly 2009), and trim spending for CFTC (Congressional Quarterly 2013) – were not considered.

As well as the policy issues, the proposals introduced in the period were not all related to farm and appropriations bills. According to Congressional Quarterly (2005-14), four cases which involved seven proposals were the most important in the period:

- a) The 2008 farm bill called Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 (H.R. 2419 and H.R. 6124);
- b) The Appropriations Act, 2010 (H.R.2997), the first after a presidency change;
- c) The Federal Agriculture Reform and Risk Management Act of 2012 (H.R. 6083); the One-year Extension of the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 (H.R. 6228), and the Agriculture Reform, Food, and Jobs Act of 2012 (S. 3240) in order to check the failure of the 112 Congress term in legislation approval,
- d) The 2014 farm bill called Agricultural Act of 2014 (H.R. 2642).

During these five Congress terms, there were four different alignments among government institutions. In 2005/2006 and 2009/2010, Republicans and Democrats respectively dominate government, but there was important legislation approved only in the 111th Congress. The 2008 farm bill was approved over an Executive veto, and the 2014 farm bill was approved under a misaligned government. The well-known rivalry between the Chambers may be the cause of the 112th Congress a fiasco, but the same didn't happen in the 113th Congress. It is also noted that there is an approximate average of 80 proposals considered by Congress' committees per Congress term, no matter the number of presented proposals. Excepting the 113th Congress, the number of proposals that pass one or both Chambers is not that different as well.

Table 12. Majority and Agriculture Legislative Production

Congress term	2005/06	2007/08	2009/10	2011/12	2013/14
Executive Government	Republican	Republican	Democratic	Democratic	Democratic
Majority in Chambers	Republican	Democratic	Democratic	Rep.(H.R)/Dem.(S)	Rep.(H.R)/Dem.(S)
Proposals introduced	150	213	138	81	147
Committee Consideration	83	90	70	81	84
Passed Committee	12	12	16	5	11
Passed one Chamber	11	12	14	5	10
Passed both Chambers	4	7	6	0	10
Became Law	4	7	6	0	1
Important Law	0	1	1	0	1

Source: (Congressional Quarterly 2005-14; congress.gov 2005-14)

In fact, considering the Congress term as the unit of analysis, there are too few observations to conclude that majority party alignment do not influence important legislation approval. But, it is possible to affirm that, although it may be circumstantially important, alignment is not a determinant factor for legislative production. The findings corroborate with the evidence provided by Orden and Zulauf (2015), in which the last four farm bills – 1996, 2002, 2008, and 2014 – were "enacted with large bipartisan congressional majorities under different control of Congress and the presidency. So, it seems that partisan majority interest, like in the mortgage case, is not the driven force behind the approval of important legislation in Congress.

Table 13. Majority and Agriculture Legislative Production Summary

Congress term	Approved Important Legislation	Majority Alignment
109 Congress term	no	100%
110 Congress term	yes	50%
111 Congress term	yes	100%
112 Congress term	no	0%
113 Congress term	yes	0%

Source: (Congressional Quarterly 2005-14; congress.gov 2005-14)

POLICY GAMES AND LEGISLATIVE OUTPUTS

In order to increase the number of observations and facilitate the analysis, each Congress term is separated in four policy games, each one corresponding to a working period in Congress: January to July, and August to December. A policy game is composed by a set of public hearings, a set of stakeholders (hearings participants), a set of legislative inputs (proposals), and a set of legislative outputs (proposal is approved or not by committees, chambers, and sanctioned). The inputs are the seven proposals considered by Congressional Quarterly (2005-14) as the most important in the period, and the list of 25 legislative outputs, related to the seven proposals, were obtained from congress.gov. It is noted that only 9 of 20 policy games have outputs, and only 7 have proposals that become law, since in the 112th Congress legislation went no further.

Table 14. Outputs on Agriculture Policy

Policy Game	Date	Proposal Number	Action
1 period of 110 th Congress	05/22/2007	H.R.2419/2008	Committee report or markup
	05/24/2007	H.R. 2419	Committee report or markup
	06/06/2007	H.R. 2419	Committee report or markup
	06/07/2007	H.R. 2419	Committee report or markup
	06/19/2007	H.R. 2419	Committee report or markup
	07/23/2007	H.R. 2419	Committee report or markup
	07/27/2007	H.R. 2419	Passed House
2 period of 110 th Congress	12/14/2007	H.R. 2419	Passed Senate
3 period of 110 th Congress	05/21/2008	H.R. 2419	Passed over veto
	05/22/2008	H.R. 2419	Become law
	05/22/2008	H.R. 6124/2008	Passed House
	06/05/2008	H.R. 6124	Passed Senate

	06/18/2008	H.R. 6124	Passed over veto
	06/18/2008	H.R. 6124	Become law
1 period of 111 th Congress	06/23/2009	H.R. 2997/2010	Committee report or markup
	07/09/2009	H.R. 2997	Passed House
2 period of 111 th Congress	08/04/2009	H.R. 2997	Passed Senate
	10/21/2009	H.R. 2997	Become law
3 period of 112 th Congress	05/24/2012	S. 3240/2012	Committee report or markup
	06/21/2012	S. 3240	Passed Senate
	07/11/2012	H.R. 6083/2012	Committee report or markup
4 period of 112 th Congress	09/13/2012	H.R. 6083	Committee report or markup
1 period of 113 th Congress	07/11/2013	H.R. 2642/2014	Passed House
	07/18/2013	H.R. 2642	Passed Senate
3 period of 113 th Congress	02/07/2014	H.R. 2642	Become law

Source: (congress.gov 2005-14)

The selection of public hearings was based on the main issues identified in the 10 years period, excluding nominations and authorizations. So, hearings in which the predominant issue was credit, research, energy, or CFTC⁸⁵ were no included, because they are also not specific related with the set of issues. The list of 66 public hearings that emerges reaches its apex in the 111th Congress, and has no pattern related to legislation approval nor majority party alignment. The stakeholders were identified from the witnesses' lists of these 66 public hearings in the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry and in the House Committee on Agriculture.

According to data, there is no national nutrition associations presented in Congress' hearings. Maybe the benefit group is not well-defined, maybe one who is concerned about money for food has no way to associate oneself in pro of entitlements. The only two public hearings in which aid groups – like Agricultural Food Aid Coalition, Alliance for Food Aid, Catholic Relief Services, Alliance for Food Aid and Food for the Hungry – were predominant, they dealt with global food aid, and not national nutrition programs.⁸⁶ And the only two

⁸⁵ Commodity Futures Trading Commission.

⁸⁶ Public hearing 110-21 (Review Food Aid and Agriculture Trade Programs Operated by The U.S. Department of Agriculture and The U.S. Agency for International Development) and 110-41 (Review Efforts to Deliver International Food Aid and Provide Foreign Agricultural Development Assistance).

important proposals related to the issue – the Hunger-Free Communities Act of 2006 (S. 1120), and the Healthy, Hunger-Free Kids Act of 2010 (S. 3307) – were not related with hearings in the studied committees as well. There were, however, the presence of stakeholders representing national economic segments related to crops, meats and dairy in many public hearings. The 66 public hearings showed that 18 stakeholders were more assiduous in participated between 2005 and 2014:

Table 15. Most Assiduous Stakeholders in Agriculture Hearings

N. of Appearances	Organization's Name	Organization's Classification
15	National Farmers Union	General farmers association
13	American Farm Bureau Federation	General farmers association
11	National Corn Growers Association	Midwest crops
10	National Cattleman's Beef Association	Meat industry
7	American Soybean Association	Midwest crops
7	National Association of Wheat Growers	Southern crops
7	National Pork Producers Council	Meat industry
5	National Chicken Council	Meat industry
5	National Cotton Council	General farmers association
5	National Grain and Feed Association	General farmers association
5	National Milk Producers Federation	Dairy industry
5	USA Rice Federation	Southern crops
4	American Cotton Shippers Association	General farmers association
4	International Dairy Foods Association	Dairy industry
4	National Council of Farmer Cooperatives	General farmers association
4	National Turkey Federation	Meat industry
4	USA Dry Pea & Lentil Council	General farmers association


Source: (gpo.gov 2005-14)

Since Congressional Quarterly (2005-14) identified a competition between Midwest corn and soybean growers versus Southern rice and wheat farmers, representatives of these two groups must be presented in order to a public hearing be considered as representative of the crop industry. Thus, there are three options for considering a

representative policy network constituted in a hearing: (1) it aggregates at least 1 stakeholder representing Midwest crops, 1 stakeholder representing Southern crops, and 1 representing general farmers in order to constitute the farmers' interests network; (2) it aggregates 2 (or more) stakeholders representing the meat industry interest; (3) it aggregates 2 (or more) stakeholders representing the dairy industry interest. Besides, all these stakeholders must come from the presented list of 18 more assiduous stakeholders. Even though a hearing aggregates stakeholders from these three different industries, these rules must be respected in order to consider that the policy network is constituted in a hearing.

On the other hand, in order to consider that there are local-farmer stakeholders in public hearings, farmers from 2 different states and regions must be present, as well as farmers representing at least 2 different kind of crops or industries in hearings. Thus, hearings that aggregates only farmers from a specific state are not considered, as well as hearings that aggregates only farmers representing a monoculture. In order to avoid any exclusion of important stakeholders, all local farmers that appear frequently were checked, and no one appeared more than three times in different hearings in the studied period.

Figure 6. Agriculture Policy Network Representation



Legend:

Blue: general farmers associations;

Light violet: Midwest crops

Dark Violet: Southern crops

Red: social meat and dairy industries;

Green: governmental institutions;

Orange: technic-scientific stakeholders;

Size: size is proportional to the number of appearances in Congress' public hearings between 2005 and 2014.

Now it is possible to check the appearance of these groups in the most important events that occurred in the studied period: the approval of the 2008 Farm Bill (H.R. 2419 and H.R. 6124); the approval of the 2010 Appropriation Act (H.R. 2997), the first after a presidency change; and the 2012 failure and approval of the 2014 Farm Bill (H.R. 2642). Through the tables below, it is possible to note that there is a correlation between some of the most important outputs and some sets of public hearings in which there is a policy network constituted. The two times in which local-farm networks were constituted, one has no correlation with output, and the other has correlation with the only important output that do not became a law: the approval of proposal S. 3240 by the Senate.

Table 16. Agriculture Policy Games

Year/Semester	N. Hear.	Outputs?	Imp. Out? ⁸⁷	Net. Constit. ⁸⁸	Local Farmers	Major. Align.
2005/Semester 1	1	no	no	0	0	100%
2005/Semester 2	0	no	no	0	0	100%
2006/Semester 1	2	no	no	0	0	100%
2006/Semester 2	0	no	no	0	0	100%
2007/Semester 1	16	yes	yes	4	0	50%
2007/Semester 2	1	yes	yes	0	0	50%
2008/Semester 1	5	yes	yes	0	0	50%
2008/Semester 2	0	no	no	0	0	50%
2009/Semester 1	10	yes	yes	6	0	100%
2009/Semester 2	6	yes	yes	0	0	100%
2010/Semester 1	20	no	no	3	9	100%
2010/Semester 2	1	no	no	0	0	100%
2011/Semester 1	9	no	no	3	0	0%
2011/Semester 2	1	no	no	1	0	0%
2012/Semester 1	8	yes	yes	6	6	0%
2012/Semester 2	0	yes	no	0	0	0%
2013/Semester 1	2	yes	yes	0	0	0%
2013/Semester 2	0	no	no	0	0	0%

⁸⁷ Outputs other than committees' outputs: Legislation approved by one of the chambers, by both chambers, or enacted law.

⁸⁸ At least 1 stakeholder representing Midwest crops, 1 stakeholder representing Southern crops, and 1 representing general farmers in order to constitute the farmers' interests network; or 2 (or more) stakeholders representing meat interests; or 2 (or more) stakeholders representing dairy interests.

2014/Semester 1	4	yes	yes	1	0	0%
2014/Semester 2	0	no	no	0	0	0%

Source: (congress.gov 2005-14; gpo.gov 2005-14)

In order to investigate if these 15 hearings – which constituted 22 events – are really correlated with the important legislative outputs in the period, the history of the agriculture policy will be narrated in the light of the relationships among these 17 stakeholders, representing Midwest, Southern, and general crops producers, as well as meats and dairy industries in public hearings.

Table 17. Agriculture Representative Hearings

Year/Semester	Hear. N.	Date	Midw.	South.	Farm.	Meat	Dairy	Total
2007/Semester 1	11004	03/08/2007	0	0	0	3	0	3
2007/Semester 1	11009	03/28/2007	2	2	2	0	0	6
2007/Semester 1	11010	04/17/2007	0	0	2	3	0	5
2007/Semester 1	11012	04/19/2007	1	0	1	2	0	4
2009/Semester 1	11121	06/24/2009	2	1	3	0	0	6
2009/Semester 1	11121	06/25/2009	2	1	3	0	0	6
2009/Semester 1	11124	07/14/2009	0	0	2	0	2	4
2009/Semester 1	11125	07/16/2009	0	0	3	2	0	5
2010/Semester 1	11144	03/11/2010	2	2	2	0	0	6
2010/Semester 1	11152	06/17/2010	2	2	4	0	0	8
2010/Semester 1	11152	06/24/2010	2	2	4	0	0	8
2011/Semester 1	11209	04/07/2011	1	2	1	0	0	4
2011/Semester 1	11211	04/13/2011	0	0	0	2	0	2
2011/Semester 1	11216	05/12/2011	1	2	2	2	2	9
2011/Semester 2	11223	09/14/2011	1	0	0	4	0	5
2012/Semester 1	11230	03/09/2012	2	2	6	1	2	13
2012/Semester 1	11230	03/23/2012	2	2	6	1	2	13
2012/Semester 1	11230	03/30/2012	2	2	6	1	2	13
2012/Semester 1	11230	04/20/2012	2	2	6	1	2	13
2012/Semester 1	11230	05/14/2012	2	2	6	1	2	13
2012/Semester 1	11230	05/20/2012	2	2	6	1	2	13
2014/Semester 1	11313	04/30/2014	0	0	1	4	0	5

Source: (gpo.gov 2005-14)

2008 Farm Bill - H.R. 2419 and H.R. 6124⁸⁹

The 2008 farm bill began to take shape in 2007, and the bill price tag was the major source of conflict (Congressional Quarterly 2008). Between May 22 and July 27, the proposal H.R. 2419 – called Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 – was approved in House's committee and floor. At the same time, between March 8 and April 19, the agriculture policy network was activated to defend its interests towards Congress through a set of four hearings. The first was the "Review of the Impact of Feed Costs on the Livestock Industry" that happened in March 8, 2007 – which aggregated five stakeholders of the meat and dairy group: Dairy Farmers of America, National Cattlemen's Beef Association, National Chicken Council, National Pork Producers Council, and United Egg Producers. The U.S. Department of Agriculture was also present (Public Hearing 110-04).

The second representative hearing was the "Review the Proposals to Amend the Program Crop Provisions of the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002" that happened in March 28, 2007 – which aggregated most of the crop industry: American Corn Growers Association, American Soybean Association, National Association of Wheat Growers, National Barley Growers Association, National Corn Growers Association, National Cotton Council of America, National Sunflower Association, U.S. Rice Producers Association, USA Dry Pea and Lentil Council, USA Rice Federation (Public Hearing 110-09).

The third hearing was the "Review the Market Structure of the Livestock Industry" that happened in April 17 2007, which aggregated the main stakeholders of both crop and meat industries: American Farm Bureau Federation, National Cattleman's Beef Association,

⁸⁹ Because of a clerical mistake, that dropped one of the bill's 15 titles - covering trade and international food aid - before sending the bill to the White House; Congress had to repeat the process, clearing a new bill (H.R. 6124) and overriding a second veto.

National Chicken Council, National Farmers Union, National Pork Producers Council. The U.S. Department of Agriculture was also present (Public Hearing 110-10).

Finally, there was the "Review USDA Farm Bill Conservation" that happened in April 19, 2007 – which aggregated crop producers– National Farmers Union, National Corn Growers Association –meat producers – National Cattleman's Beef Association, National Pork Producers Council – and stakeholders related to conservation – Agriculture and Wildlife Working Group and the American Wildlife Conservation Partners, American Farmland Trust, American Tree Farm System, National Association of Conservation Districts (Public Hearing 110-12).

It is interesting to note how the meat and crop industry met separately in a short period of time, and after that, both groups met representatives of the conservation group. It is important to highlight that there was a change on mandatory funding for conservation programs, which became discretionary spending in the 2007 Appropriation Bill.

After a year of debate and dispute with the presidency, Congress cleared a new, five-year farm bill and overrode a presidential veto to enact it into law. Bush vetoed the bill because it was, according to him, onerous and fiscally imprudent. It continued subsidies for the wealthy, even with high food prices and record farm income. It was also inconsistent with the national objectives in international trade negotiations. Finally, there was an excessive government spending for pet projects. Despite this the votes in both chambers exceeded the needed two-thirds majority, and the bill was enacted into law over the president's veto.

Appropriations Act, 2010 - H.R. 2997

The H.R. 2997 was the first appropriation proposal under a Democrat presidency after two mandates of a Republican president. Therefore, it was an important point for the agriculture policy network shows its positions and defend its interests. The proposal passed

House in July 9, 2009; and it passed Senate in August 4, 2009. There were 3 important public hearings that happened in this period. The first was the "Review Implementation of the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008" that happened in June 24, 2009 – which aggregated the crop industry: American Farm Bureau Federation; American Soybean Association; National Association of Wheat Growers; National Corn Growers Association; National Cotton Council; National Farmers Union. The U.S. Department of Agriculture was also present (Public Hearing 111-21).

The second representative hearing was the "Review Economic Conditions Facing the Dairy Industries" that happened in July 14, 2009 – which aggregated the crop and the dairy industries: American Farm Bureau Federation; National Farmers Union American Independent Dairy Alliance; Dairy Farmers of America; International Dairy Foods Association; Midwest Dairy Coalition; National Milk Producers Federation; National Family Farm Coalition; U.S. Dairy Export Council. The U.S. Department of Agriculture was also present (Public Hearing 111-24). According to the Congressional Quarterly (2005-14), the extra funding for struggling dairy farmers was one of the highlights of the bill.

The third hearing was the "Review Current Issues in Food Safety" that happened in July 16, 2009 – which aggregated some representatives of the crop group– National Farmers Union, American Farm Bureau Federation, National Council of Farmer Cooperatives – some of the meat industry– National Cattlemen's Beef Association, National Turkey Federation – and stakeholders related to food safety: Consumer Federation of America, National Consumers League, National Quality Systems. The U.S. Department of Agriculture was also present (Public Hearing 111-25).

It is interesting to note how the meat, dairy and crop industry met in a short period of time, repeating the pattern of the previous case, and after that, both groups met representatives of the food safety group. It is important to bold that animal identification was the main point of the 111-25 hearing, an issue that was pointed by Congressional

Quarterly (2005-14) as the most important in the period related to the food safety category. Besides that, the country-of-origin labeling for meat issue also appear in hearing's debate.

2012 Failure and 2014 Farm Bill - H.R. 2642

The 2012 farm bill started its debate in 2010. The hearing "Review U.S. Farm Safety Net Programs in Advance of the 2012 Farm Bill" (111-52) reunited, in June 17, 2010, the crop industry –American Farm Bureau Federation, American Soybean Association, National Association of Wheat Growers, National Barley Growers Association, National Corn Growers Association, National Cotton Council, National Farmers Union, National Sorghum Producers, USA Rice Federation, U.S. Rice Producers Association, USA Dry Pea & Lentil Council – and the U.S. Department of Agriculture – plus the Risk Management Agency and the Farm Service Agency – to debate the U.S. farm safety net programs in advance of the 2012 Farm Bill to come to order. Disagreements between Midwest growers, who preferred an insurance-like revenue protection plan, and Southern farmers, who preferred a price loss protection plan, were one of the main problems.

In September 14, 2011, the meat industry did their meeting in the hearing 112-23 – "Examine The Issue of Feed Availability and Its Effect on The Livestock and Poultry Industries" – which aggregated most of the meat industry – National Cattlemen's Beef Association, National Chicken Council, National Pork Producers Council, National Turkey Federation – the American Feed Industry Association, and the National Corn Growers Association.

In 2012, the agriculture policy network worked hard to resolve their discordances. In the Senate, the proposal S. 3240 offered an insurance-like revenue protection plan that were more beneficial for to Midwest corn and soybeans growers, where natural disasters were a frequent source of crop losses. The measure also would have eliminated the countercyclical payment program that subsidized farmers when prices dropped below

target levels. On the other hand, the House bill focused on a price loss protection plan, which was preferred by Southern rice and wheat farmers. Both bills would have eliminating direct payments.

Starting in March 9, 2012, there were a series of 6 hearings – named "The Future of U.S. Farm Policy: Formulation Of the 2012 Farm Bill" (112-30) – in which 117 stakeholders were present. Among them, all crop industry: American Farm Bureau Federation, American Soybean Association, National Association of Wheat Growers, National Barley Growers Association, National Corn Growers Association, National Corn Growers Association, National Cotton Council, National Council of Farmer Cooperatives, National Farmers Union, National Grain and Feed Association, National Sorghum Producers, Southern Peanut Farmers Federation, USA Dry Pea and Lentil Council, USA Rice Federation, and U.S. Rice Producers Association.

Besides the crop industry, there were representatives of the energy industry – Agriculture Energy Coalition, and National Biodiesel Board – the foresters and conservation groups – National Association of Conservation Districts, National Association of Conservation Districts, American Forest Foundation, National Association of State Foresters, Society of American Foresters, American Loggers Council – the bank and insurance industry – American Bankers Association, Farm Credit Council, National Crop Insurance Services, Crop Insurance Professionals Association – other farmers organizations – Family Farm Alliance, National Association of Farmers Market Nutrition Programs, American Farmland Trust, and National Sustainable Agriculture Coalition – and the National Association of Counties.

It is important to note that this set of hearings was the apex of the participation of both, the agriculture policy network and the local farmer constituent, in the Congressional legislative process. After this hearing, three important efforts, according to the Congressional Quarterly (2005-14), were made: (1) the Agriculture Reform, Food, and Jobs Act of 2012 (S. 3240) which was introduced in May 24, 2012 and passed Senate in June 21,

2012; (2) the Federal Agriculture Reform and Risk Management Act of 2012 (H.R. 6083) which was introduced in July 9, 2012; and (3) the Farm Bill 2008 One-Year Extension (H.R. 6228) which was introduced in July 30, 2012.

Nevertheless, the disagreements about the nutrition programs get through 2012 and 2013. The cost of food assistance for the poor was the central issue in the debate, conservative members of Congress wanted even deeper cuts to the food stamp program. There was also a temptation to eliminate the food stamp program and replace it with block grants to states operate their own programs to provide nutritional assistance to the poor. In the House, a fight over the proposed cuts to food stamps also dominated the debate. The bill sought to restrict eligibility to households inserting a federal eligibility program. Democrats decried the reductions, saying that there is no information about people trying to game the system, and that the cuts will attack on society's most vulnerable. The expiring programs in the law were extended because House and Senate were not able to deliver the new bill. So House GOP⁹⁰ leaders split their farm bill into two parts: one was for agriculture programs, and the other for nutrition aid. It was the first time in four decades that farm and nutrition authorizations had moved separately. The bills were recombined when they convened a farm bill conference committee. Again, Democrats refused to support the bill because of its food stamps cutbacks. The White House threatened to veto the House measure because of the GOP plans to cut nutrition spending and the budget of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. So the 2013 bill did not pass the House.

In February of 2014, the Agriculture Act 2014 passed in both chambers in July and become law in a Congress that still divided between Republicans in the Senate and Democrats in the House.

⁹⁰ *GOP* stands for "Grand Old Party" and is often used interchangeably with the word *Republican*.

The Outliers:

Among the 13 public hearings that aggregated the crop industry, respecting the Midwest/Southern competition, the meat/dairy industry, or both, there were 4 hearings that were not directly correlated to the outputs considered the most important in the period. The first was the "Review U.S. Agricultural Sales to Cuba" (111-44) that happened in March 11, 2010 – which aggregated the crop industry – American Farm Bureau Federation; American Soybean Association; National Association of Wheat Growers; National Corn Growers Association; National Farmers Union; U.S. Rice Producers Association and USA Rice Federation – and the dairy industry – National Milk Producers Federation and Dairy Farmers of America. The commerce with Cuba was considered a hot topic by Congressional Quarterly (2005-14) in the 2005/06 policy game.

The second was the "Review Market Promotion Programs And Their Effectiveness On Expanding Exports Of U.S. Agricultural Products" (112-09) that happened in April 17, 2011 – which aggregated the crop industry – American Soybean Association, , National Association of Wheat Growers, , National Council of Farmer Cooperatives and Sunkist Growers, Plains Cotton Cooperative Association, U.S. Apple Association, U.S. Grains Council, , U.S. Wheat Associates, United States Dry Bean Council, USA Rice Federation, National Council of Farmer Cooperatives – the export industry – American Seed Trade Association, Food Export Association of the Midwest USA and Food Export USA-Northeast, and Coalition to Promote U.S. Agricultural Exports, U.S. Meat Export Federation – and the U.S. Department of Agriculture. The commerce with China was one of the main topic of the hearing, and keeping the ban on poultry from China⁹¹ was considered a hot topic by Congressional Quarterly (2005-14) in the 2009/10 policy game.

⁹¹ China and U.S. had banned each other's poultry products in 2004, after an outbreak of bird flu in Asia. China lifted the

The third was the "Review Pending Free Trade Agreements" (112-16) that happened in May 12, 2011 – which aggregated once more the crop industry – American Farm Bureau Federation, Corn Refiners Association, , National Association of Wheat Growers and U.S. Wheat Associates, National Corn Growers Association, National Farmers Union, U.S. Grains Council, and USA Rice Federation – the meat/dairy industry – International Dairy Foods Association, National Cattlemen's Beef Association, National Milk Producers Federation, National Pork Producers Council, and U.S. Dairy Export Council, – and the U.S. Department of Agriculture. The commerce with China, and the poultry issue, was still one of the main topic of the hearing. The cotton issue⁹² involved Brazil's cotton industry was also an important topic of the hearing debate that was cited by Congressional Quarterly (2005-14) as a hot topic in the 112th Congress.

It seems that exportation is an issue, besides the farm and appropriation bills studied, that is important enough to reunite the whole agriculture policy network. These topics in exportation were also considered by Congressional Quarterly (2005-14) as hot topics in the period that was debated. However, Congressional Quarterly (2005-14) also included expanding foreign markets for the tobacco industry as a hot topic, but none of the 3 studied hearings contain the presence of its representatives. Finally, there is the hearing "Review the State of the Livestock Industry" (113-13), which reunited the meat industry to analyze the ongoing burdens associated with the mandatory Country-of-Origin Labeling law, in April 30, 2014. The fact that the meat industry need to be aggregated right after the enactment of the 2014 Farm Bill may means that the country-of-origin labeling – a food safety problem that is more related with importation – was not resolve in the farm bill.


ban after a few months, but the U.S. provision remained.

⁹² The World Trade Organization decided in 2005 that the U.S. cotton program violated international trade rules.

POLICY NETWORK ANALYSIS

The main purpose of this survey is to provide evidence for inferring the existence of the agriculture policy network, instead of a bunch of loose stakeholders. There were 6 respondents among 17 stakeholders, totalizing 35% of the network.

Figure 7. Agriculture Policy Network Discussion and Collaboration



Legend:

Blue: general farmers associations;

Light violet: Midwest crops

Dark Violet: Southern crops

Red: social meat and dairy industries;

Octagonal shape: stakeholders which answered the survey;

Tie size: it is proportional to the intensity of discussions related to Congress' proposals between two stakeholders;

Tie color: it is a gradation according to the collaboration between stakeholders related to Congress' proposals:

Yellow: collaborate in few proposals;


Orange: collaborate in half the proposals;

Light green: collaborate in most proposals;

Dark green: collaborate always;

Gray: never collaborate.

Figure 8. Agriculture Policy Network Information and Advice Flow



Legend:

Blue: general farmers associations;

Light violet: Midwest crops

Dark Violet: Southern crops

Red: social meat and dairy industries;

Octagonal shape: stakeholders which answered the survey;

Tie size: it is proportional to the frequency of information flow between two stakeholders;

Tie color: it is a gradation according to the advice frequency between stakeholders:

Yellow: ask for advice annually;

Orange: ask for advice semiannually;

Light green: ask for advice monthly;

Dark green: ask for advice weekly;

Gray: never ask for advice.

Despite this percentage of respondents – which influences the network analysis – there is no isolated stakeholders in both discussion/collaboration, and information/advice networks. The proportion of pair of stakeholders that can reach each other by a path is 100% in both networks, which means that all stakeholders are connected.

Besides, the cohesiveness of the network, which is given by the density measure, is 0.419 for the discussion/collaboration network, and it is 0.449 for the information/advice network, which means that almost 40% of the stakeholders in the first case and 45% in the second were connected directly to everyone else. This is a highly dense network, considering the percentage of respondents (it is also denser than the mortgage network). The density and the clustering coefficient values are also higher than for a random network (Erdős-Rényi model; Erdős and Rényi 1960) of the same size. Therefore, through the characteristics of the ties among the stakeholders, it is safe to infer the existence of the mortgage policy network.

Beyond that, applying the least squares method for linear regression to measure the neighborhood connectivity distribution,⁹³ I found that the data fitted well the regression line well. Since it is a decreasing function in k , edges between low connected and highly connected nodes (the ones which not answered the questionnaire and the ones which answered it) prevail in the network.

Table 18. Agriculture Network Statistics

Measure	Discussion/Collaboration	Information/Advice
Connected by a path	100%	100%

⁹³ The connectivity of a node is the number of its neighbors. The neighborhood connectivity of a node n is defined as the average connectivity of all neighbors of n . The neighborhood connectivity distribution gives the average of the neighborhood connectivities of all nodes n with k neighbors for $k = 0.1$.

Isolated nodes	0	0
Avg. Number of Neighbors	6.706	7.176
Network density	0.419	0.449
Neighborhood connectivity distribution - Correlation	0.981	0.990
Neighborhood connectivity distribution - R-squared	0.962	0.980
Network centralization	0.658	0.625
Network heterogeneity	0.678	0.633
Clustering coefficient	0.831	0.815
Average clustering coefficient distribution - Correlation	0.994	0.994
Average clustering coefficient distribution - R-squared	0.988	0.988

The respondents also nominated 8 other organizations that are not in the hearings lists, but, in their view, influence legislation approval in the committees: the Biotechnology Industry Organization, the National Association of Conservative Districts, the American Seed Trade Association, the Environmental Working Group, the National Cooperative Business Association, the Heritage Action, the National Consumers League, and the CropLife America.

CONCLUSION

There is a clear correlation between representative public hearings and important legislative outputs. So, if there is a representative agriculture policy network present in public hearings, then important legislation is more likely to pass. Policy games with representative hearings were the ones which approved important legislation. There was also evidence of a temporal coincidence between representative public hearings and important decision making points in the legislative process related to the outputs of important proposals. Therefore, empirical evidence suggests that there is more going on in legislation approval than a majority party governing, and there is no evidence to support that local farmers' interests have influence in important legislation approval. It seems that in the agriculture case the Washington interest groups are still the voice of the national

farm interests. However, it also seems that the partisan majority interest of Republicans or Democrats is a better explanation for legislative outputs related to the nutrition aid programs. The fact that the Congress' chambers were politically divided during the two last policy games indeed contributed for the stalemate of 2012 and for increasing the difficulty to approve legislation thenceforward. In fact, the agriculture and nutrition policy is too big for being influenced only by stakeholders related to crops, meat, and dairy industries.

Therefore, only legislative outputs related to agriculture subsidy programs are better explained by the dynamic of the agriculture policy network constituted around the Congress' committees.⁹⁴ Despite the fact that there is no organized conflict between social and economic interests, the stakeholders related to dairy/meat industry, and Southern/Northwest crop industry compete among each other for benefits. When it was necessary, they put their differences aside and collaborated to achieve more favorable outputs. Since it is a non-zero-sum repetitive game, this collaborative behavior tends to be reinforced. This informal cluster of routine stakeholders representing their industries dominates the portion of the agriculture policy related to agriculture subsidies. So it doesn't matter that the expansion of the policy network brought a host of non-producers' interests, they gained access, but not influence, as the cases of conservationists and global food aid groups showed. Thus, despite the maintenance of a vital broad coalition, it is not an ad hoc network that influences policymaking, but this small number of recurrent stakeholders. When these stakeholders act together, forming a policy network to influence the formulation process, they become another stratum between government and society. So, this policy network operates to complement the power of congressman, and Congress

⁹⁴ As it was discussed before, the agriculture policy network also engages in a struggle for the construction of meaning in people's minds. This stable source of power (Castells 2011) cannot be despised, because it shapes the debate and establish the range of alternatives. In the case of the agriculture policy, American people believe that the agriculture safety net is one of the bases of the welfare state in United States, and that rely on other countries to get its food supply is not an option.

becomes responsive to it. At the end of the day, the agriculture policy networks is a factor of stability and maintenance of the status quo.

An interview with seasoned staff of both the Senate and the House committee corroborated with this view. Even though there is no competition between farm subsidies and nutrition programs, the agriculture stakeholders complain about increasing in nutrition spending because it can make more difficult to approve their subsidies. However, they also know that the nutrition programs are fundamental to build an urban and farm coalition, which is required for the entire farm or appropriation bill relevance and approval. The interviewed staff also testified that the stakeholders list is a trustworthy representation of the organizations that participate in policy formulation process in the committees. In their perception, most of the stakeholders know each other, some of them very well. They have an active participation in decision making, not only in hearings, but also participating in internal meetings with congressman, in which these stakeholders sit at the same table and settle their disputes. So, they usually act as a networked group, and they have an important role in coalition building to approve legislation as well. Besides, the information that they provide is critical to give the full picture to congressman. Their suggestions, as a group consent, are more likely to be accepted by the congressman than not. Most of them are able to block legislation through their relationships with diverse congressman when they really are opposed or not listened, and this is more likely to happen in the Senate than in the House.

So, there is evidence to support the closed model or bounded policymaking, and evidence against the open model or unbounded policymaking. Regardless of the party that won the elections, the agriculture policy network will be present, as an indispensable factor for the passage of important legislation. At the end of the day, stability is given by the informal clusters of routine stakeholders representing competing interests which dominate the agricultural policy network. With this stable group at the core of the policy network inertia is the rule, and policy change goes no further. But the question is not anymore if government was captured, but how the struggle among these competing interests shapes

decisions in Congress. After all, the competitive play within and between policy networks is all what our democracy is about. In a context in which governance is more important than government, it is time to treat the participation of policy networks in Congress as an essential part of the operation of our reinvented government.⁹⁵ It is time to change from lobbying to democratic governance.

⁹⁵ The difficulty in perceiving the relationship between these policy stakeholders' governance and the legislative outputs in Congress is because, as Aldous Huxley feared, we have so much information that we are drowned in a sea of irrelevance, unable to separate what is trivial and what is important for legislation approval.

CHAPTER 6

THESIS CONCLUSION

This research presents a different view of lobbying through a kind of policy analysis that is relevant for understanding governance and how policy networks influence policy outputs. To do so, Castells' (2011) network theory of power fulfill the theoretical gap identified by authors in both public administration and political science literature. In this way, the conceptualization of policy process, issues, stakeholders and relational ties provide the needed sounder concepts to empirical research. Both mortgage and agriculture cases showed that governing through policy networks is an important form of exercising political power in our network society, and the inclusion/exclusion of stakeholders representing rival or competing interests in Congress' hearings can be an effective way to predict legislative outputs.

As both political science and public administration literature advocates, a mixed method which combine social network and qualitative analysis seems to be the adequate approach (SNA analysis left no doubt that the studied policy stakeholders present in hearings are bonded in a stable network). However, instead of providing only a description, this research offers a step forward by providing a causal relation in which a structural property of the network – in this case being representative or not – drives explanation as independent variable. As the 'intermediation school' advocates, the focus is still on how this kind of policy networks influence policy outputs and/or outcomes. At the end of the day, according to the findings, the assumption that policy networks are 'stable and based on non-hierarchical coordination' – advocated by the 'governance school' – is more likely to be correct.

Besides that, both cases showed that representative policy networks matter for the approval of important legislation. In the mortgage case, stakeholders representing social interests are consistently present in the constituted network when important legislation is approved. It means that this representative policy network is acting as a counter weight to economic domination, insofar as only the presence of economic stakeholders is not enough to approve important mortgage legislation. In the agricultural case, on the other hand, the competing interests between Midwest and Southern crops, as well as among crops, meats, and dairy industries shape farm and appropriation bills, regarding agricultural subsidies. Despite there being no rival social and economic interests clashing, this closed network composed by few regular participants gives stability to policymaking in Congress, and this informal institution is an explanation for why legislation didn't change as expected by expanding the set of participants, and diminishing farm population.

Therefore, the findings contradict the mainstream literature which advocates that economic-elite domination and biased pluralism are the main influence in Congress' policy formulation. In the mortgage case, mass based groups also play a crucial role in policy making, which implies that the average citizen tends to be reasonably well served by the outputs of interest group struggle if these social groups in fact represent their target populations. It was the convergence between the special interests of the financial and real estate industries and the constituent interests of the borrowers in Congress that determined the mortgage policy in the studied period. Thus, the majoritarian pluralism theory is more likely to be correct. On the other hand, in the agriculture case, the findings corroborate the mainstream literature which advocates that interest groups lobbying shapes legislation in Congress. Despite the odds, national Washington groups are still playing an important role in the farm policy, determining agricultural subsidies. So, the claim that these groups are losing power to local farmers' constituents is more likely to be incorrect.

In the agriculture case, however, it doesn't mean that these interest groups captured government, like in the iron triangle metaphor. Since these groups are also mass

based, because they represent, or claim to represent, a large portion of farm population, it can be said that the majoritarian pluralism better explains the agriculture case as well. However, saying that policy networks are in fact empowering citizens in our reinvented government is a different claim. This shadow structure of interests may form another stratum between government and society, but it is necessary to investigate if these stakeholders are controlled or even accountable to the members who they claim to represent, because these institutions also may be captured by a small group of leaders who use this presumption of representativeness to leverage their personal agenda focused on their narrow interests. So, stakeholders which enjoy privileged access to governmental institutions should present the control and accountability mechanisms available to their affiliates. But, this is a debate for further research.

Also for further research is testing the empirical model in other policies and in other countries. A larger sample of different types of policies, and different sets of issues, also would contribute to confirm if the model is applicable to all policies, and if the findings are consistent. Besides that, the comparison between countries could contribute for other purposes. A comparison between the Brazilian and the U.S. Congresses, for example, would provide the chance to contrast two countries which have different society variables – like social capital, party system, and lobby system – but similar state variables – like presidentialism, federalism, bicameral legislative, and independent bureaucracy – and contextual variables similar in many aspects – such as size, heterogeneity, and secularism – but different in wealth. Due to these differences, it would be possible to maximize the variation of the independent variable 'representative policy network constitution'. Besides that, a comparison with the European Union would provide the chance to test the model in different state variables, and a comparison with the Russian Federation would provide the chance to test the model in a non-democratic country. Finally, it is necessary to increase the time range to 30 years, in order to provide a better sample to statistically test to what extent the presence of a representative policy network is a good predictor for the approval of important legislation, since it would increase the number of policy games from 20 to 60.

Beyond being useful for predicting policy outputs, I believe that this kind of policy analysis can also improve our democracy, and help democratic institutions to make and implement better policies. Due to the fact that policy networks influence important legislation approval regardless of the party which won the elections, assessing the participation of representative policy networks in policy making provides also a new way to assess democracy, because most comparative indicators used to assess it – like Freedom House, and Polity IV – are based on elections. Far from being a factor of degeneration of government performance, the participation of policy networks in the policy making – what is also defined as lobbying – is an essential part of our democracy, and sine qua non condition to important legislation approval. But it doesn't mean that policy networks in Congress are doomed to be an exclusive arena to a few powerful national associations. New technology has developed a digital democracy in which the average citizen can deepen participation in policy processes.⁹⁶ Mingling policy networks and these participative tools can result in a new level of participative democracy. Besides, nowadays artificial intelligence system is able to capture and organize the necessary data to predict if a bill currently under consideration will be enacted based on the participation of the related policy networks. This kind of policy analysis – focused on policy networks as independent variables to explain policy outputs/outcomes – is just beginning. The mathematical foundations for network analysis is very far ahead, but there is still a long way to transform the policy network metaphor in algebra.

⁹⁶ This kind of technology is already utilized by parliaments in Brazil, France, Finland, Taiwan, and England.

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APPENDIX A

LISTS OF PUBLIC HEARINGS

Mortgage Public Hearings

Number	Title	Date	Legislature	Committee
109015	Hearing Entitled "The Administration Perspective on GSE Regulatory Reform."	4/13/2005	2005/06	Committee on Financial Services
109033	Joint Hearing Entitled, "Legislative Solutions to Abusive Mortgage Lending Practices."	5/24/2005	2005/06	Committee on Financial Services
109043	Zero Downpayment Pilot Program Act of 2005	6/30/2005	2005/06	Committee on Financial Services
109058	Hearing Entitled "Licensing and Registration in the Mortgage Industry."	9/29/2005	2005/06	Committee on Financial Services
109064	Insurance Regulation Reform (1091064)	9/29/2005	2005/06	Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs
109065	FHA: Issues For The Future (1091065)	11/17/2005	2005/06	Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs
109082	Hearing Entitled "Transforming The Federal Housing Administration for the 21st Century."	4/5/2006	2005/06	Committee on Financial Services
109085	Field Hearing Entitled "Community Development Block Grants (CDBG): The Impact of CDBG on our Communities."	4/12/2006	2005/06	Committee on Financial Services
109085	The Housing Bubble and Its Implications for the Economy (1091085)	9/13/2006	2005/06	Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs
109099	Home Mortgage Disclosure Act: Newly Collected Data and What It Means	6/13/2006	2005/06	Committee on Financial Services
109100	Calculated Risk: Assessing Non-Traditional Mortgage Products (109)	9/20/2006	2005/06	Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs
109112	Hearing Entitled "The Changing Real Estate Market."	7/25/2006	2005/06	Committee on Financial Services
109116	Community Solutions For The Prevention of and Management of Foreclosures	8/23/2006	2005/06	Committee on Financial Services
110012	Legislative Proposals on GSE Reform	3/12/2007	2007/08	Committee on Financial Services
110015	GSE Reform 2007	3/15/2007	2007/08	Committee on Financial Services
110018	Subprime and Predatory Lending: New	3/27/2007	2007/08	Committee on Financial

	Regulatory Guidance, Current Market Conditions, and Effects on Regulated Financial Institutions			Services
110020	Household Incomes and Housing Costs: A New Squeeze for American Families of 2007	4/4/2007	2007/08	Committee on Financial Services
110021	Possible Responses to Rising Mortgage Foreclosures	4/17/2007	2007/08	Committee on Financial Services
110023	The Expanding American Homeownership Act of 2007: H.R. 1852 and Related FHA Modernization Issues	4/19/2007	2007/08	Committee on Financial Services
110028	The Role of The Secondary Market in Subprime Mortgage Lending	5/8/2007	2007/08	Committee on Financial Services
110044	Reauthorization of the HOPE VI Program	6/21/2007	2007/08	Committee on Financial Services
110045	Homeowner Down-payment Assistance Of 2007	6/22/2007	2007/08	Committee on Financial Services
110047	Affordable Housing Preservation: Lessons From Starrett City	7/10/2007	2007/08	Committee on Financial Services
110053	National Affordable Housing Trust Fund Act of 2007	7/19/2007	2007/08	Committee on Financial Services
110055	Improving Federal Consumer Protection In Financial Services--Consumer and Industry Perspectives	7/25/2007	2007/08	Committee on Financial Services
110061	Legislative and Regulatory Options for Minimizing and Mitigating Mortgage Foreclosures	9/20/2007	2007/08	Committee on Financial Services
110068	The Reauthorization of the McKinney-Vento Homeless Assistance Act	10/4/2007	2007/08	Committee on Financial Services
110070	The Reauthorization of the McKinney-Vento Homeless Assistance Act	10/16/2007	2007/08	Committee on Financial Services
110074	Legislative Proposals On Reforming Mortgage Practices	10/24/2007	2007/08	Committee on Financial Services
110081	Foreclose Prevention And Intervention	11/30/2007	2007/08	Committee on Financial Services
110083	Accelerating Loan Modifications, Improving Foreclosure Prevention, And Enhancing Enforcement	12/6/2007	2007/08	Committee on Financial Services
110103	Using FHA For Housing Stabilization And Homeownership Retention	4/9/2008	2007/08	Committee on Financial Services
110104	Using FHA For Housing Stabilization And Homeownership Retention	4/10/2008	2007/08	Committee on Financial Services
110106	H.R. 5579, The Emergency Mortgage Loan Modification Act Of 2008	4/15/2008	2007/08	Committee on Financial Services
110108	H.R. 5679, The Foreclosure Prevention And Sound Mortgage Servicing Act Of 2008	4/16/2008	2007/08	Committee on Financial Services
110114	Impact On Homebuyers And Housing Market Of Conforming Loan Limit Increase	5/22/2008	2007/08	Committee on Financial Services
110115	Targeting Federal Aid To Neighborhoods Distressed By The Subprime Mortgage Crisis	6/4/2008	2007/08	Committee on Financial Services
110120	Foreclosure Problems And Solutions: Federal, State, And Local Efforts To Address The	6/16/2008	2007/08	Committee on Financial Services

	Foreclosure Crisis In Ohio			
110122	Affordable Housing Preservation And Protection Of Tenants	6/19/2008	2007/08	Committee on Financial Services
110126	Federal Spending Requirements In Housing And Community Development Programs: Challenges In 2008 And Beyond	7/9/2008	2007/08	Committee on Financial Services
110132	A Review Of Mortgage Servicing Practices And Foreclosure Mitigation	7/25/2008	2007/08	Committee on Financial Services
110134	Affordable Housing In West Virginia: Challenges In The Eastern Panhandle	7/29/2008	2007/08	Committee on Financial Services
110139	The Implementation Of The Hope For Homeowners Program And A Review Of Foreclosure Mitigation Efforts	9/17/2008	2007/08	Committee on Financial Services
110142	Oversight Hearing To Examine Recent Treasury And FHFA Actions Regarding The Housing Gses	9/25/2008	2007/08	Committee on Financial Services
110144	Private Sector Cooperation With Mortgage Modifications-Ensuring That Investors, Servicers And Lenders Provide Real Help For Troubled Homeowners	11/12/2008	2007/08	Committee on Financial Services
110906	Preserving The American Dream: Predatory Lending Practices And Home Foreclosures	2/7/2007	2007/08	Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs
110913	Subprime Mortgage Market Turmoil: Examining The Role Of Securitization	4/17/2007	2007/08	Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs
110920	Ending Mortgage Abuse: Safeguarding Homebuyers	6/26/2007	2007/08	Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs
110956	Strengthening Our Economy: Foreclosure Prevention And Neighborhood Preservation	1/31/2008	2007/08	Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs
110957	Reforming The Regulation Of The Government-Sponsored Enterprises	2/7/2008	2007/08	Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs
110973	Oversight Of Hud And Its Fiscal Year 2009 Budget	3/12/2008	2007/08	Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs
110974	Turmoil In U.S. Credit Markets: Examining The Recent Actions Of Federal Financial Regulators	4/3/2008	2007/08	Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs
110975	Restoring The American Dream: Solutions To Predatory Lending And The Foreclosure Crisis	4/7/2008	2007/08	Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs
110976	Turmoil In U.S. Credit Markets: Examining Proposals To Mitigate Foreclosures And Restore Liquidity To The Mortgage Markets	4/10/2008	2007/08	Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs
110978	Turmoil In U.S. Credit Markets: Examining Proposals To Mitigate Foreclosures And Restore Liquidity To The Mortgage Markets	4/16/2008	2007/08	Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs
110981	The More You Know, The Better Buyer You Become: Financial Literacy For Today's	5/1/2008	2007/08	Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban

	Homebuyers			Affairs
111006	Loan Modifications For Mortgage Services	2/24/2009	2009/10	Committee on Financial Services
111011	Mortgage Lending Reform: A Comprehensive Review Of The American Mortgage System	3/11/2009	2009/10	Committee on Financial Services
111016	Examining The Making Home Affordable Program, 111-16	3/19/2009	2009/10	Committee on Financial Services
111023	The Housing Crisis In Los Angeles And Responses To Preventing Foreclosures And Foreclosure Rescue Fraud, 111-23	3/28/2009	2009/10	Committee on Financial Services
111025	H.R. 1728, The Mortgage Reform And Anti-Predatory Lending Act Of 2009	4/23/2009	2009/10	Committee on Financial Services
111028	Legislative Solutions For Preventing Loan Modification And Foreclosure Rescue Fraud, 111-28	5/6/2009	2009/10	Committee on Financial Services
111030	The Role Of Neighborworks And Housing Counseling Intermediaries In Preventing Foreclosures; 111-30	5/7/2009	2009/10	Committee on Financial Services
111038	The Present Condition And Future Status Of Fannie Mae And Freddie Mac	6/3/2009	2009/10	Committee on Financial Services
111046	Strengthening Oversight And Preventing Fraud In FHA And Other HUD Programs, 111-46	6/18/2009	2009/10	Committee on Financial Services
111051	Legislative Options For Preserving Federally- And State-Assisted Affordable Housing And Preventing Displacement Of Low-Income, Elderly And Disabled Tenants, 111-51	6/25/2009	2009/10	Committee on Financial Services
111052	The Homeowners' Insurance Crisis: Solutions For Homeowners, Communities, And Taxpayers", 111-52	7/2/2009	2009/10	Committee on Financial Services
111058	Banking Industry Perspectives On The Obama Administration's Financial Regulatory Reform Proposals	7/15/2009	2009/10	Committee on Financial Services
111061	Community And Consumer Advocates' Perspectives On The Obama Administration's Financial Regulatory Reform Proposals	7/16/2009	2009/10	Committee on Financial Services
111072	Progress Of The Making Home Affordable Program: What Are The Outcomes For Homeowners And What Are The Obstacles To Success?, 111-72	9/9/2009	2009/10	Committee on Financial Services
111091	Fy09 Fha Actuarial Report, 111-91	12/2/2009	2009/10	Committee on Financial Services
111096	H.R. 476, The Housing Fairness Act Of 2009, 111-96	1/20/2010	2009/10	Committee on Financial Services
111097	The Future Of The Federal Housing Administration's Capital Reserves: Assumptions, Predictions And Implications For Homebuyers, 111-87	1/21/2010	2009/10	Committee on Financial Services
111099	The Impact Of The Foreclosure Crisis On Public And Affordable Housing In The Twin Cities, 111-99	1/23/2010	2009/10	Committee on Financial Services

111110	The FHA Reform Act Of 2010, 111-110	3/11/2010	2009/10	Committee on Financial Services
111113	The Administration's Proposal To Revitalize Severely Distressed Public And Assisted Housing: The Choice Neighborhoods Initiative, 111-113	3/17/2010	2009/10	Committee on Financial Services
111115	Housing Finance--What Should The New System Be Able To Do?: Part I-- Government And Stakeholder Perspectives	3/23/2010	2009/10	Committee on Financial Services
111120	Second Liens And Other Barriers To Principal Reduction As An Effective Foreclosure Mitigation Program	4/13/2010	2009/10	Committee on Financial Services
111121	Housing Finance-What Should The New System Be Able To Do?: Part II-Government And Stakeholder Perspectives, 111-121	4/14/2010	2009/10	Committee on Financial Services
111122	The Recently Announced Revisions To The Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP), 111-122	4/14/2010	2009/10	Committee on Financial Services
111164	The Future Of Housing Finance-A Review Of Proposals To Address Market Structure And Transition, 111-164	9/29/2010	2009/10	Committee on Financial Services
111166	Signing, Chain Of Title, Loss Mitigation And Other Issues In Mortgage Servicing, 111-166	11/18/2010	2009/10	Committee on Financial Services
111260	The Effects Of The Economic Crisis On Community Banks And Credit Unions In Rural Communities	7/8/2009	2009/10	Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs
111317	Preserving Home Ownership: Progress Needed To Prevent Foreclosures	7/16/2009	2009/10	Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs
111397	Securitization Of Assets: Problems And Solutions	10/7/2009	2009/10	Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs
111435	The Future Of The Mortgage Market And The Housing Enterprises	10/8/2009	2009/10	Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs
111473	The State Of The Nation's Housing Market	10/20/2009	2009/10	Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs
111987	Problems In Mortgage Servicing From Modification To Foreclosure	11/16/2010	2009/10	Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs
112002	Gse Reform: Immediate Steps To Protect Taxpayers And End The Bailout	2/9/2011	2011/12	Committee on Financial Services
112004	An Analysis Of The Post-Conservatorship Legal Expenses Of Fannie Mae And Freddie Mac	2/15/2011	2011/12	Committee on Financial Services
112007	Are There Government Barriers To The Housing Market Recovery?	2/16/2011	2011/12	Committee on Financial Services
112013	Legislative Proposals To End Taxpayer Funding For Ineffective Foreclosure Mitigation Programs	3/2/2011	2011/12	Committee on Financial Services
112024	The State Of The Housing Market	3/9/2011	2011/12	Committee on Banking,

				Housing, and Urban Affairs
112032	Legislative Proposals To Determine The Future Role Of Fha, Rhs, And Gnma In The Single- And Multi-Family Mortgage Markets	5/25/2011	2011/12	Committee on Financial Services
112044	Mortgage Servicing: An Examination Of The Role Of Federal Regulators In Settlement Negotiations And The Future Of Mortgage Servicing Standards	7/7/2011	2011/12	Committee on Financial Services
112047	Mortgage Origination: The Impact Of Recent Changes On Homeowners And Businesses	7/13/2011	2011/12	Committee on Financial Services
112050	Public Proposals For The Future Of The Housing Finance System	3/29/2011	2011/12	Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs
112056	Facilitating Continued Investor Demand In The U.S. Mortgage Market Without A Government Guarantee	9/7/2011	2011/12	Committee on Financial Services
112057	Legislative Proposals To Determine The Future Role Of Fha, Rhs, And Gnma In The Single- And Multi-Family Mortgage Markets, Part 2	9/8/2011	2011/12	Committee on Financial Services
112069	The Obama Administration's Response To The Housing Crisis	10/6/2011	2011/12	Committee on Financial Services
112082	The Private Mortgage Market Investment Act, Part 1	11/3/2011	2011/12	Committee on Financial Services
112087	Perspectives On The Health Of The Fha Single-Family Insurance Fund	12/1/2011	2011/12	Committee on Financial Services
112091	II, The Private Mortgage Market Investment Act, Part 2	12/7/2011	2011/12	Committee on Financial Services
112107	An Examination Of Potential Private Sector Solutions To Mitigate Foreclosures In Nevada	3/15/2012	2011/12	Committee on Financial Services
112134	Oversight Of The Federal Housing Administration's Multifamily Insurance Programs	6/7/2012	2011/12	Committee on Financial Services
112138	Mortgage Disclosures: How Do We Cut Red Tape For Consumers And Small Businesses?	6/20/2012	2011/12	Committee on Financial Services
112139	The Need For National Mortgage Servicing Standards	5/12/2011	2011/12	Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs
112144	The Impact Of Dodd-Frank's Home Mortgage Reforms: Consumer And Market Perspectives	7/11/2012	2011/12	Committee on Financial Services
112245	Housing Finance Reform: Access To The Secondary Market For Small Financial Institutions	6/28/2011	2011/12	Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs
112318	New Ideas To Address The Glut Of Foreclosed Properties	9/20/2011	2011/12	Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs
112325	Housing Finance Reform: National Mortgage Servicing Standards	8/2/2011	2011/12	Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs
112339	Housing Finance Reform: Continuation Of The 30-Year Fixed-Rate Mortgage	10/20/2011	2011/12	Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs

				Affairs
112382	New Ideas For Refinancing And Restructuring Mortgage Loans	9/14/2011	2011/12	Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs
112460	Helping Homeowners Harmed By Foreclosures: Ensuring Accountability And Transparency In Foreclosure Reviews	12/13/2011	2011/12	Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs
112461	Saving Our Neighborhoods From Foreclosures	2/10/2012	2011/12	Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs
112468	State Of The Housing Market: Removing Barriers To Economic Recovery	2/9/2012	2011/12	Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs
112571	Strengthening The Housing Market And Minimizing Losses To Taxpayers	3/15/2012	2011/12	Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs
112666	Helping Responsible Homeowners Save Money Through Refinancing	4/25/2012	2011/12	Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs
112677	Expanding Refinancing Opportunities To Improve The Housing Market	5/8/2012	2011/12	Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs
113001	Examining The Proper Role Of The Federal Housing Administration In Our Mortgage Insurance Market	2/6/2013	2013/14	Committee on Financial Services
113005	Fannie Mae And Freddie Mac: How Government Housing Policy Failed Homeowners And Taxpayers And Led To The Financial Crisis	3/6/2013	2013/14	Committee on Financial Services
113006	Mortgage Insurance: Comparing Private Sector And Government-Subsidized Approaches	3/13/2013	2013/14	Committee on Financial Services
113008	Addressing Fha's Financial Condition And Program Challenges--Part Ii	2/28/2013	2013/14	Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs
113010	Sustainable Housing Finance: Perspectives On Reforming The Fha	4/10/2013	2013/14	Committee on Financial Services
113014	Helping Homeowners Harmed By Foreclosures: Ensuring Accountability And Transparency In Foreclosure Reviews	4/17/2013	2013/14	Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs
113015	Oversight Of Federal Housing Finance Agency: Evaluating Fhfa As Regulator And Conservator	4/18/2013	2013/14	Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs
113016	Building A Sustainable Housing Finance System: Examining Regulatory Impediments To Private Investment Capital	4/24/2013	2013/14	Committee on Financial Services
113020	Bipartisan Solutions For Housing Finance Reform?	3/19/2013	2013/14	Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs
113021	Sustainable Housing Finance: The Government's Role In Multifamily And Health Care Facilities Mortgage Insurance And Reverse	5/16/2013	2013/14	Committee on Financial Services

	Mortgages			
113022	Qualified Mortgages: Examining The Impact Of The Ability To Repay Rule	5/21/2013	2013/14	Committee on Financial Services
113028	Beyond Gses: Examples Of Successful Housing Finance Models Without Explicit Government Guarantees	6/12/2013	2013/14	Committee on Financial Services
113032	Examining How The Dodd-Frank Act Hampers Home Ownership	6/18/2013	2013/14	Committee on Financial Services
113035	Returning Private Capital To Mortgage Markets: A Fundamental For Housing Finance Reform	5/14/2013	2013/14	Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs
113058	How Prospective And Current Homeowners Will Be Harmed By The Cfpb's Qualified Mortgage Rule	1/14/2014	2013/14	Committee on Financial Services
113061	Long-Term Sustainability For Reverse Mortgages: Hecm's Impact On The Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund	6/18/2013	2013/14	Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs
113146	Housing Finance Reform: Essentials Of A Functioning Housing Finance System For Consumers	10/29/2013	2013/14	Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs
113159	Housing Finance Reform: Essential Elements Of The Multifamily Housing Finance System	10/9/2013	2013/14	Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs
113175	Housing Finance Reform: Essential Elements To Provide Affordable Options For Housing	11/7/2013	2013/14	Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs
113577	Inequality, Opportunity, And The Housing Market	12/9/2014	2013/14	Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs

Agriculture Public Hearings

Number	Title	Date	Legislature	Committee
109-454	Review The Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement: Potential Impacts On The Agriculture And Food Sectors	7-Jun-05	109	Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry
109-622	Review The Implementation Of The Peanut Provisions Of The Farm Security And Rural Investment Act Of 2002	2-May-06	109	Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry
109-625	Review The Implementation Of The Sugar Provisions Of The Farm Security And Rural Investment Act Of 2002	10-May-06	109	Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry
110-1	Review The 2007 Farm Bill Proposals Of The U.S. Department Of Agriculture	14-Feb-07	110	Committee on Agriculture
110-2	Review The Proposals Of The United States Department Of Agriculture For The 2007 Farm Bill With Respect To Specialty Crops And Organic Agriculture	28-Feb-07	110	Committee on Agriculture
110-05	Review The Federal Food Stamp Program And Its	13-Mar-	110	Committee on

	Impact On Children's Health	07		Agriculture
110-6	Review U.S. Department Of Agriculture Rural Development Programs And The Agency's Rural Development Proposal For The 2007 Farm Bill	21-Mar-07	110	Committee on Agriculture
110-9	Review The Proposals To Amend The Program Crop Provisions Of The Farm Security And Rural Investment Act Of 2002	28-Mar-07	110	Committee on Agriculture
110-14	Review Proposals To Amend The Program Crop Provisions Of The Farm Security And Rural Investment Act Of 2002	26-Apr-07	110	Committee on Agriculture
110-21	Review Food Aid And Agriculture Trade Programs Operated By The U.S. Department Of Agriculture And The U.S. Agency For International Development	10-May-07	110	Committee on Agriculture
110-23	Review Of The Industry Response To The Safety Of Fresh And Fresh-Cut Produce	15-May-07	110	Committee on Agriculture
110-33	Review Disaster Conditions Across The United States	25-Oct-07	110	Committee on Agriculture
110-37	Review The Source Of Dramatic Movements In The Commodity Markets (Agriculture And Energy): A Change In Market Fundamentals Or Influence Of Institutional Investors?	15-May-08	110	Committee on Agriculture
110-40	Review Legislation Amending The Commodity Exchange Act	July 9, 2008; July 10, 2008; July 11, 2008	110	Committee on Agriculture
110-41	Review Efforts To Deliver International Food Aid And Provide Foreign Agricultural Development Assistance	16-Jul-08	110	Committee on Agriculture
110-45	Examining The Performance Of U.S. Trade And Food Aid Programs For The 2007 Farm Bill	21-Mar-07	110	Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry
110-125	Economic Challenges And Opportunities Facing American Agricultural Producers Today	18-Apr-07	110	Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry
110-156	Farm Bill Policy Proposals Relating To Farm And Rural Energy Issues And Rural Development	9-May-07	110	Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry
110-04	Review Of The Impact Of Feed Costs On The Livestock Industry	8-Mar-07	110	Committee on Agriculture
110-10	Review The Market Structure Of The Livestock Industry	17-Apr-07	110	Committee on Agriculture
110-12	Review Usda Farm Bill Conservation	19-Apr-07	110	Committee on Agriculture
110-13	Review The Federal Milk Marketing Rulemaking Procedures	24-Apr-07	110	Committee on Agriculture
110-155	Conservation Policy Recommendations For The Farm Bill	1-May-07	110	Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry

111-1	Review Derivatives Legislation	February 3, 2009; February 4, 2009	111	Committee on Agriculture
111-7	Review The State Of The Farm Economy	1-Apr-09	111	Committee on Agriculture
111-18	Review Rural Development Programs Operated By The U.S. Department Of Agriculture And Status Of American Recovery And Reinvestment Act Funds For These Programs	10-Jun-09	111	Committee on Agriculture
111-21	Review Implementation Of The Food, Conservation, And Energy Act Of 2008	June 24, 2009; June 25, 2009	111	Committee on Agriculture
111-25	Review Current Issues In Food Safety	16-Jul-09	111	Committee on Agriculture
111-30	Review The Implementation Of The Research Title Of The 2008 Farm Bill	30-Sep-09	111	Committee on Agriculture
111-31	Review The Implementation Of The Conservation Title Of The 2008 Farm Bill	7-Oct-09	111	Committee on Agriculture
111-32	Examine The U.S. Department Of Agriculture's Rural Business Programs And To Review Current Conditions For Rural Entrepreneurship And Business Development	21-Oct-09	111	Committee on Agriculture
111-34	Review Implementation Of The Horticulture And Organic Agriculture Title Of The Food, Conservation, And Energy Act Of 2008	28-Oct-09	111	Committee on Agriculture
111-38	Review The Potential Economic Impacts Of Climate Change On The Farm Sector	2-Dec-09	111	Committee on Agriculture
111-42	Review Implementation Of Changes To The Commodity Exchange Act Contained In The 2008 Farm Bill	3-Mar-10	111	Committee on Agriculture
111-44	Review U.S. Agricultural Sales To Cuba	11-Mar-10	111	Committee on Agriculture
111-46	Review Access To Healthy Foods For Beneficiaries Of Federal Nutrition Programs And Explore Innovative Methods To Improve Availability	14-Apr-10	111	Committee on Agriculture
111-48	Review U.S. Agriculture Policy In Advance Of The 2012 Farm Bill	October 13, 2009; April 30, 2010; May 1, 2010; May 3, 2010; May 4, 2010; May 14, 2010; May 15, 2010; May 17, 2010; May	111	Committee on Agriculture

		18, 2010; June 28, 2010		
111-51	Review The Implementation Of The 2008 Farm Bill Energy Title	9-Jun-10	111	Committee on Agriculture
111-52	Review U.S. Farm Safety Net Programs In Advance Of The 2012 Farm Bill	June 17, 2010; June 24, 2010	111	Committee on Agriculture
111-55	Review Rural Development Programs In Advance Of The 2012 Farm Bill	20-Jul-10	111	Committee on Agriculture
111-57	Review Specialty Crop And Organic Agriculture Programs In Advance Of The 2012 Farm Bill	21-Jul-10	111	Committee on Agriculture
111-1025	Empowering Rural Communities, The Status And Future Of The Farm Bill's Energy And Rural Development Programs	21-Jul-10	111	Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry
111-1026	Promoting Agricultural Exports: Reviewing U.S. Agricultural Trade Policy And The Farm Bill's Trade Title	4-Aug-10	111	Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry
111-24	Review Economic Conditions Facing The Dairy Industry	July 14, 2009; July 21, 2009; July 28, 2009	111	Committee on Agriculture
111-41	Review Federal Nutrition Programs	25-Jan-10	111	Committee on Agriculture
111-47	Review Dairy Policy	20-Apr-10	111	Committee on Agriculture
111-56	Review Livestock And Related Programs At Usda In Advance Of The 2012 Farm Bill	20-Jul-10	111	Committee on Agriculture
112-4	Review The State Of The Farm Economy	17-Feb-11	112	Committee on Agriculture
112-9	Review Market Promotion Programs And Their Effectiveness On Expanding Exports Of U.S. Agricultural Products	7-Apr-11	112	Committee on Agriculture
112-26	At Risk: American Jobs, Agriculture, Health And Species—The Costs Of Federal Regulatory Dysfunction	3-May-11	112	Committee on Agriculture
112-16	Review Pending Free Trade Agreements	12-May- 11	112	Committee on Agriculture
112-30	The Future Of U.S. Farm Policy: Formulation Of The 2012 Farm Bill	March 9, 2012; March 23, 2012; March 30, 2012; April 20, 2012; May 14, 2012; May 20, 2012	112	Committee on Agriculture

112-281	Farm Bill Accountability: The Importance Of Measuring Performance, While Eliminating Duplication And Waste	23-Jun-11	112	Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry
112-286	Opportunities For Specialty Crops And Organics In The Farm Bill	28-Jul-11	112	Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry
112-691	Strengthening Conservation Through The 2012 Farm Bill	28-Feb-12	112	Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry
112-693	Risk Management And Commodities In The 2012 Farm Bill	15-Mar-12	112	Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry
112-8	Review The State Of The Beef Industry	6-Apr-11	112	Committee on Agriculture
112-11	Review The State Of The Poultry Industry	13-Apr-11	112	Committee on Agriculture
112-14	Review The State Of The Pork Industry	4-May-11	112	Committee on Agriculture
112-23	Examine The Issue Of Feed Availability And Its Effect On The Livestock And Poultry Industries	14-Sep-11	112	Committee on Agriculture
113-4	Review Horticulture Priorities For The 2013 Farm Bill	24-Apr-13	113	Committee on Agriculture
113-17	Implementing The Agricultural Act Of 2014: Commodity Policy And Crop Insurance	10-Jul-14	113	Committee on Agriculture
113-245	Drought, Fire, And Freeze: The Economics Of Disasters For America's Agricultural Producers	14-Feb-13	113	Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry
113-558	2014 Farm Bill: Implementation And Next Steps	7-May-14	113	Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry
113-13	Review The State Of The Livestock Industry	30-Apr-14	113	Committee on Agriculture, Committee on Appropriations
113-366	Meeting The Challenges Of Feeding America's School Children	23-Jul-14	113	Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry

APPENDIX B

SOCIO-METRIC SURVEY

A. Mortgage Policy Network Survey

You do not have to answer any question that makes them feel uncomfortable answering, and they may also stop their participation at any time.

1. Enter your organization's name:

2. Enter your job title:

3. Regarding the policy-making process in Congress:

Who do you engage in policy discussions with?					
<i>Organization</i>	<i>Never</i>	<i>In few proposals</i>	<i>In half the proposals</i>	<i>In most proposals</i>	<i>Always</i>
Mortgage Bankers Association	0	2	4	6	8
National Association of Realtors	0	2	4	6	8
Center for Responsible Lending	0	2	4	6	8
National Council of La Raza	0	2	4	6	8
National Association of Home Builders	0	2	4	6	8
National Association of Mortgage Brokers	0	2	4	6	8
National Consumer Law Center	0	2	4	6	8
National Community Reinvestment Coalition	0	2	4	6	8
American Bankers Association	0	2	4	6	8
American Securitization Forum	0	2	4	6	8
Fannie Mae	0	2	4	6	8
Wells Fargo	0	2	4	6	8
Bank of America	0	2	4	6	8
Conference of State Bank Supervisors	0	2	4	6	8
Independent Community Bankers of America	0	2	4	6	8
Freddie Mac	0	2	4	6	8
National Low Income Housing Coalition	0	2	4	6	8
Consumer Federation of America	0	2	4	6	8
Hope Now Alliance	0	2	4	6	8

Who do you collaborate with?					
<i>Organization</i>	<i>Never</i>	<i>In few proposals</i>	<i>In half the proposals</i>	<i>In most proposals</i>	<i>Always</i>
Mortgage Bankers Association	Grey	Yellow	Orange	Light Green	Dark Green
National Association of Realtors	Grey	Yellow	Orange	Light Green	Dark Green
Center for Responsible Lending	Grey	Yellow	Orange	Light Green	Dark Green
National Council of La Raza	Grey	Yellow	Orange	Light Green	Dark Green
National Association of Home Builders	Grey	Yellow	Orange	Light Green	Dark Green
National Association of Mortgage Brokers	Grey	Yellow	Orange	Light Green	Dark Green

National Consumer Law Center	Grey	Yellow	Orange	Light Green	Dark Green
National Community Reinvestment Coalition	Grey	Yellow	Orange	Light Green	Dark Green
American Bankers Association	Grey	Yellow	Orange	Light Green	Dark Green
American Securitization Forum	Grey	Yellow	Orange	Light Green	Dark Green
Fannie Mae	Grey	Yellow	Orange	Light Green	Dark Green
Wells Fargo	Grey	Yellow	Orange	Light Green	Dark Green
Bank of America	Grey	Yellow	Orange	Light Green	Dark Green
Conference of State Bank Supervisors	Grey	Yellow	Orange	Light Green	Dark Green
Independent Community Bankers of America	Grey	Yellow	Orange	Light Green	Dark Green
Freddie Mac	Grey	Yellow	Orange	Light Green	Dark Green
National Low Income Housing Coalition	Grey	Yellow	Orange	Light Green	Dark Green
Consumer Federation of America	Grey	Yellow	Orange	Light Green	Dark Green
Hope Now Alliance	Grey	Yellow	Orange	Light Green	Dark Green

4. Regarding your relations with stakeholders in Congress' policy-making:

How often do you share information with?					
<i>Organization</i>	<i>Never</i>	<i>Annually</i>	<i>Semiannually</i>	<i>Monthly</i>	<i>Weekly</i>
Mortgage Bankers Association	0	2	4	6	8
National Association of Realtors	0	2	4	6	8
Center for Responsible Lending	0	2	4	6	8
National Council of La Raza	0	2	4	6	8
National Association of Home Builders	0	2	4	6	8
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National Consumer Law Center	0	2	4	6	8
National Community Reinvestment Coalition	0	2	4	6	8
American Bankers Association	0	2	4	6	8
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Wells Fargo	0	2	4	6	8
Bank of America	0	2	4	6	8
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Independent Community Bankers of America	0	2	4	6	8
Freddie Mac	0	2	4	6	8
National Low Income Housing Coalition	0	2	4	6	8
Consumer Federation of America	0	2	4	6	8
Hope Now Alliance	0	2	4	6	8

How often do you ask for advice with?					
<i>Organization</i>	<i>Never</i>	<i>Annually</i>	<i>Semiannually</i>	<i>Monthly</i>	<i>Weekly</i>
Mortgage Bankers Association	Grey	Yellow	Orange	Light Green	Dark Green
National Association of Realtors	Grey	Yellow	Orange	Light Green	Dark Green
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Hope Now Alliance	Grey	Yellow	Orange	Light Green	Dark Green

5. Please list other organizations that influence these committees.

B. Agriculture Policy Network Survey

You do not have to answer any question that makes them feel uncomfortable answering, and they may also stop their participation at any time.

1. Enter your organization's name:

2. Enter your job title:

3. Regarding the policy-making process in Congress:

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National Farmers Union	0	2	4	6	8
American Farm Bureau Federation	0	2	4	6	8
National Corn Growers Association	0	2	4	6	8
National Cattleman's Beef Association	0	2	4	6	8
American Soybean Association	0	2	4	6	8
National Association of Wheat Growers	0	2	4	6	8
National Pork Producers Council	0	2	4	6	8
National Chicken Council	0	2	4	6	8
National Cotton Council	0	2	4	6	8
National Grain and Feed Association	0	2	4	6	8
National Milk Producers Federation	0	2	4	6	8
USA Rice Federation	0	2	4	6	8
American Cotton Shippers Association	0	2	4	6	8
International Dairy Foods Association	0	2	4	6	8
National Council of Farmer Cooperatives	0	2	4	6	8
National Turkey Federation	0	2	4	6	8
USA Dry Pea & Lentil Council	0	2	4	6	8

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National Association of Wheat Growers	0	2	4	6	8
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National Chicken Council	0	2	4	6	8
National Cotton Council	0	2	4	6	8
National Grain and Feed Association	0	2	4	6	8
National Milk Producers Federation	0	2	4	6	8
USA Rice Federation	0	2	4	6	8

American Cotton Shippers Association	0	2	4	6	8
International Dairy Foods Association	0	2	4	6	8
National Council of Farmer Cooperatives	0	2	4	6	8
National Turkey Federation	0	2	4	6	8
USA Dry Pea & Lentil Council	0	2	4	6	8

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American Soybean Association	0	2	4	6	8
National Association of Wheat Growers	0	2	4	6	8
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National Chicken Council	0	2	4	6	8
National Cotton Council	0	2	4	6	8
National Grain and Feed Association	0	2	4	6	8
National Milk Producers Federation	0	2	4	6	8
USA Rice Federation	0	2	4	6	8
American Cotton Shippers Association	0	2	4	6	8
International Dairy Foods Association	0	2	4	6	8
National Council of Farmer Cooperatives	0	2	4	6	8
National Turkey Federation	0	2	4	6	8
USA Dry Pea & Lentil Council	0	2	4	6	8

How often do you ask for advice with?					
<i>Organization</i>	<i>Never</i>	<i>Annually</i>	<i>Semiannually</i>	<i>Monthly</i>	<i>Weekly</i>
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National Turkey Federation	Grey	Yellow	Orange	Light Green	Dark Green
USA Dry Pea & Lentil Council	Grey	Yellow	Orange	Light Green	Dark Green

5. Please list other organizations that influence these committees.

APPENDIX C

INTERVIEWS QUESTIONS

Questions for the Committees related to the Agriculture Policy:

1. In your opinion, the stakeholders presented in this list know each other, and they are even friends, or they are strangers that just greet each other during public hearings?
2. In your opinion, these stakeholders who participate in public hearings are only witnesses, or they participate more actively on the policy decision making process?
3. Do you think that their participation contribute to the process, bringing important information and facilitating decision?
4. Do you think these stakeholders are able to block legislation approval through congressmen?
5. In your opinion, Republicans and Democrats only need to obtain majority in order to approving important legislation, or the alignment between them and the interests of these stakeholders is also fundamental?
6. Do you think that a dispute between Midwest corn and soybeans versus Southern rice and wheat farmers can block legislation? And about a dispute between nutrition programs and agriculture subsidies?